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The rapidly diminishing numbers of defense dollars and
the even more rapid shrinkage in their purchasing power are
forcing extensive re-examination of defense appropriations
in the United States and other North Atlantic Alliance
countries. Politicians within the governments of all the
member nations are discussing the possibilities of reducing
budgetary outlays for armed forces personnel and weapons systems,
Until recently, most of these conversations centered around
land-based forces, especially those forces stationed in other
countries. With the exception of the Strategic Arms Limita-
tion Talks, few defense limitation proposals have addressed
directly maritime forces. The time is coming, nevertheless,
when this will change, perhaps in the very near future.
It is necessary, therefore, to examine carefully all of
the options available to a government in considering future
maritime arms control measures. This must be done now for
two reasons. First, the United States and her allies might
as well try, through the negotiation process with the Warsaw
Pact members, to obtain some sort of mutual restraints in
reciprocation for what the former intend to do sooner or
later, anyway. In the second place, the NATO members should,
while they have the time and are not yet squeezed by extreme
monetary or political pressures, thoroughly examine every
aspect and facet of this problem to insure a full understand-
ing of the situation and. the possible results of any courses
i

of action taken. Then when it becomes necessary to negotiate
with potential adversaries, the allies will be ready to bar-
gain effectively to achieve optimum results.
This essay reviews recent maritime arms control agree-
ments, accords, and attempts in light of their applicability
to present circumstances. Other arms endeavors which might
have an indirect application are also discussed. The present
maritime forces of the NATO and Warsaw Treaty Organization
members are assessed, as are their relative strengths and
weal-messes. Next, the various ways of considering a maritime
arms agreement are examined, as are the problems associated
with each method of constructing an agreement. Finally, the
relative merits of each proposal are considered and conclu-
sions are drawn about the factors needed in calculating an
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A recent article in The Washington Post indicated that the
1976 United States defense budget is some $8 billion over the
1975 request, and weighs in at $92.8 billion. The article
underscores the difficult battle expected in Congress over the
large defense requests. The Secretary of Defense, in his re-
port to the Congress argues that for the past few years, the
Soviet Union has outspent the United States by large amounts
(in real terms) and that
this trend could soon tilt the balance of world
power against the United States and its allies.-
This is not the first statement on the growing sentiment in the
Congress to limit and preferably to reduce the defense expendi-
tures of this country. Nor will it be the last. That these
expenses are a smaller part of the gross national product than
any time before in recent history seems unimportant. (Present
and proposed defense spending are 5.9 percent of the GNP.
1968 Vietnam-era defense spending peaked at 9.5 percent of the
GNP. ) Total dollar amounts of the defense budget are rising
and this figure draws most of the Congressional attention. Re-
gardless of its value in "real dollars" or "constant dollars,"
this total defense expenditure proposal seems in for heavy
1 Michael Getler, "Soviet Arms Restraint Urged," The Washing-
ton Post
.
February 12, 1975, PP. A1 , A10.
2Getler, "Soviet Arms Restraint Urged," p. A10.
^"More for Defense," Newsweek . Vol. 85, No. 6, February
10, 1975, P. 17.
- 1 -

trimming in this Congress.
Unless there is some presently unforeseen international
calamity involving United States military forces, there seem
to be few possibilities for the Congress (and the general
population) not to demand reduced expenditures and smaller
portions of the GNP for the Department of Defense. Much has
been and is being written on this subject by experts both in
and out of the federal government. It is not the intention
here to expand upon these arguments. Rather, it is the opinion
of this writer that the economic squeeze presently gripping
the United States and her allies will not soon be loosened.
And until it is loosened or, until a military situation demand-
ing the use of American forces occurs, this country and her
allies will be increasingly unwilling to accept defense spend-
ing perceived as excessive. Whether or not 5.9 percent of the
GNP is an excessive amount in fact is relatively unimportant.
The total dollar amount is perceived as too much and, there-
fore, must be reduced in one manner or another.
This paper is based on the assumption that costs for
personnel, weapons systems and platforms, and operational
commitments for the maritime forces of the United States and
her allies are not going to fall in the near future. In fact,
inflationary costs for naval and merchant ship building and
maintenance are rising at a startling rate. The platform
^For example, in the FY 1976 budget, the U.S. Navy is
asking for a $2.39 billion increase in shipbuilding costs alone*
up from S3. 06 billion in FY 1975 to its present cost of $5.k5
billion (a k3% increase). See Alan Jarvis, "Navy Aims for
Fewer, Better Ships," Navy Times « February 19, 1975, p. 56.

costs do not, in many cases, include the expenses of the hard-
ware put onto the hulls once they are built. This applies to
naval and civilian ships. The former have complex communica-
tion and weapons systems, while the latter have complicated
automated systems for sailing, off- and on-loading, and manning
the ships. But suffice to say, costs of ships, especially
naval ships, are increasing rapidly.
It follows, then, that the navies of America and her
allies must shortly reach a point beyond which they can no
longer stretch themselves thinner and thinner to meet the
multiple commitments of their governments and their alliances.
At this juncture governments (and the United States government
in particular) have three choices. They can reduce their
international naval commitments. They can increase their
navies to meet the commitments. They can attempt to alleviate
or lessen the threats which generated these individual and
alliance commitments in the first place. The reduction of
commitments by the United States seems an unlikely prospect,
although that might be the most sensible solution to the
problem. (This, in effect, has been the British solution.)
Be that as it may, this government, through its Executive and
Legislative branches, seems unwilling to re-examine its inter-
national commitments carefully and thoughtfully with an eye
to realigning them with present military and naval capabili-
ties. The second choice, increasing maritime forces to meet
present commitments, seems highly unlikely for the reasons
already mentioned. This brings up the third choice in trying
to narrow the gap between capabilities and commitments. The

if.
third solution is the basis for this paper. Reducing the per-
ceived threat and thus lessening the need for large naval
forces seems a highly likely and perhaps desirable course for
the government to take, especially in the present atmosphere
of detente. Mutual arms controls, restraints, and reductions
attempts are the paths to these lessened threat perceptions.
It seems then, that future maritime arms control con-
siderations should be examined as a possible area of fruitful
negotiations between the United States and her allies, and
among the allies and their potential adversaries. These
avenues of possible negotiation will be viewed in the light of
recent history, the present forces, and the various methods of
constructing maritime arms agreements. The perceptions of the
situation are obviously predominantly those of an American, but
the allied and adversary positions are also included for balance
and proper perspective of the total picture. The conclusions
are by no means definitive, nor are they meant to be so.
Rather, they are proposals designed to generate some discussion
and thought regarding maritime arms control because little
attention has been devoted to this subject since World War II.
What little has been written on the subject has been based, in
most instances, on faulty information, incomplete grasp of the
complexities of naval forces and their effective utilization,
or over-simplified views of the world situation, especially
the geographic area of interest to the North Atlantic Alliance
and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. It would seem that a dis-
cussion of this situation, before it becomes a dominant issue,
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would be both prudent and necessary. Prudent because time is
needed to examine the problem carefully and thoroughly before
being confronted with the need to make firm decisions.
Necessary because this complex issue should not be treated in
haste or with superficiality.
These then are the reasons for this paper. Maritime arms
control considerations are coming, perhaps within a decade or
so. They are based on economic considerations and the thought
that negotiating mutual constraints are more beneficial than
proceeding with unilateral reductions which have no correspond-
ing restraints on the opponents' forces. Allied maritime
forces exist in large measure because of these perceived
threats. Therefore, the lessening of these adversary forces
should make more acceptable the reductions of allied capabili-
ties. The possible ways of examining future maritime arms
control considerations are the subject of this paper.
Chapter I reviews selected arms control agreements prior
to World War II, with emphasis on the methods used to determine
the formulae for reductions and navies to be involved. It
touches on the reasons for the agreements, as well as the lack
of accords in some instances. The second chapter follows this
same line, concentrating on post-World War II maritime arms
efforts. This period was much less productive in agreements
and the reasons for this are outlined and examined in some de-
tail. Certain themes can be traced in these two chapters as
they relate to the obstacles to agreements, reasons for accords,
and the difficulties surrounding these negotiations. Chapter
III reviews selected post-war arms control attempts that
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indirectly affect the maritime environment. These are discussed
because they continue the themes detected in the first two
chapters 9 and because they provide some thoughts on future
maritime arms control considerations. Chapter four diverges
from the first three in that it is contemporary rather than
historical and discusses the present maritime situation in the
North Atlantic Alliance area of interest. This chapter is
divided into two parts, with the first part assessing the
forces (their strengths and weaknesses) of the two opposing
alliances. The second part is a very brief outline of the
current Soviet naval thinking as stated by Admiral Gorshkov in
a series of articles originally published in Morskoi Sbornik
.
This second part is short, but it does provide some insight
into Soviet perceptions of the uses of the seas and ocean
force employment. Although not directly related to maritime
arms considerations, this second part impacts upon the possible
methods of arms control to be followed and the arenas in which
negotiations might be productive. After laying the groundwork
with the historical background, the assessments of the current
circumstances, and the present thinking on maritime affairs,
the last three chapters discuss the ways of considering future
maritime arms control agreements, the advantages and liabili-




SELECTED ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS PRIOR TO WORLD
WAR II AFFECTING MARITIME FORCES
They shall beat their swords into plowshares,
and their spears into pruning-hooks; nation
shall not lift sword against nation, neither
shall they learn war any more. Isiaih (2:4)
The notion contained in this verse has moved men of good
will to examine means and methods of achieving the goal of
"plowshares" for centuries. One of the first "new world"
proposals was An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of
Europe by William Penn, written in 1693. Penn proposed a
"general parliament" or "imperial dyet" of the sovereign
princes of Europe, meeting every two or three years to "formu-
late rules of justice" which would govern their relations with
x
one another. According to this proposal, "disarmament would
follow, and the funds generally spent on military preparedness
would be spent to better advantage." This would benefit all
by: less spilling of blood, an enhanced reputation for
Christendom in the eyes of the infidels, a great saving of
money, greater freedom of travel and commerce, a unification
of Christians against the Turkish menace, and a greater
Actually a British subject, but residing on the western
side of the Atlantic in the future country of America, William
Penn was the leader of the Quaker colony of Pennsylvania.
p
Sylvester J. Hemleben, Plans for World Peace Through Six
Centuries , The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1943,
P. if7.




friendship among the princes of Europe allowing them to "take
wives of their own choice." 4 Penn's approach emphasized a
diplomatic negotiation among the leaders of the European states
»
accepting their inequality of size, strength, and wealth.
Other writers following Penn had more ambitious propositions
which tended to alter or modify the political map of Europe
with their outlines. For example, John Bellers, a Quaker friend
of Penn, proposed a division of Europe into a league of 100
equal provinces each with "1000 soldiers or an equivalent in
ships or money for enforcement of rules and defense of the
league.""^ Bellers was followed by Charles de Saint-Pierre, who
wrote several tracts between 1712 and 1738 on perpetual peace
in Europe through a European assembly. This assembly would
construct a treaty bringing the signatories together in a
"permanent and perpetual union." "War was to be renounced as
an instrument of national policy, for a sovereign was to take
up arms only against a country which the union had declared an
c
enemy to European society." Saint-Pierre also wished to alter
the political fabric of Europe through his union which would be
governed by the rule of force and compulsory membership. Arms
control v/as important to Saint-Pierre because he asked that all
^"Hemleben, Plans for World Peace... , pp. 51~52. Penn
thought this last benefit "should be very moving to the Princes."
5
"Xhristos Zirps, "The Limitation of Naval General Purpose
Forces in Historical Perspective," unpublished thesis of the
Naval War College, Newport, R. I. , 1973, p. 5.
r
Hemleben, Plans for World Peace... , pp. 56-6^-.
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states, large or small, have the same numbers of troops in their
armies, and that these numbers be reviewed by the union semi-
7
annually.
In the latter half of the Eighteenth Century Jean Jacques
Rousseau added to Saint-Pierre's works with his Project for
Perpetual Peace , in which he advocated a federation of Europe
"with a court or parliament to arbitrate all disputes between
o
the member-states" and a federal army for enforcement if neces-
sary. Jeremy Bentham wrote also at this time about perpetual
peace, although his views on this subject were not published
until later. He advocated the establishment of a world court
and emphasized "disarmament as a requisite for international
o
peace. "^ At about the same time, Immanuel Kant published his
proposals for a perpetual peace which included the abolition of
standing armies and constitutional governments for all states
in Europe. This latter proposal embodied his assumption that
the people would be less likely to give their consent to war
than would their leaders, the princes.
The Nineteenth Century saw such expressions of the desire
for peace as the formation of the American Peace Society in
'Hemleben, Plans for World Peace... , p. 69.
^Hemleben, Plans for World Peace... , pp. 7^-79.
"Hemleben, Plans for World Peace...
, p. 83. See also,
Hans Wehberg, The Limitation of Armaments , The Carnegie En-
dowment for International Peace, Washington, 1921, translated
by Edwin H. Zeydel, p. 6.
10









, he advocated the creation of
A Congress of Nations for the establishment of
a code of international laws and other purposes
promoting the peace and happiness of mankind;
and, 2d, a Court of Nations entirely distinct
from the Congress, though organized by it, for
the purpose of arbitrating or adjudicating all
disputes referred to it by the mutual consent of
two or more contending nations. ..-,
Ladd's proposal was followed shortly by William Jay, writing
a book called War and Peace 08if2). He advocated "alliances"
(treaties) for peace with tribunals to hear complaints and ad-
1 3judicate causes. -* "Public opinion, moreover, would unite with
self-interest in preserving these treaties inviolate," thus
making war "unjust and dishonorable." Additionally the
millions now expended in our military estab-
lishments could be applied to objects directly
ministering to human convenience and happiness.
Our whole militia system, with its long train
of vices and its vexatious interruptions of
labor would be swept away...
•'James Brown Scott, "Introduction," to William Ladd, An
Essay on a Congress of Nations for the Adjustment of Inter-
national Disputes without Resort to Arms , Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, Oxford University Press, New York,
1916, p. vii. Other peace societies had been formed previously,
but Ladd's was a larger and national effort. His Essay was
originally published in 18^0.
l^Ladd, An Essay on a Congress of Nations... , p. 106. See
also, Georg Schwarzenberger, William Ladd: An Examination of
an American Proposal for an International Equity Tribunal ,
Constable and Company, Limited, London, 1935, especially
pp. 18-22.
•^William Jay, War and Peace: The Evils of the First and
a Plan for Preserving the Last . The Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, Oxford University Press, New York, 1919,
especially pp. 5*f~55.
'
fJay, War and Peace.
.
.
, p. 63 and p. 6*f.
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James Lorimer, of the University of Edinburgh, wrote The
1 5Institutes of the Law of Nations , in which he proposed an
international government, separate from national governments,
to act as "the guardian of the freedom" of the national enti-
1
6
ties. His plan included the reduction of armaments, a diffi-
cult but not impossible task even although nations could rearm
17in times of emergency.
Practical applications of these ideas were attempted in
the negotiations between John Jay and Lord Grenville in 1794,
and were actually reached in the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1818.
When Jay went to Great Britain to negotiate with Grenville, he
had originally been instructed by Alexander Hamilton and others
to explore the possibility of and to attempt to obtain an evacu-
ation of the British posts along the Canadian-United States
border "even to the extent of limiting the size of American
garrisons in those forts and a mutual limitation of armaments
1
8
on the Great Lakes." Lord Grenville rejected that particular
proposal and in no part of the final treaty was the concept
included.
1 5
^James Lorimer, The Institutes of the Law of Nations, A
Treatise of the Jural Relations of Separate Political Communi-




°Hemleben, Plans for World Peace...
, pp. 118-119.
p. 6.
17Zerps, "The Limitation of Naval General Purpose Forces...,
'"Samuel Flagg Bemis, Jay's Treaty: A Study in Commerce
and Diplomacy
. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1923, p. 122.
'^Bemis, Jay's Treaty... . See pp. 321-345 for a complete
text of the Treaty.
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The War of 1812 involved several spectacular battles on
the Great Lakes, and demonstrated "the importance of naval
control of the inland waterways, especially of the St. Lawrence
River and the Great Lakes...." Sporadic negotiations between
the British and the Americans took place during the ensuing
years, being punctuated by periodic hostile acts by the British
even while the United States was dismantling her ships. In an
attempt to stop the contemplated British build-up of forces on
the Great Lakes in 1815, the President, through the Secretary
of State, authorized the United States Minister to London to
propose to the British Government such an
arrangement respecting naval force to be kept
on the lakes by both Governments as will demon-
strate their pacific policy and secure their
peace. /The President/ is willing to confine
it on each side to a certain moderate number of
armed vessels, and the smaller the number the
more agreeable to him; or to abstain altogether
from an armed force beyond that used for revenue. p .
After two more years of negotiations, the Rush-Bagot
Agreement became effective, limiting the naval forces to four
vessels on each side "not exceeding one hundred tons burden,
and armed with one eighteen-pound cannon. ...All other armed
vessels on those lakes shall be forthwith dismantled and no
other vessel of war shall be there built or armed." Although
20Merze Tate, The United States and Armaments , Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 19^8, P. 28.
21 John B. Moore, A Digest of International Law , (Eight
Volumes), U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
1906, Vol. 1, p. 691.
22
Tate, The United States and Armaments , p. 31.
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the Agreement was threatened, during the Civil War and reinter-
preted during World War II to permit the building of naval
ships on the Great Lakes, it still stands today as a successful
example of arms control mutually acceptable and agreeable to
both parties.
Although unsuccessful in its arms control attempts, mention
must be made of the First Hague Peace Conference of 1899. The
Russian Circular Note Proposing the Program of the First
Conference included: a "non-augmentation" and eventual reduc-
tion of land and sea forces budgets; limits of new firearms to
these forces; the prohibition of the use of submarines or
torpedo-boats and rams; and the neutralization of certain rescue
23
vessels. ^ The United States government, in its instructions
to the American delegates, " commented on the non-augmentation
of land and sea budgets that
(i)n comparison with the effective forces, both
military and naval, of other nations, those of
the United States are at present so far below
the normal quota that the question of limitation
could not be profitably discussed. pc.
The State Department instructions continued by categoriz-
ing other restrictive proposals as "lacking in practicability,"
but did encourage support for those rendered helpless in battle,
23^James B. Scott, editor, Instructions to the American
Delegates to the Hague Peace Conferences and their Official
Reports , The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
Oxford University Press, New York, 1916, pp. 3~k.
4Andrew D. White, Seth Low, Stanford Newel, Captain
Alfred T. Mahan, USN, Captain William Crozier, USA.
25^Scott, Instructions to the American Delegates... , p. 7.

and the efforts of the conferees toward an extension of good
26
offices, mediation, and arbitration. No positive maritime
arms control efforts resulted from this conference, perhaps
because the leading powers were placing greater emphasis on
their naval forces and did not desire any restraints.
The Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907 adopted several
conventions pertaining to the maritime aspects of war includ-
ing: the status of enemy merchant ships at the initiation of
hostilities, the laying of automatic submarine contact mines,
bombardment by naval forces during war, restrictions to the
right of capture in ocean war, creation of an international
prize court, and rights and duties of maritime neutrals. ' The
United States, however, did not approve of all of these conven-
tions, signing only those pertaining to submarine contact mines,
naval bombardment, maritime warfare and the Geneva Convention,
capture in naval war, the prize court, and neutral rights. All
of those conventions which the United States signed may be con-
sidered maritime arms restraints in that they limited, defined,
—*
Scott, Instructions to the American Delegates...
. pp. 7-
8. For the complete text of Captain Mahan's reports concerning
the maritime questions raised at the First Conference, see
PP. 35-45. The Permanent Court of Arbitration was the most
significant result of the First Conference.
27Hemleben, Plans for World Peace... , p. 132.
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or prohibited various actions in time of war.
"
The instructions to the American delegates specifically
authorized them to submit a question concerning "the reduc-
tion or limitation of armaments," but only if "affirmative evi-
dence" indicated that the European states wished to discuss
29this matter. J The report of the American delegation included
this statement regarding restraints on arms.
The Second Conference was equally unprepared
to limit armaments, to place a restriction
upon military or naval forces, or to bind the
nations not to increase the budgets pertaining
thereto. 7q
Although the subject was eventually discussed, no commitments
were made except to urge that "Governments take up again the
serious study of that subject."
A subsequent effort was made at the International Naval
Conference in London in 1909 to delimit maritime war by com-
pleting the work of the Second Hague Conference. The declara-
tion covered blockades, contraband, convoys, and compensa-
__
^°For complete texts of the various conventions and de-
clarations and their signatories, see James B. Scott, editor,
The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907 . The
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Oxford University
Press, New York, 1915, especially pp. 141-219 for conventions
affecting maritime efforts. Interestingly the Russias signed
the maritime conventions on merchant shipping at the beginning
of hostilities, conversion of merchantmen to warships, naval
bombardment, the maritime applications of the Geneva Convention,
and neutral rights and powers in wartime.
^9scott, Instructions to the American Delegates...
,
PP. 69-85, especially pp. 70, 75, and 76.
30
^ Scott, Instructions to the American Delegates , p. 131.
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tion," and was the final attempt along these lines prior to
the First World War.
Post-World War I Disarmament Efforts
The end of the War brought renewed considerations of the
maritime war problems, but in a somewhat different light. In
the speech outlining his Fourteen Points, President Wilson
called for
Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas,
outside territorial waters, alike in peace and
war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or
in part by international action for the enforce-
ment of international covenants. „
The other allies, particularly Great Britain, objected to this
3*5
point and it was dropped at their insistence. * While not
perhaps a direct arms restraint measure, Wilson's proposal was
definitely a provision for the control of war because it dis-
allowed any special rules for the conduct of war (belligerant
or neutral rights, for example) and permitted limits to be set
only by an "international covenant," and was consistent with
his philosophy of obtaining and maintaining world peace. That
^ Conventions and Declarations between the Powers Concern-
ing War, Arbitration and Neutrality , Martinus Nijhoff, The
Hague, 1 9 1 5 j (no author or editor), (no page numbers). See
"XX Declaration of London concerning the law of naval war,
February 26, 1909."
32
^ Address of President Wilson to the Congress of the
United States, January 8, 191 8, as quoted in Ruhl J. Bartlett,
editor, The Record of American Diplomacy , Fourth Edition,
Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 196^, p. 460.
P. 23*
33^Zirps, "The Limitation of Naval General Purpose Forces...,"
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philosophy was at least acknowledged in the League Covenant,
although in very general terms and without any strong Organi-
34
zation machinery to give substance to the thought. ^
The internal politics of the United States after the War
revolved essentially around two opposing notions concerning
naval strength and use. President Wilson argued that if the
Senate did not provide its advice and consent to the League of
Nations, then the United States would have to turn to build-
•55
ing "incomparably the biggest navy in the world. "-^ In trying
to encourage Senate accession to the Versailles Treaty, Presi-
dent Wilson withdrew a naval building program from Congress,
but to no avail politically for the Treaty was not accepted.
This rejection of the Treaty and the League, coupled with re-
newed American suspicions of Great Britain, led to calls in
the United States for a renewed naval building program to put
the country on at least an equal footing with Great Britain
and, preferably, superior to "the next two" nations combined.
Meanwhile, renewed attempts to control the armaments problems
-^Articles 8 and 9 talked of the "reduction of national
armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety"
and created a Commission to advise on the attainment of this
objective. See Bartlett, The Record of American Diplomacy
,
for the full text of the Covenant of the League of Nations,
pp. I|_6l-A-70, esp. p. 462.
35^Harold and Margaret Sprout, Toward a New Order of Sea
Power , Second Edition, Princeton University Press, Princeton,
T94S7 P. 7k.
-zr
Sprout, Toward a New Order.
.
.
, pp. 75-83* "The next two"
potential rivals (enemies) were Great Britain owing to tradi-
tional feelings and her control of many of the world's major
oil sources, and Japan because of her expansion in the Pacific
and her potential threat to U.S. interests there.
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were made in the United States, Japan, and Great Britain, many
of these feelings being generated by public concern about the
37dangers of "militarism" and excessive budget demands. ' The
result of these sentiments, along with other influences, led
Senator Borah in December 1920 to propose a mutual agreement
among the three naval powers on future naval policy, specifical-
ly a 50 percent reduction in naval building for five years.
After much discussion in and out of government over the next
18 months, President Harding, having finally made his decision,
announced on July 11, 1921 a conference on the "limitation of
armament—among the Principal Allied and Associated Powers,
that is, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan" and the
TO
United States to be held in Washington.
The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922
Secretary of State Hughes in his opening statement to the
Conference on November 12, 1921, called for a "naval holiday"
for a period "not less than ten years," including the abandon-
ment of capital ship building programs, the scrapping of cer-
tain older ships, and a ratio between capital ships and auxili-
ary ships for each Power. 7 Secretary Hughes identified by
3?John C. Vinson, The Parchment Peace— The United States
Senate and, the Washington Conference , The University of Georgia
Press, Athens, Georgia, 1955, Chapter 5, especially pp. Zf6-if9.
^"Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign
Relations of the United States 1921 , Two Volumes, U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1936, Vol. 1, p. Zl\,
-^Sprout, Toward a New Order.
.
.
. See Chapter Nine for an
excellent description of the opening session and Hughes' pro-
posals, especially pp. 1^9-157. See Appendix I for a List of




type, and in some cases by name, the ships to be scrapped
(already built, being built, or being designed), and the ships
to be retained by each country. Although his proposal was
initially by numbers of ships, his overall formula for devising
the limits related to their total tonnage rather than their
numbers. For example, Secretary Hughes proposed that the
United States scrap 8^5,740 tons of ships, Great Britain scrap
583,375 tons, and Japan reduce her Navy by Zfi+8,928 tons. He
further specified the total tonnage of the remaining ships
(capital, other surface ships, and submarines), as well as re-
placement tonnage limits.
Secretary Hughes' proposals achieved initial popular
approval, but the representatives of the other four governments
involved expressed various doubts about the plan in their re-
plies a few days later. The numbers of submarines, the exact
capital ship ratios, the geographic considerations, the auxili-
ary ratio problems, and other reservations were mentioned by
each member. After much discussion, compromise and in some
cases agreement not to agree, the Washington Naval Treaty was
signed on 6 February 1922. The final accord consisted of
^ U.S. Congress, Senate, Conference on the Limitation of
Armament , Document No. 126, 6>7th Congress, 2nd Session, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1922, pp. if7—49
.
^ Capital ships were battleships and battle cruisers, also
called dreadnaughts; while other non-capital ships were cruisers,
light cruisers, flotilla leaders, and destroyers; auxiliaries
were a separate category, as were submarines. See U.S. Congress,
Senate, Conference on the Limitation of Armament , pp. k9 and
802-805 for the exact tonnages and descriptions proposed by
Secretary Hughes.




capital ships limits of 525>000 tons for the United States and
Great Britain, 175,000 tons for Italy and France, and 315,000
tons for Japan. No new capital ships to be built could exceed
35>000 tons or have more than 16 inch guns. y Aircraft carriers
were limited in total tonnage for each signatory, as well as
numbers of new construction and maximum gun armament (Articles
7-10). The numbers limits did not apply to non-capital or non-
aircraft carrier ships, but these others were limited by maxi-
mum tonnage in that they could not exceed 10,000 tons nor carry
guns in excess of 8 inches in calibre (Article 11). Interest-
ingly, the Treaty also limited what a signatory could construct
for another power whether or not the latter was a party to the
treaty (Article 15). The United States retained 18 capital
ships, Great Britain 22, and the other three 10 each. The
details as to time and method of scrapping ships were outlined,
as were replacement procedures. There were no limits on
smaller combatants or submarines by numbers or types, although
because of "possible technical and scientific developments,"
another conference was specified in eight years to consider
"what changes, if any, in the Treaty /might/ be necessary to
meet such developments."
A second treaty relating to submarines was also signed by
the participants, but it was very general and bland by
W7)
^See "Treaties," in U.S. Congress, Senate, Conference on




comparison. ^ It established procedures for protecting neutrals
and noncombatants at sea and forbade the use of submarines as
"commerce destroyers" (Article 4). Other treaties not directly
related to maritime arms controls were signed at this Conference
as were various resolutions and declarations.
The Washington Naval Treaty or Treaties, then, put some
limits or restraints on certain aspects of naval warfare by
stipulating how many of certain types of ships could be had by
each contracting party. Built into the treaties were assump-
tions of political strength and military force to support the
national needs of each country— thus a general capital ship
ratio of 5:5:3:1.75:1.75 (United States, Great Britain, Japan,
France, and Italy). The numbers were explicit within the
categories of ship type and maximum armament was listed. Be-
cause of the political perceptions of some of the participants,
the same limitations were not agreed upon for non-capital
vessels. No real strictures were placed on the numbers or
types of smaller surface combatants or submarines, y although
acknowledgement was made of possible scientific and/or techni-
cal advancements and their possible implications for the future
viability of the Treaty. No direct attempts were made toward
any sort of geographic controls or restraints except that naval
^See "A Treaty Between the Same Powers, in Relation to
the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gasses in Warfare," in U.S.
Congress, Senate, Conference on the Limitation of Armament %
pp. 886-889.
^"Cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and aircraft, accord-
ing to accepted doctrine, were 'auxiliaries' to be used primari-
ly, though not exclusively, to protect and assist the capital
ships in carrying out their appointed mission." See Sprout,
Toward a New Order. .. , p. 287.
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bases in the Pacific Ocean area would not have increased forti-
fications or repair and maintenance facilities. This lack of
increase was designed to show a continued peaceful intent in
the area by all concerned.
There were several attempts following the Washington Con-
ference to strengthen and/or broaden the limitations on naval
ships and warfare—none of them very successful. A brief attempt
by the League of Nations was made in Rome in 1924 to extend the
capital ship restraints to other non-signatory powers. The
46
meeting lasted 11 days and accomplished nothing.
Two year later, President Coolidge tried to convene a
second naval conference to supplement but not overlap still
another meeting being planned by the League of Nations. The
former never came to pass because France and Italy were not
interested, and at the latter meeting the participants tried to
encompass the "whole problem of disarmament" not just naval
weapons. ' The naval element of this conference examined com-
promises among several different proposals by Japan, Great
Britain, and the United States, but to no avail because "the
fundamental cause of the failure of the conference undoubtedly
lay in the differing strategic requirements of Britain and
i o
America in cruiser types and tonnage.
"
+ Both of these
Hugh Latimer, Naval Disarmament— A Brief Record from the
Washington Conference to Date , Chatham House Monographs, No. 3,
The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House,







f Stephen Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars , Collins,
London, 1968, p. 314.
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countries wanted greater strength in the Pacific (against a
potentially hostile Japan) , but neither was willing to com-
promise in any naval ship category to attain its ultimate goals.
Shortly after Herbert Hoover became President in 1929, his
delegate to the sixth session of the League of Nations Prepara-
tory Commission for the Disarmament Conference announced the
interest of the United States in "a method of estimating naval
values which takes account of other factors than displacement
tonnage alone. "^" y The formula for estimating equivalent tonnage,
for example, could include age, unit displacement, and calibre
of guns, thus providing a greater freedom of movement in creat-
ing a formula or structure acceptable to all participants.
Various proposals, both official and unofficial, were discussed
by the governments and the press over the next several months
and in September the British invited the original Washington
Treaty signatories to another meeting in London in January 1930.
In the interim between the announcement and the commencement of
the London Conference, the various governments indicated their
particular interests and preferences for the conference. For
example, both Italy and France saw naval limits or reductions
as being an integral part of overall disarmament efforts includ-






but preferred actual reductions as a positive goal. 50
The London Naval Treaty of 1950
The London Naval Conference met in January 1930 and de-
cided to divide into working committees to examine particular




To cooperate with the delegations in terminat-
ing naval competition by limiting all classes of
warships;
2. To assure equality of naval strength for the
United States with Great Britain;
3. To arrange a satisfactory relation between our
navy and that of the Japanese;
4. To bring about reductions in tonnage wherever
practicable.
^
Only some of these goals were met in the more than three months
of negotiations among the five participants.
Latimer, Naval Disarmament. .
.
, p. 68. See also Raymond
G. O'Connor, Perilous Equilibrium—The United States and the
London Naval Conference of 1930 « University of Kansas Press,
Lawrence, Kansas, 1962, p. 51. And as follows: "Britain and
the United States were separated by 30,000 tons of cruisers,
but the relative value of 8-inch-gun and 6-inch-gun cruisers
was a question that neither statesmen nor experts had been able
to settle. Japan was determined that the capital-ship ratio of
the V/ashington Conference should not be applied to auxiliary
vessels, and the United States was equally determined that it
should. Italy insisted on parity was France, which the latter
refused to consider. The French clamored for security before
disarmament and demanded that any final settlement be made with-
in the framework of the League of Nations. It was obvious to
participants and spectators alike that success would depend on
concessions, either mutual or unilateral. But there was little
evidence of the spirit of compromise among the statesmen, the
naval experts, the press, or the public," p. 61.
51y Department of State, London Naval Conference—Speeches
and Press Statements by Members of the American Delegation
January 20-April 29. 1950 * Conference Series No. 3» U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, Washington, D. C. , 1930, p. ko.
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All of the participants finally agreed not "to exercise
their rights to lay down the keels of capital ship replacement
52tonnage during the years 1931-1936...," (Article 1), Great
Britain, the United States, and Japan even agreed to scrap
several more battleships (5, 3» and 1 respectively); aircraft
carriers were redefined as ships "designed for the specific and
exclusive purpose of carrying, .. . launch/ing/ and land/ing/
/aircraft/" (Article 3), and were limited as to calibre of guns
and minimum tonnage (Articles l\. and 5); submarines were limited
by maximum tonnage and gun calibre, but not by number (Articles
6 and 7) ; generally surface combatants less than 600 tons or
600-2000 tons with specified armament, were ©xempt from limita-
tions, as were troop transports and other auxiliaries (Article
8) ; notification had to be made concerning the building of new
ships limited by the treaty including the vital statistics of
each as the keel v/as laid (Article 10). Rules for replacement
and disposal were extensively outlined in Annexes I and II,
while Annex III listed the special ships of each country (by
name) exempted from the Treaty.
Much to the disappointment of many national leaders, Part
III of the Treaty was not signed by France or Italy who could
not solve their political differences between themselves or
^ Foreign Office /Great Britain^ Documents of the London
Naval Conference 1950 , His Majesty's Stationery Office, London,
1930, pp. 2.-35 for a complete text of the treaty from which




with others. ^ This final part limited by various categories
those naval vessels of Great Britain, the United States, and
Japan which were not covered by the Washington Treaty or by the
London Treaty, or more simply, cruisers, destroyers, and sub-
marines. The cruisers were defined by tonnage (exceeding 1 ,850
tons), and/or classed by gun calibre (more or less than 6.1-
inches) ; while destroyers were less than 1,850 tons and with
guns less than 5.1 inch calibre (Articles 14 and 15). Overall
tonnages for cruisers (two categories), destroyers, and sub-
marines (already described in Article 7) were stated for each
5k
signatory. Large cruisers were further limited by number
(United States 18, Great Britain 15, Japan 12) and large
destroyers (more than 1,500 tons) could not exceed six percent
of each signatory's total number of destroyers (Article 16).
Building and substitution programs were specific in nature as
were procedures for notification of these actions (Articles
17-21). Article 21 allowed any of the three countries to in-
crease its requirements after notifying the others, if it felt
its "national security" were threatened by a non-signatory to
the Treaty. Finally, merchantmen and the rules for sinking
them were discussed and another conference was set for 1935
53^Department of State, London Naval Conference—Speeches
and Press Statements... , "The Italians insisted on parity with
the navy of the strongest continental power, even though there
is little likelihood that Italy would actually build up to
French tonnage during the period of the treaty. The French
refused, this demand. France is carrying forward a naval construc-
tion program materially increasing her tonnage in cruisers, sub-
marine boats, and destroyers. She was not disposed to reduce
these tonnages without new quarantees of security," p. 48.




The Conference was considered a qualified success by its
president, Ramsay MacDonald, in his letter to the Secretary-
55General of the League of Nations. y Three of the participants
agreed on limits (and in some cases reductions) of cruisers,
destroyers and submarines, as well as a "national security"
escalator clause to be used not against the other two signa-
tories, while all five agreed on definitions of submarine dis-
placement limitations, calibre of guns for classes of ships,
minimum tonnage of aircraft carriers exempted vessels, and
rules for scrapping and replacement.
In the London Naval Treaty of 1930 further elements of
limitation and/or reduction were introduced, extending the in-
tent of the Washington Treaty. Tonnage by class of ship was
still the primary denominator, but sub-categories (cruisers)
were introduced, not only by tonnage but also by size of weapon
(gun calibre). A minimum was set for aircraft carriers, but
nothing was said about the airplanes on a carrier. Gun calibre
was outlined, but nothing was said about torpedoes in either
surface combatants or submarines. And finally, small craft
were given only passing mention and then only as to their gun
calibre. No limits or even conversations were mentioned con-
cerning any numbers of personnel, geographic areas, or the inte-
gration of naval forces with the other warfare elements
—
-^"Letter from the President of the London Naval Conference
to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations," Foreign





military and aerial.' Small combatants, submarines, and light
cruisers were not limited by numbers, and the final tonnage
limits of cruisers, destroyers, and submarines were not to be
implemented until the end of 1936 by the three signatories. In
order to meet the 1936 limits, each of the three would have to
scrap ships in some categories, but also could build up
57tonnages in other categories. ' The political will to agree
was evidenced by the creation of the Treaty in the first place,
but it was obvious by what the Treaty did not include and by
the fact that only three parties signed Part III, that the
58Treaty was the result of these politics and not mathematics.
In other words, the ability to make any such agreements depended
on the political assessment of the situation and the effects
of any agreement on the future situation, not on the innate
correctness of any particular numbers or mathematical formula.
While the five major powers involved in the 1922 and 1930
treaties were examining their problems of the major oceans of
the world, several other maritime agreements were concluded in
attempts to control and stabilize, if not reduce, naval
^ O'Connor, Perilous Equilibrium... , on p. 118 says, "One
must recall the atmosphere and attitude of the times /in the
United States/ in order to understand how such a decisive mili-
tary factor /as air power/ could have been overlooked. The
failure to comprehend the role of air power, the faith in unen-
forceable agreements, the lack of co-ordination between the
civil and military branches of government, the fervent dedica-
tion to peace, and. the political desire for a treaty, combined
to create an unstable and illusory equilibrium of armaments."
57
"See Appendix I for the changes for each country from
1929 to 1936 needed to meet the London Naval Treaty limits.
> Tate, The United States and Armaments , p. 18/+. Also:




Maritime Limitation Efforts in the Mediterranean and Black Seas
in the 1930's
In the early 1930's the eastern end of the Mediterranean
Sea loomed as a field for naval arms races between Greece and
Turkey and Turkey and the Soviet Union until two bilateral
agreements halted the competition. While "neither naval accord
sought to promote 'disarmament' in a direct quantitative or
qualitative sense, ... each accepted the current status quo of
naval forces in Near Eastern waters and required six months
notice of additional acquisition, transfer, or construction of
warships. "-^ The Treaty that Greece and Turkey signed in
October 1930 at Ankara resembled in no way the Washington or
London treaties. This one was a "Treaty of Friendship, Neu-
trality, Conciliation and Arbitration..." in which naval
warfare matters were mentioned in a Protocol. In that Protocol
-^Richard D. Burns and Donald Urquidi, California State
College at Los Angeles Foundation, Disarmament in Perspec-
tive: An Analysis of Selected Arms Control and Disarmament
Agreements Between the World Wars, 1919-1939 Volume III:
Limitation of Sea Power , prepared for the U.S. Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency, Contract No. ACDA/RS-55 HI, July 1968,
mimeographed copy, p. 165.
"Treaty of Friendship, Neutrality, Conciliation, and
Arbitration Between Greece and Turkey. Signed at Ankara,
October 30, 1930," League of Nations Treaty Series, Volume 125,
1931-1932, Nos. 1-4 « League of Nations Secretariat, Lausanne,
1933, PP. 11-21. Protocol is on p. 21. Another treaty signed
at the same time generally established most favored nation
status for each and allowed general freedom of movement for
ships of each country in the other's ports and harbors for
trade and transport. "Convention of Establishment, Commerce
and Navigation Between Greece and Turkey. Signed at Ankara,





both agreed that they sought no "unnecessary increase in their
expenditure on naval armaments" and would give six months
notice to the other of any new or newly acquired naval arma-
ments. The language was vague and this Protocol was tacked on
to the end of the friendship treaty, but it served the purpose
of stopping the nascent naval arms buildup between the two
countries, both of which had other more pressing domestic and
political problems to face and settle.
The accommodation between Greece and Turkey provided a
diplomatic pattern for lessening the fears existing between
Turkey and the Soviet Union, especially over a naval arras
buildup in the Black Sea. Briefly, the Turks worried about the
Soviet transfer of a battleship and a cruiser from the Baltic
to the Black Sea fleet, while the Soviet Union was deeply con-
cerned about increasing British influence over Turkey (and
therefore the Bosporus and the Dardenelles) . Also the British
were encouraging Rumania to construct a shipyard, further
61
aggravating the naval armaments problem in the Black Sea.
The Protocol to the Soviet-Turkish Treaty itself was brief and
involved no qualitative restraints or quantitative reductions,
it was rather more of a naval "holiday."
Neither of the High Contracting Parties shall
proceed to lay down any naval fighting unit
whatsoever for the purpose of strengthening its
fleet in the Black Sea or in neighboring seas,
or to place orders for any such unit in foreign
shipyards, or to take any other measure the
effect of which would be to increase the present
strength of its war fleet in the above-mentioned
Burns and. Urquidi, Disarmament in Perspective.... Volume
III; Limitation of Sea Power , pp. 170-174.
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seas, without having notified the second Contract-
ing Party previously.
,?
Although the "neighboring seas" were not defined and left room
for possible misinterpretation, the Protocol to this second
treaty served its purpose and brought to an end any desires to
build up a Black Seas fleet by either party. Each seemed satis-
fied and neither apparently felt any need to use more specific
language or make more detailed arrangements. These two agree-
ments were ones of limitation—not reduction. They involved
no scrapping of ships, no reduction of firepower, only control
of what already existed by three countries who were politically
motivated to achieve workable agreements. ^
Elsewhere in the Mediterranean attempts at agreements were
not so successful as the running dispute over naval parity be-
tween Italy and France again came to the forefront. France
viewed her national security (and therefore the maintenance of
peace) in terms of her military strength, thus rejecting the
elsewhere popular theme of "peace through disarmament." Or,
put differently, "equality of armaments meant inequality of
"Completing the Provisions of Article 2 of the Protocol
of December 17th, 1929, Concerning the Prolongation of the
Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality between Turkey and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics. Signed at Ankara, March 7th
1931," League of Nations Treaty Series, Volume 1*37 , 1935, Nos.
3601-3618 , League of Nations Secretariat. Lausanne. 1936, p. 365.
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The protocols "had been facilitated by several factors:
the sincere desire for peace, the hope of balancing budgets,
the recognition of changing tactics of warfare, and the relative
simplicity of the agreements." Burns and Urquidi, Disarmament
in Perspective.
.
.Volume III: Limitation of Sea Power , p. 174.

security" H specifically regarding Germany, but also in rela-
tion to French interests in the Mediterranean. Italy, on the
other hand, was "out for change, not for the enforcement of
the status quo " and could not be attracted by "mere guarantees
65
of the established order." y The net result was that France
refused to accept Italy's demand for naval parity, stating she
had to worry about maritime defense of the Atlantic as well as
the Mediterranean (to say nothing of her other overseas commit-
ments). Italy kept demanding parity, perhaps for reasons of
"prestige" more than anything else, and there seemed no solu-
tion to the problem.
The United States, in turn, became concerned over a naval
arms race in the western Mediterranean because this might cause
the British to execute the "escalator" clause in the London
Naval Treaty just concluded. ' This, in turn, would disrupt
the limits and reductions so painfully arranged among the
TTT
HArnold Wolfers, Britain and France b etween Two Wars-
Conflicting Strategies of Peace Since Versailles , Harcourt,
Brace and Company, New York, 1940, p. 73*
^Wolfers, Britain and France... , p. 143.
re
Charles P. Hov/land, director of research, Survey of
American Foreign Relations 1951 , Council on Foreign Relations,
Yale University Press, New Haven, 1931, p. 337.
'A memorandum to the Secretary of State from the Charge
in France, after an interview with the French Premier, states,
"Should the 1924 /French naval building/ program be put into
rapid execution, it is apparent that the British Government,
when a certain point is reached, would invoke article 21 of the
London Treaty, thus upsetting the existing three power agreement;
any event which upsets the agreement would certainly give rise
to misgivings among the peoples of these three countries."
Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations
of the United States 1930, Volume I , U.S. Government Printing




United States, Great Britain, and Japan in London. The
United States efforts to alleviate the dispute between Italy
and France were sincere and untiring but generally ineffective.
°
The British, on the other hand were more successful than the
Americans at concluding an agreement among the three powers
—
Great Britain, France, and Italy.
On March 1, 1931, the British Foreign Office announced the
reaching of an accord in Rome "on the questions of naval limita-
tions and naval disarmament pending since the Naval Treaty of
70London." The agreement raised the capitalship tonnage of
France and Italy to 181,000 tons (from 175,000 in the Washing-
ton Treaty). These two also agreed to: lay down no more heavy
cruisers (more than 6.0 gun calibre) after the completion of
their 1930 building programs; restrictions on light cruiser and
destroyer construction (determined by tonnage and the age of
their existing ships); limit submarine tonnage by 1936. There
was a partial "holiday" on destroyer building among the three
countries, but the "arrangement establishe/d/ no permanent ratio
in any category of ship as between the members of the British
-__
It must also be remembered that the depression was a not
unimportant factor to be considered in thinking of renewed
naval building programs, and certainly influenced U.S. and
British efforts to alleviate the French- Italian differences of
opinion,
^Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign
Relations of the United States 1930 . see pp. 132-1(36, "Negotia-
tions Looking Toward a Solution of the Problem of French and
Italian Naval Construction."
70
' Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign
Relations of the United States 1931 * Volume I, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1946, p. 371.
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71Commonwealth of Nations, France and Italy."'
The Agreement did not stand for long because the French and
the Italians could not agree on what cruisers and destroyers
would be in the "over-age" category by 1936, thereby determining
the replacement building program. By the end of March, the
agreement was dead, although for a while, both the Americans
72
and the British tried to revitalize it.
The League and World Disarmament
The unsettled naval problems of the French and Italians
were carried over into the World Disarmament Conference at
Geneva in February 1932. The "naval material" portion of the
Draft Treaty was in large measure put together by the five
signatories to the Washington and London Treaties who possessed
about 80 percent of the world's naval tonnage. '~* It sought
such controls as: the maximum number of sea personnel ("effec-
tives"), their length of conscripted service and naval reserves;
global tonnage limitations by ship-type for each signatory
(including capital ships, aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers,
and submarines) ; specified budgetary limitations for naval arma-
ments; rules of transfer of naval assets to another signatory
and ship replacement and disposal; the numbers of planes (and
71
' See "Bases of Agreement," Department of State, Papers
Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1931 «
Volume I , pp. 380-382 for the full text of the agreement.
'^Burns and Urquidi, Disarmament in Perspective.
.
.Volume
III: Limitation of Sea Power , pp. 162-163.
?3l)enys P. Myers, World Disarmament— Its Problems and Pros-




dirigibles) aboard aircraft carriers and ashore; civilian
personnel and other material assets; and specified annual re-
porting procedures to the League of Nations. ^ These far-
reaching ideas were given support by President Hoover who pro-
posed that the "arms of the v/orld be reduced by nearly one
third," through cutting capital ships one third; aircraft
carriers, cruisers, and destroyers one fourth; and submarines
a third with maximum total tonnage of 35,000.
The effect of this plan would be to bring an
enormous savings in cost of new construction
and replacement of naval vessels. It would
also save large amounts in the operating ex-
pense in all nations of land, sea, and air
forces. It would greatly reduce offensive
strength compared to defensive strength in
all nations. nz-
Hoover was supported in these and other non-naval arms
control proposals by the smaller nations, especially the
"Straight Eight," but failed to gain acceptance by the other
members of the "Crooked Five" (the major naval powers). The
Conference continued for several years, with repeated political
obstacles occurring between and among various participants.
In 1933 Germany left the Conference (and the League) because
^"For a complete copy of the draft disarmament convention,
see United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, Subcommittee on Disarmament, Disarmament and. Security,
A Collection of Documents 1919-1955 , 84th Congress, 2nd Session,
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1956, pp. 118-
147.
75]3artlett, The Record of American Diplomacy , pp. i+97-2+99.
?°Tate, The United States and Armaments, p. 106. The
Eight were Spain, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Belgium, the Nether-
lands, Switzerland, and Czechoslovakia.
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it was not fulfilling "its sole object, namely, general dis-
77
armament."'' In fact it never reached that goal, as the deteri-
orating political situation in Germany and her moves to rearm
and expand made talks of disarmament or even arms restraints
useless. (Japanese moves in the Far East were equally unsettling
but generally ignored in public conversation.)
Independent from the League of Nations World Disarmament
Conference, another Conference on further naval limitations was
being discussed in London. It was required by the 1930 London
Naval Treaty, was set for December 1935, and involved several
months of bi-lateral pre-conference meetings to establish areas
of agreement (and disagreement). At these preliminary sessions
in London, it became evident that: the United States v/anted an
all-around reduction up to 20 percent in naval tonnages, or at
least a continuation of the restraints of the 1922 and 1930
Naval Treaties; Great Britain preferred a qualitative reduction
by smaller gun-calibre (and an increased cruiser tonnage for
the Empire) ; Japan wanted to abandon the ratio system estab-
lished by the first two treaties, substituting rather a "common
upper limit" for all powers, and she was going to give termina-
tion notice to the 1930 London Treaty anyway; and France and
77
''Tate, The United States and Armaments , p. 112; and "By
1933 the 'have not 1 or 'renovating' states were highly dissatis-
fied; they looked forward to regaining their lost possessions
or to expanding in other directions. The 'have' or resisting
states, on the other hand, possessed territory which they knew
was coveted, which they did not intend to relinquish peacefully,
and which they were ready to defend by force of arms. Needless
to say, the dissatisfied powers would not voluntarily accept
their status as permanent, and the satisfied powers were equally
determined to maintain their status quo ; thus any plan for a
limitation of armaments was bound to fail," p. 117.
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Italy did not care for Great Britain's idea of unilateral de-
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clarations of six-year building programs. Given the disparity
of views expressed prior to the Conference, as well as the poli-
tical situations in central Europe and China, the common grounds
for any agreement were few indeed. Nevertheless, the Conference
convened in December 1935, and a treaty was finally hammered
out in March 1936. (While these negotiations were transpiring,
Great Britain concluded an agreement that "the future strength
of the German navy in relations to the aggregate naval strength
of the Members of the British Commonwealth of Nations should be
79in the proportion of 35:100," 7 thus attempting to cool if not
turn off the potential naval arms competition between those two
countries. This 33 to 100 ratio did not apply to submarine
tonnage in which they were to have parity with Great Britain,
_
' "Report of the Delegates of the United States of America
to the London Naval Conference, 1935?" in Department of State,
The London Naval Conference 1933—Report of the Delegates of the
United States of America, Text of the London Naval Treaty of
1936 and Other Documents , Conference Series No. 2M~, U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1936, pp. 1-3.
79
'^"Exchange of Notes between the Government of the German
Reich and His Majesty's Government of the United Kingdom Regard-
ing the Limitation of Naval Armaments. London, June 18th 1933,"
League of Nations Treaty Series, Volume 161 1935, Nos. 3701-
372.9 * League of Nations Secretariat, Lausanne, 1937, pp. 9-1 6.
0/~j
Germany, by the Versailles Treaty, had originally been
limited to six battleships, six light cruisers, 12 destroyers
and 12 torpedo-boats, and no submarines. She had also been
limited to a 15,000 man Navy, and maximum tonnages for each
category of ship (10,000 ton battleships, 6,000 ton cruisers,
800 ton destroyers, 200 ton torpedo-boats). She had no con-
scription and minimum voluntary enlistments of 12 years (25 for
officers). See: United States Congress, Senate, Committee on
Foreign Relations, Disarmament and Security.
.
.
, pp. 8 and 9 for
the naval clauses of the Versailles Treaty. Great Britain, by
concluding this agreement in effect endorsed Germany's unilateral
abrogation of the Versailles Treaty restrictions.
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but the Germans agreed to build only to 43 percent of Britain,
unless otherv/ise necessary.)
Shortly after the Conference began, it became apparent that
Japan was not going to be able to persuade the other partici-
pants to accept her idea of a common upper limit even although
it could be set low enough to reduce the naval tonnage of all
present. Japan, therefore, withdrew from the Conference in
Q -I
January 1936. France and Italy continued to oppose any form
of fixed ratios, thus ruling that out as a device for an agree-




size and. gun calibre among Great Britain, the United tates,
and France. Italy did not sign for political reasons.
The Treaty ran until January 1 943 and limited by quality
only; there were no limits on the numbers of ships to be built
within the categories, subject only to the advance notification
and exchange of information procedures agreed upon in the
Treaty. Capital ships were split into two categories of 10,000
tons and more and between 8,000 and 10,000 tons with gun-
calibre of over or under 8 inches (a reference to "small"
Oi
battleships of minor powers) . ^ Aircraft carriers were
o1 Department of State, The London Naval Conference 1933... .
P. 3.
82Tate, The United States and Armaments , p. 190.
"^Department of State, The London Naval Conference 1933... »
p. 6.
8^"Analysis of the Treaty and Protocol of Signature,"
United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Hearings on the London Naval Treaty, 1956 , 74th Congress, 2nd
Session, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., May




redefined to be "primarily for carrying and operating aircraft
at sea" (as opposed to such as seaplane tenders). Heavy and
light cruisers and destroyers were classed as light surface
vessels with maximum tonnage of 10,000 tons and guns of either
8 inches or 6 inches. Destroyers were limited to 3,000 tons or
less and 6.1 inch guns, and submarines to 2,000 tons. There
was, in effect, a construction "holiday" on cruisers until
January 19^-3 and a technical "holiday" on capital ships between
8,000 and 17,300 tons, to keep a ship from being built and
called capital but actually serving as a cruiser. Aircraft
carriers were reduced in size to 23,000 tons (from 27,000) and.
could not carry more than 10 5.23 inch guns. Each signatory
had to notify the others annually of her upcoming building pro-
grams and could not thereafter increase the numbers of ships or
calibre of guns on them that year. Minor war vessels (not ex-
ceeding 2,000 tons or carrying guns more than 6.0 inches and
not carrying torpedoes) were exempt from the construction
announcement program, but had to be listed each year.
The provisions for advance notification of con-
struction programs are new. ...The exchange of in-
formation required under the treaty concerning each
individual ship is much more detailed than required
under former treaties, and it must take place before
instead of after a ship is laid down. or
A signatory involved in war could suspend any or all of
°^U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Hearings on the London Naval Treaty, 1956 , p. 26. See also:
Foreign Office, Documents of the London Naval Conference 1935*
December 1933-Harch 1936 , His Majesty's Stationery Office,
London, 1 936 , for the text of the various committees and
meetings.

the treaty limits after notifying the others. A signatory could
build any type of ship she deemed necessary if a non-signatory
built one that did not conform to the treaty and which ship
threatened a signatory power, provided the Treaty party first
notified the other members and waited three months to commence
construction. These last two strictures applied to the "national
security" escalator clause, except that new construction, al-
though it could violate the annual budget declaration, had to
conform to the tonnage and gun calibre limitations. Both Great
Britain and the United States approached Japan about adhering to
the 1936 London Treaty, but she refused to accept either the
gun calibre or the tonnage limits of that Treaty.
Although not a weapons restraint measure, the Montreux
Convention may be viewed as a maritime measure in the field of
arms control. The Treaty signed at Montreux actually replaced
the earlier Peace Treaty of Lausanne of 1923, which had set up
an international commission under the League of Nations to
supervise the passage of warships and military aircraft in
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accordance with that Treaty. There was complete freedom of
transit for all merchant vessels, and few restrictions for
_
"Convention relating to the Regime of the Straits, signed
at Lausanne, July 24, 1923," League of Nations Treaty Series,
Lausanne, 1924, Nos. 1-4« 1924 * League of Nations Secretariat,




warships in peacetime. Additionally Turkey, who did not super-
vise the Straits (although she had a member on the commission)
had to demilitarize both sides of the Straits, the Sea of
Marmara, and some of the Aegean Islands (Article 4)
.
As the League of Nations and its security system began to
fail in the mid- 1930' s, Turkey sought a more acceptable agree-
ment based (she hoped) on her control of the Straits which ran
oo
through her country. The high contracting parties, although
they did "recognize and affirm the principle of freedom of
transit and navigation by sea in the Straits, 1 ' returned essen-
89tial control of the Straits to Turkey. 7 Again, merchant ships
have complete freedom of transit in peacetime regardless of
nationality, and in wartime if Turkey is a neutral. Warships
have to conform to certain categories and numbers to qualify
for transit privileges. For example, submarines must travel on
the surface by daylight and must be going for repairs or join-
ing their bases after construction or purchase (Article 12).
w?
'Three ships of one non-raparian state, none more than
10,000 tons, could pass through to the Black Sea in peacetime.
There were also different rules governing passage in wartime
depending on Turkey's being a neutral or belligerent, and
whether or not the merchant or warships were neutral or belli-
gerent. See, "Convention Relating to the Regime of the
Straits...," League of Nations Treaty Series Volume 28... ,
pp. 121-125.
oo
° For an excellent description of the strategic importance
of, and the continued diplomatic and military struggles over
the Straits, see Ferenc A. Vali, Bridge Across the Bosporus
—
The Foreign Policy of Turkey , The Johns Hopkins Press, Balti-
more, 1971, especially Chapter 5.
"^"Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits Signed
at Montreux, July 20th, 1936," League of Nations Treaty Series ,
Volume 173, 1936-1937, Nos. 4001-4032 , League of Nations




Non-riparian states' warships passing into the Black Sea are
limited by type, tonnage, and numbers (Articles 13-18). In
wartime or threat of war, Turkey (as a belligerent) can control
the straits completely, closing them as she desires. There are
also procedures for notification of passage to Turkey, times
for passage, duration of visits to the Black Sea, and other
strictures. In addition to the tonnage, type, and numbers
limits seen before, this Treaty involves geographic limits, in-
volving definitions of what ships may pass through what areas
90
of the waters, and under what circumstances. This Treaty 7 is
still in effect today, one of the very few survivors of the
pre-World War II efforts at arms restraints.
Great Britain persisted in her efforts to restrain the
naval arms races throughout Europe. She managed to negotiate a
bilateral treaty with Germany in 1937 which substantially
paralleled the 1936 London Naval Treaty. She got this by also
negotiating a similar bilateral naval treaty with the Soviet
Union, which was worried about both German building in the
Baltic and Japanese construction programs in the Pacific Ocean.
(In addition to these tv/o, Poland, Italy, Sweden, Norway, Den-
mark, and Finland had all acceded to the 1936 Treaty by end of
1938.r The two treaties accepted the various categories and
sub-categories of the London Naval Treaty of 1936 as well as
° It was signed by Great Britain, Australia, Bulgaria,
France, Greece, Rumania, Turkey, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia,
and Japan, who took the classification of the warships verbatim
from the 1936 London Naval Treaty.
91
' Burns and Urquidi, Disarmament in Perspective. .. Volume
III Limitation of Sea Power , p. 2^0.
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the gun-calibre stipulations cited therein. The same provisions
for annual advance notification of building programs was included,
as were the "escape" clauses involving the ship construction of
non-signatory states and/or the needs of "national security"
92
as they affected a High Contracting Party. Although not in
the Treaty itself, Great Britain and Germany agreed, by way of
a Declaration of the same date, that the 35 to 100 total tonnage
ratio continued to exist; that there was some room for marginal
variations within the tonnage limits by category for Germany as
compared to Great Britain, and that the submarines continued to
be bound by the 1935 Agreement. Otherwise, the tonnage re-
straints and construction holidays on certain cruisers and de-
stroyers, as well as capital ship limits, were essentially the
same as the 1936 Naval Treaty. ^ The Soviets did not have any
special ratios with Great Britain (or any other state for that
matter) nor did she attach any special significance to sub-
marines or their building programs.
"
"Agreement Between the German Government and His Majesty's
Government in the United Kingdom Providing for the Limitation of
Naval Armament and the Exchange of Information Concerning Naval
Construction. Signed at London, July 17th, 1937," and "Agree-
ment Between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and
the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Pro-
viding for the Limitation of Naval Armament and the Exchange of
Information Concerning Naval Construction. Signed at London,
July 17th, 1937," League of Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 187,
Nos. 4328-43^9 , League of Nations Secretariat, Lausanne, 1939,
PP. hk- 77~) and pp. 94~12if respectively, for full texts of the
agreements and additional notes.
7
-oee "Declaration" League of Nations Treaty Series Vol.
187... , pp. 66-70.

Summary
Since the 17th Century, ideas about peace and disarmament have
had a permanent place in the conversation and literature of this
country. The first ideas were expressed through various parlia-
ments or diplomatic negotiations, some accepting the varieties
of states extant, others preferring to make all states the same
size and strength. Some writers wished, to use a federal army
for enforcement while differing authors preferred a world court
to adjudicate all disputes. One group of thinkers felt that
public opinion would keep leaders from making war; yet another
group thought that a congress would legislate the necessary
steps to disarmament and peace. Some talked of complete dis-
armament for individual states with an international government
to guard freedom. Others outlined plans for reductions of
arms, with sufficient national forces to fight only defensive
wars if necessary.
A reduction of armaments actually became a reality in the
19th Century on the Great Lakes, but it is evident that both
parties wanted to agree and trusted each other enough to reach
their stated goal. Besides, rearming could not really be done
secretly on the Great Lakes and neither had any particularly
sensitive "pressure points" in that area. These desires for
peace and commitment to reductions or restraints were not evi-
dent at the First and Second Hague Peace Conferences. The
United States, among others, was feeling the exhilaration of
sailing with greater impact on the world's oceans and had no
desire to limit these movements. She was willing to help

k5.
distressed persons at sea v/here needed and to fight in a humane
manner, but not to restrict herself in any fundamental way un-
less everyone else did. so, too (a safe prerequisite since the
European powers seemed disinclined toward substantive restraints
or reductions)
.
The post-World War I atmosphere breathed renewed life into
two concepts relating to maritime arras control. The first was
President Wilson* s call for absolute freedom of navigation in
peace or war, except for those limits imposed by the inter-
national organization, thus making illegal large navies used
for commerce raiding and unnecessary (and perhaps illegal)
large navies for fighting other navies. The second method, was
actually put to practice in the Versailles Treaty which severely
limited the German navy in numbers of ships, types and tonnages
of ships, numbers of personnel, and rules of their service.
One might mention a third "road to peace" stated by President
Wilson as the alternative to his freedom of navigation proposal;
that was a huge navy, sufficiently large to ward off any war-
like thoughts let alone actions towards the United States.
Followed to its logical conclusion, however, this last argument
would lead eventually to an arms buildup all around, rather
than substantial reductions.
The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 used several devices
to gain arms restraints. In order to achieve these methods,
however, each participant had to have the political will to
support and sustain the compromises necessary in the mutual
give-and-take of most diplomatic negotiations. The devices
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used for attaining an agreement included a ratio of capital
ships for each signatory, specific reductions of ships by name,
a "holiday" on some building programs, tonnage limits (both to
be retained and to be scrapped) within the categories of ships,
and gun-calibre limits by ship type. This Treaty did not at
all cover smaller combatants or submarines, but did anticipate
another conference to consider scientific and technical develop-
ments. This conference, in another treaty, acknowledged the
importance of geographic entities by agreeing not to fortify
any further certain areas of the Pacific, but this referred to
land fortifications only. (The Montreux Convention, fifteen
years later, again used geographic tools for arms restraints,
although in a more direct manner.)
Subsequent naval conferences in the 1920' s foundered on
the rocks of politics— the states attending or invited to attend
these meetings did not have the national political interest or
desire for a successful agreement based on mutually acceptable
compromises. In other words, other political pressures, both
domestic and international, were sufficiently strong and force-
ful to make agreements unreachable. After 1930, the forces
influencing a reconsideration of maritime arms restraint rose
again, perhaps for economic reasons (navies, large modern ones
at least, are expensive to build and maintain), but also for
political reasons. Political stability among the major world
powers was declining and perhaps some leaders felt a need to
stunt arms growth before it got out of hand and ran beyond
control.
The 1930 London Naval Treaty, the result of this renewed
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interest in arms restraints, used the "holiday" device for limit-
ing capital ships, while gun-calibre and tonnage were measures
for other ships. Building notification, replacement, and dis-
posal procedures were all retained in this Treaty. The ratios
no longer appealed to some members who considered the political
inferiority conferred by a lesser number to be unacceptable.
Also, the Treaty had an "escape clause" allowing building beyond
the Treaty if "national security" needs demanded these actions.
The London Naval Treaty of 1930 further complicated arms re-
straints measures by increasing the numbers of ship categories
and. the calibre of guns within these groupings. This may be
merely a reflection of the increasing complexity of naval war-
fare as technical and scientific developments refined ship
design and weapons diversification. Interestingly, the time
frame for the second major treaty was shorter than the first,
having been reduced essentially from eight to six years, perhaps
owing to the faster technological pace, but also to the declin-
ing stability of the world's political situation.
Contrary to the complex 1930 Treaty, the Turkish agreements
with the Soviet Union and Greece were very simple in language
and expectations—no reductions or limits, just a maintenance of
the status quo through the stopping of naval ship building.
Although these negotiations were bilateral (a possible reason
for agreement and. simplicity of wording) other attempts at two-
power arrangements did not endure. Italy and France agreed
for less than a month— the political influences (as well as
their philosophies of security) differed too much for them to
be brought together for any great duration.
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By far the most comprehensive proposals on arms control
were those outlined, in the World Disarmament Conference spon-
sored by the League of Nations. It covered (and limited) every
aspect of warfare from the amount of money and numbers of
personnel (both civilian and military), to the specifics of
ships and weapons by number and type, to the material reserves
and industrial capacity of each country. It was a magnificent
attempt, but fell victim to a degenerating world situation.
Those participants who continued negotiating did so with one
eye looking toward the increasingly stormy political atmosphere
in Europe and Asia. Soon self-protection through arms (and
thus an increase in arms) became more important than self-
protection through reduction of weapons.
The mid- 1 930' s agreements indicated a further decline in
the political environment and. the influences favoring arms re-
straints. Great Britain made a bi-lateral agreement with
Germany in which it was understood that, although they had sub-
marine parity, Germany would build, to only l\^> percent of Great
Britain's numbers. Germany, however, would not risk limiting
herself in relation to any other nation by attending the 1936
Naval Conference. Japanese demands for a common upper limit
on ships (thus indicating her rejection of inferior status
along with Italy and France) were non-negotiable and she left
the conference when the other parties refused to accept her
plan. She objected strongly enough to refuse to negotiate
except under her own guidelines
—
guidelines unacceptable to the
other parties.
The 1936 Naval Treaty, as finally negotiated, removed, all

k9.
ratios and numbers limits on ships and ship building. Some new
administrative devices were developed including the annual re-
port of future building programs from which a country could not
deviate once it was announced, except for "national security"
reasons. The qualitative strictures of tonnages and gun
calibres were still used, as was a partial construction "holi-
day" in certain areas. Prohibitions were less and. of vastly
decreased importance, but prior announcements and adherence to
stated building programs were of ascending importance. One
might conclude that the signatories decided that more specific
knowledge of what their potential enemies were building was
better than lack of information, especially when extensive con-
struction could no longer be prevented by treaty. This changed
emphasis, of course, also gave each country greater maneuvering
room for itself in the political and military arenas.
As will be seen in future chapters, techniques, methods,
and formulae for arms control in the maritime arena are multiple
in number and complex in application. They depend, on the poli-
tical atmosphere of the time, the numbers and interests of the
participants, the economic and military forces in play, and the
ultimate goals of the negotiators. More recent accords and
attempts at agreements (see next chapters) have been beset with
the same problems and negative forces as the efforts at arms
restraints reviev/ed in this chapter. The circumstances, geo-
graphic regions, participants, and technologies alter over time,
but the dominant factors of politics, economies, perceptions of
international stability (or instability), and national will
remain as most important in creating any arms restraint
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agreements. Post-World War II arms control attempts relating
to maritime interests encountered similar problems and similar
attempts at solutions.
There seems to be some particular climate in which arms
restraints proposals of a realistic and at least theoretically
workable proportions can be nurtured. That atmosphere prevailed
in the 1920' s but seemed to grow stale in the 1930's as the
political instabilities increased. When the international
situation is too peaceful (if that is possible) states feel
they do not need treaties of arms restraint or limitation among
themselves. On the other hand, when the situation degenerates
beyond a certain point, these same states feel they cannot,
from a national security standpoint, "afford" these same agree-
ments. In other words, when the level of tensions and hostili-
ties between states or among groups of states begins to rise
sharply, these states then perceive arms control attempts as
being deleterious to their national interests because the other
side might or could become militarily dominant if they them-
selves do not increase their own arms efforts. As political
and military instability increase, states become afraid to re-
frain from arms building programs—afraid they will be caught
short if fighting ensues. That middle ground between complete
relaxation of tensions and pending hostilities is a very narrow
area, and one whose growing season for the cultivation of sub-
stantive agreements is short.

CHAPTER II
POST-WORLD MR II ARMS CONTROL ATTEMPTS AND
AGREEMENTS DIRECTLY RELATING TO THE
MARITIME SITUATION
Building a peace requires as much moral stamina
as waging a war. Perhaps it requires even more,
because it is so laborious and painstaking and
undramatic. It requires undying patience and
continuous application. But it can give us, if
we stay with it, the greatest reward that there
is in the whole field of human effort.
Harry S. Truman
Although the Second World War witnessed the extensive
increase of arms, weapons, and material for fighting a de-
structive and lengthy battle, the desires for reductions of
these armaments were not dead. In fact, they were reiterated
during the hostilities. The Atlantic Charter of 191+1 and. the
2United Nations Declaration of 1942 supported these goals.
The end of this war in Europe brought the first manifestation
of these sentiments, directed at Germany for the second time
in less than 30 years. Great Britain, France, the United
''"Address on Foreign Policy at the Navy Day Celebration in
New York City. October 2.7, 1945," National Archives and Records
Service, General Services Administration, Public Papers of the
Presidents of the United States—Harry S. Truman , 1945> U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1961, p. 435.
2
"The Atlantic Charter, August 14, 1941," and the "Declara-
tion by United Nations, January 1, 1942," in U.S. Congress,
Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Disarmament and Secur-
ity— A Collection of Documents 1919-1955 . U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1956, pp. 78-80. President
Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill declared in part that,
"(T)hey believe that all of the nations of the world, for
realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the aban-
donment of the use of force. ..the disarmament of such nations
is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other
practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples
the crushing burden of armaments," p. 79. The U.N. Declaration




States, and the Soviet Union agreed that, "All German armed
forces, including land, air, anti-aircraft and naval forces...
shall be and shall remain completely disarmed, demobilized and
disbanded," and that they shall prevent the "manufacture, pro-
duction, or importation of...(a)ll naval vessels of all classes
both surface and submarine, and auxiliary naval-craft...."
The same words were used in the draft treaty concerning Japan
a few weeks later.
Although both states eventually regained self-government
and control of their own armed forces, the initial treaties
established total disarmament of these areas, with any necessary
defense being provided by the four powers (three in the case of
Japan because France v/as not a part of that effort). As the
political differences among the former Allies became more evi-
dent in the late 1940's and early 1950' s, the total disarmament
of these two states turned from an asset into a liability and
they were permitted (even encouraged) to rearm within limits.
The United Nations made several earnest and repeated
attempts at "early general regulation and reduction of arma-
ments and armed forces," including the exclusive control of
3„ Draft Treaty on the Disarmament and Demilitarization of
Germany," Department of State, The Department of State Bulletin ,
Vol. 1Zf, No. 358, May 12, 1946, p. 815.
^""Draft Treaty on the Disarmament and Demilitarization of
Japan," Department of State, The Department of State Bulletin ,




atomic energy and the prohibition of atomic weapons. All
these efforts, as history indicates, were essentially unpro-
ductive, except in a negative sense in that there have been no
world wars since 1945. The myriad other resolutions, declara-
tions, and proposals were aimed at arms control in general and
not until the late 1950' s did any agreements pertaining to the
maritime aspects of this problem appear, and then only narrow
in perspective. But they are worth examining.
The Law of the Sea Conference Treaties
In 1958, under United Nations sponsorship, the international
community completed its work of codifying some aspects of ocean
use and activity. Certain portions of these treaties constrain,
restrain, or limit the uses of the seas by elements of maritime
warfare. In the Territorial Sea Treaty, the coastal state has
sovereignty over its territorial sea, the airspace above that
sea, and the bed and subsoil under it (Articles 1 and 2).
Baselines for this sea may be straightlines between islands or
points of a deeply indented, coastline (Article 4). Coastal
states may under certain circumstances (and without discrimina-
-^See: "Principles Governing the General Regulation and.
Reduction of Armaments: Resolution of the United Nations
General Assembly, December 14, 1946"; "Essentials of Peace:
Resolution Approved by the United Nations General Assembly,
December 1, 1949"; "Peace Through Deeds: Resolution of the
United Nations General Assembly, November 17, 1950"; in U.S.
Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Disarmament
and Secu rity* *«.
,
pp. 82-85.
There are four treaties of 1958: the Convention of the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zones; the Convention on the High
Seas; the Convention on the Continental Shelf; and the Convention
on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources on the High Seas.
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tion anions foreign ships) "suspend temporarily in specified
areas of its territorial sea the innocent passage of foreign
ships if such suspension is essential for the protection of
its security." But, "there shall be no suspension of the inno-
cent passage of foreign ships through straits which are used
for international navigation between one part of the high seas
and another part of the high seas or the territorial sea. of a
n
foreign State," (Article 16). Further strictures require any
warship to "comply with the regulations of the coastal State
concerning passage through /its/ territorial sea" or leave
that sea (Article 2.3). The nature of the possible requirements
o
are not specified.
This treaty also defined a zone "contiguous" to the terri-
torial sea in which the coastal state can exercise control re-
lating to the prevention of customs, fiscal, immigration, or
sanitary violations (Article 2.1+). The contiguous zone is
measured, from the same baseline as the territorial sea and may
not be wider than 12 miles. The Treaty, however, does not de-
limit, or in any way indicate the breadth of the territorial
7
'"Lav/ of the Sea: Convention on the Territorial Sea and.
the Contiguous Zone," in Department of State, United States
Treaties—Treaties and Other International Acts Series, 361^-
3700 , U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1963,
TIAS 5639» p. 6, herein after referred to as, "The Territorial
Sea Treaty," TIAS 3639 .
o
Requirements of this type might include a request by the
coastal state that the warship declare her ultimate destination,
or how many nuclear weapons she is carrying, or other classi-
fied or unclassified questions. In the case of U.S. ships, the
questions, particularly about nuclear weapons are not answered
and the ship exits the area. From a conversation with a U.S.
senior Navy lawyer, Washington, D.C., Summer 197^.
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sea and, therefore, the territorial seas claimed by many coastal
Q
states are much broader than their contiguous zones. This
omission was deliberate because even in 1958 the conference par-
ticipants could not agree on a common width for their terri-
torial seas.
The same United Nations conference on the Law of the Sea
drafted the Convention on the High Seas, which are defined as
"all parts of the sea that are not included in the territorial
sea or in the internal waters of a State" (Article 1). The
freedoms of the high seas include those of navigation, fishing,
laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and overflight
1
1
(Article 2). The High Seas Treaty grants warships "complete
immunity from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag
State"; this applies also to non-warships, owned by a govern-
ment and used, for "non-commercial service" (Articles 8 and
o7See Appendix II for the territorial sea claims of various
coastal states of interest to the North Atlantic Alliance. '
"Law of the Sea: Convention on the High Seas," in De-
partment of State, United States Treaties—Treaties and Other
International Acts Series, 5200-5252 , U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C., 1963, TIAS 5200, herein after re-
ferred to as "The High Seas Treaty," TIAS 5200
.
1 1 Interestingly, this Treaty states that non-coastal (land
locked) s bates "should have free access to the sea" by agree-
ment with the coastal state. This agreement should include
reciprocal freedom of transit and equal treatment within sea-
ports of the coastal state (Article 3). Article 2 also mentions
other unspecified freedoms "recognized by the general prin-




9). Warships may send a boarding party aboard a foreign
merchant ship only if the former suspects piracy, slaving, or
that the merchant is in reality of the same flag as the warship
(Article 22). "Warships or military aircraft, or other ships
or aircraft on government service specially authorized" may
exercise the right of hot pursuit of a foreign ship, but only
under strict guidelines. The pursuit must start when the
foreign ship is in the internal, territorial, or contiguous
waters of the coastal state, must not be an interrupted pursuit,
must be due to a distinct violation of the coastal states 1
rights, and ends when the foreign ship enters her own or third
country's territorial sea (Article 23).
The remainder of the Treaty covers the prevention of pollu-
tion on the high seas, the right to lay cables and the care
thereof, and the responsibilities for damaging these cables.
The coastal state has the right to explore and exploit the con-
tinental shelf, but may not impede the laying or maintenance of
these cables (Articles 2Zf-29).
The third of the 1958 Law of the Sea treaties covered the
continental shelf and has only a tangential effect on warships.
This Treaty allows the exploration of the continental
12These include, but are not limited to oceanographic re-
search ships, government owned but civilian manned auxiliary
ships used to service naval ships, government-owned civilian




shelf and the exploitation of its natural resources, but not
any "unjustifiable interference with navigation" in "recognized
sea lanes" (Article 5). The coastal states, however, exercise
sovereign rights over the continental shelf for purposes of
exploration and exploitation and may build installations or
other devices to these ends (Articles 2 and 5). "Ships of all
nationalities must respect /the/ safety zones" of up to 500
meters around these installations. ^ There are no restrictions
as to the size of, or type of equipment on, these installations
except that they be used for the "exploration and exploitation
of the shelf's natural resources." Also, this Treaty does not
examine the rights of any states governing the deep ocean floor
beyond the continental shelf.
1 3
^The continental shelf refers to "the seabed and subsoil
of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the
area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters or,
beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superadjacent
waters admits of exploitation of the natural resources of the
said areas /and/ to the seabed and subsoil of similar sub-
marine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands." Article 1,
"Law of the Sea: Convention on the Continental Shelf," in
Department of State, United. States Treaties—Treaties and Other
International Acts Series, 5516-5580 , U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. , 19&+, TIAS 5578, herein after referred
to as "The Continental Shelf Treaty," TIAS 5578 .
The continental shelf may be defined, as "the shallow
part of the sea floor immediately adjacent to and surrounding
the land.
.
./and/ covers a large area: approximately one-sixth
of the world." David A. Ross, Introduction to Oceanography
,
Apple ton, Century, Crofts, New York, 1970, p. 261 . See Appendix
2L for a diagram of the Continental Margin (including the
shelf) and the Ocean Basin.
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The last of these 1958 Law of the Sea treaties ^ deals
strictly with fishing and the conservation of these resources.
It did not define fishing boats or their equipment, or the fish-
ing grounds involved, except that they are high seas areas.
These 1958 Law of the Sea treaties avoided as many problems
as they attempted to solve. The Territorial Sea Treaty failed
to provide a measurable distance for that sea, although the
assumption is somewhere under 12 miles because the contiguous
zone adjacent to the territorial sea cannot be more than 12
miles at its outer limit. The treaty permits the innocent
passage of foreign ships, including warships, through straits
which are used for international navigation between two high
seas areas or into a state's territorial sea, but does not
further define either straits or the constitution of inter-
national navigation. By the same token, these same internation-
al straits are assumed, by definition, to be part of the high
seas ("all parts of the sea that are not included in the terri-
torial sea or in the internal waters of a State"). The Con-
tinental Shelf Treaty has an unlimited loophole in its state-
ment of depth limit beyond the 200 meters as being the ex-
ploitable depth. This latter is limited only by expanding
technology. Some of these problems were not forseen in 1958,
but others were deliberately ignored in order to achieve some
1 5
"^'Law of the Sea: Convention on Fishing and Conservation
of the Living Resources of the High Seas," in Department of
State, United States Treaties—Treaties and Other International
Acts Series, 5c3tJ2~59o^h u * s « Government Printing Office.
Washington, D.C., 1966, TIAS 5969, herein after referred to as




agreement— this being thought better than none at all. What
few restraints were mentioned in these treaties may be con-
sidered as geographic in nature because they in no way differen-
tiate between or among types or nationalities of warships.
In a well-publicized move in 1961, the General Assembly
responded to the expressed desires for general and complete
disarmament and to the French nuclear weapons test in the
Sahara Desert by resolving that Africa be declared a denucle-
arized zone. This Resolution expressed concern about radio-
active fallout and the arms race of "the Powers." To avoid
these problems it called, upon the member states of the United
Nations to refrain from nuclear testing in Africa, to
refrain from using the territory, territorial
waters or air space of Africa for testing,
storing or transporting nuclear weapons,
1 7
and to consider the continent as a denuclearized zone. ' The
Resolution did not define the territorial waters of Africa,
nor did it regulate the transporting of nuclear weapons in or
through these waters. It ignored any implicit conflict between
the innocent passage of warships and this resolution. It was
Department of the Air Force, Air Force Pamphlet 110-20,
Selected International Agreements , Headquarters U.S. Air Force,
Washington, D.C., June 1973> pp. 7-1, herein after referred to
as AFP 110-20, Selected International Agreements
.
i n
'"General Assembly Resolutions 1652 (XVI): Consideration
of Africa as a Denuclearized Zone, November 2/+, 1961," in
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on
Disarmament 1961 , U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington,
D.C., 1962, pp. 6^-7-6^-8; herein after referred to as ACDA,
Documents on Disarmament 1961.
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aimed primarily at above ground weapons testing in the desert,
and not the newly created submarine launched ballistic missiles
or the coming nuclear weapons carrying surface warships. At
any rate, none of the nuclear powers approved the Resolution,
1 R
preferring to abstain from voting.
The J.atin American Nuclear Free Zone
In late 196k > the Latin American nations began a Prepara-
tory Conference, convened to draft a treaty creating a nuclear-
free zone in their area. After more than two years of work,
the 21 nations involved in this effort met in a final session
to
contribute, so far as lies in their power, to-
wards ending the armaments race, especially
in the field of nuclear weapons, and towards
strengthening a world at peace... «q
This Treaty prohibits and prevents within the territories of
the signatories the "testing, use, manufacture, production or
acquisition" of nuclear weapons, as well as their receipt,
storage, installation, or deployment either directly or in-
directly (Article 1). Of equal, or perhaps greater importance
here, is the definition of territory used.
__
ACDA, Documents on Disarmament 1961 , p. 6*f8.
1 Q^
"Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin
America with Additional Protocol I," and "Additional Protocol
II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in
Latin America," AFP 110-20. Selected International Agreements
pp. 8-9; herein after referred to as "The Latin American
Nuclear Free Zone Treaty," "Protocol I," and "Protocol II."
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For the purposes of this Treaty, the term 'terri-
tory 1 shall include the territorial sea, air
space and. any other space over which the State
/a signatory/ exercises sovereignty in accordance
with its own legislation. (Article 3)
And
The zone of application of this Treaty is the
whole of the territories for which the Treaty
is in force. (Article k)
The zone of application, described in detailed latitude
and longitude, covers an enormous amount of territory, barely
missing Bermuda and the Hawaiian Islands and including great
portions of the Atlantic, South Atlantic, and South Pacific
20Oceans. It further defines a nuclear weapon, but differen-
tiates between a v/eapon and an "instrument that may be used
for the transport or propulsion of the device.
.
./that/ is
separable from the device and not an indivisible part thereof"
(Article 5).
The remainder of the Treaty discussed an organization to
handle the peaceful development of nuclear energy, its rela-
tion with the International Atomic Energy Agency, and other
housekeeping procedures. The Protocol I applied the Treaty to
those areas within the nuclear free zone which, de .jure or de
facto , are the responsibility of non-signatory major powers
20Article i+. Perhaps the inclusion of such large expanses
of water were necessary to accommodate the claimed, territorial
seas of several of the Latin American nations. See Appendix II
for information on these claims. It also specifically excludes
the continental part of the U.S. and her territorial waters.
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21(specifically, the United States, Great Britain, and France).
22Protocol II, which the United States and Great Britain signed,
is an affirmation by the acceding parties outside the zone that
they will do nothing to contribute to the violation of the
Treaty. The United States Senate, however, "understood and
declared" that it deems relevant only those portions which are
compatible with international law (non-recognition of extended
territorial seas claims); that the United States, regardless
of the Treaty, retains exclusive rights to grant or deny transit
and transport privileges (the Panama Canal and. other high seas
areas); and that the U.S. could use nuclear weapons in Latin
America if she were attacked by an alliance of a Latin country
25
and a non-Latin nuclear power.
Theoretically, this Treaty closes off large areas of the
oceans to any naval warships carrying nuclear weapons aboard.
21 Henry Giniger, "Latin Nuclear Ban Treaty Approved, but
Faces Snags," The New York Times , February 13, 1967, pp. 1 and
1 if . Great Britain retains several Caribbean Islands, as well
as the Faulkland Islands in the South Atlantic. France classi-
fies Guadeloupe and Martinique as integral parts of metropoli-
tan France and thus had a constitutional problem deciding
whether or not to make a special case for them. And the United
States refused to include the Virgin Islands or Puerto Rico in
the zone, although they agreed to include Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, if Cuba signed. She did not. None of these three signed
Protocol I. See also: Henry Giniger, "21 Hemisphere Nations
Hopeful as Talks Open on Atom Curb," The New York Times ,
February 2, 1967, p. 18.
22
"Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibi-
tion of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America," Department of State,
United States Treaties and Other International Agreements ,
Volume 22, Part I , 1971, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C., 1972, TIAS 7137, 22 UST754, p. 73k.
^"Protocol II." AFP 110-20, Selected International Agree-
ments , pp. 8-19 to 8-20.
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It makes allowances for nuclear or conventionally powered, ships
not carrying nuclear weapons, as they are "separable from the
/nuclear/ device and. not an indivisible part thereof." Since
"territory" includes the territorial sea and the air space
claimed by each signatory according to "its own legislation,"
it prohibits overflight, in this vast area, of planes carrying
nuclear weapons regardless if their destinations; neither
does it allow for transit (innocent passage) of naval warships
carrying nuclear weapons. It does not even permit merchant
ships whose cargo includes nuclear weapons to sail through the
area. If enforced, then, it could be one of the most extensive
of geographic restraints in the maritime area of arms control. ^
The Baltic Continental Shelf Declaration of 1968
In an otherwise undistinguished declaration among the
Soviet Union, Poland, and the German Democratic Republic on
the Baltic Continental Shelf, a new phrase appears. In October
of 1968, these three states signed a declaration to "confirm
and further develop the provisions contained in the 1958
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf in conformity with
25the concrete conditions of the Baltic Sea...." y The declara-
tion reaffirmed the states' rights to explore and exploit the
^"The U.S. and Great Britain signed only Protocol II.
France, the U.S.S.R. , and. the PRC have not signed the Treaty
or either Protocol. Neither has India.
25
"^"German Democratic Republic-Poland-U.S.S.R. Declaration
on the Continental Shelf of the Baltic Sea," International Legal
Materials Current Documents, Vol. 7* 1968 , The American Society
of International Law, Washington, D.C., 1§69, p. 1393. Trans-
lated from Izvestia , October 2if, 1968, p. 2, by William E. Butler.
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natural resources of the shelf, but failed to mention anything
about the rights of scientific research as the 1958 Continental
Shelf Treaty had. '" The interesting feature is paragraph
three: "The continental shelf of the Baltic Sea must be used
by all states exclusively for peaceful purposes." Peaceful
purposes and continental shelf are nowhere defined, or expanded
upon, but the possibilities are almost limitless. Other Baltic
27
states may accede to the declaration, but none has no far. '
It certainly could be viev/ed as a possible arms control or
restraining measure, as it apparently is by a Soviet representa-
tive to the United Nations, who said that the "whole of the
seabed and the ocean floor must be used for exclusively peace-
ful purposes." This includes the all continental shelves, one
of which has been reserved for this purpose by the Baltic Sea
Declaration of 1968.
The concept of a sea-bed and an ocean floor used, for
peaceful purposes is given at least partial expression in the
Seabed Treaty.
__
William E. Butler, "Notes and. Comments— The Soviet
Union and the Continental Shelf," American Journal of Inter-
national Law , Vol. 63, No. 1 , January 1969, p. 10?.
'The Baltic Sea States are: Norway, Sweden, Finland,
the U.S.S.R., Poland, the GDR, the Federal Republic of Germany,
and Denmark.
28
"United. Nations General Assembly, Provisional Verbatim
Record, of the Fifteen Hundred and Ninety-Second Meeting First
Committee, 31 October 1 968," in Moshe Y. Sachs, editor, World-
mark International Documentation—Sea-Bed. 1968, Volume B-2 ,
Worldmark Press, Ltd. , New York, 1970, p. 678.
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The Seabed Arms Control Treaty of 1971
The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, meeting
regularly in Geneva, began working on a seabed arras control
measure in 1968, as a preventive rather than remedial measure.
After more than two years of negotiations, the Treaty was
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 7,
29
1970. Interestingly, the draft from which the final Treaty
was negotiated had. been a joint presentation by the United
States and the Soviet Union. The latter had "started with a
proposal for a comprehensive ban on all military uses of the
seabed," but later moved sufficiently close to the American
position to generate a joint effort. The Treaty, with 85
31
signatories by the end of 1971 is a popular one, perhaps be-
cause no one is presently interested in using the seabeds for
nuclear or other weapons.
The Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of
Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the
Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof was
^"Treaty on Seabed Arms Will Be Signed Thursday," The
New York Times , February 9, 1971, p. 12.
^Benjamin Welles, "Ban on Atom Arms on Seabed Signed in
Three Capitals," The New York Times , February 12, 1971,
pp. 1, 5.
-* So far, 52 nations have deposited their ratifications
or accession to this Treaty. Department of State, Treaties
in Force—A List of Treaties and Other International Agree-
ments of the United States in Force on January 1, 1974 , U.S.




signed in Moscow, London, and Washington on February 11, 1971,
and calls for "the exploration and use of the seabed and the
ocean floor for peaceful purposes." To this end, the signa-
tories
undertake not to emplant or emplace on the sea-
bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil there-
of beyond the outer limit of a seabed zone, as
defined in Article II, any nuclear weapons or
any other types of weapons of mass destruction
as well as structures, launching installations
or any other facilities specifically designed
for storing, testing or using such weapons
(Article 1).
It specifically excludes the territorial seas of a coastal
state and starts the Treaty zone at the 12 mile contiguous
zone outlined in the 1958 Territorial Sea Treaty (Article 2).
This raises some potential problems with those nations claiming
a territorial sea of more than 12 miles, but this Treaty
states that it neither supports nor prejudices the claims of
these countries with respect to recognition or non-recognition
of territorial seas and contiguous zones (Article 1+) .
Each state has the right "to verify through observation
the activities of other States Parties... on the seabed and. the
ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof" in the prescribed zone,
but may not interfere with any activities (Article 3). Parties
still doubtful about another's activities may consult with that
suspected signatory, as well as other members. They may in-
vestigate and discuss further, but no action is prescribed.
32w See "Multilateral—Seabed Arms Control," Department of
State, United States Treaties and Other International Agree-
ments Volume 23, Part 1 , 1972, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C., 1973, pp. 701-709, herein after referred to
as "The Seabed Arms Control Treaty," 23 UST 701 .
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The Parties also "undertake to continue negotiations in good
faith concerning further measures in the field of disarmament"
to prevent a seabed arms race and will review the operation of
the Treaty after five years (1977) (Articles 5 and 7).
While this Treaty may be considered "a modest step among
33
many,"-^ it nevertheless excludes large parts of the seabed
and the ocean from military use. This Treaty must be based,
at least in part, on the "assumption that it is easier to
exclude weapons from an environment to which they have not yet
been introduced than to limit or remove them where they al~
35
ready exist. "-^ It seems apparent, at least for the present,
that this geographic and weapons-type arms restraint or limita-
tion measure was attainable because neither technological de-
velopment nor political inclination were directed toward, use of
the seabed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof.
This new (or perhaps renewed) interest in direct maritime
arms control measures manifested itself later that year in the
United Nations where more than a dozen nations followed the
footsteps of the Latin Americans in advocating restrictions
in the Indian Ocean area.
33
•^"Remarks by President Nixon on the Signature of the
Sea-Ber Treaty, February 11, 1971," in Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency, Documents on Disarmament 1971 . U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1972, p. 12 herein
after referred to as ACDA, Documents on Disarmament 1971 .
34
""ACDA, Documents on Disarmament 1971 . pp. 933-934.
35
-^James E. Dougherty, How to Think About Arms Control
and. Disarmament
. National Strategy Information Center, Inc.,
Crane, Russak and Company, New York, 1973, p. 152.
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The 1971 Indian Ocean Zone of Peace Proposals
A draft resolution was submitted, to the First (Political)
Committee of the General Assembly which called for
the littoral and hinterland. States of the Indian
Ocean to preserve their independence, sovereignty
and territorial integrity, and to resolve their
political, economic and social problems under
conditions of peace and tranquility. .. ^z-
^7They mentioned a 1970 Conference^' which advocated that the
Indian Ocean be declared a zone of peace which would exclude
"Great Pov/er rivalries and competition as well as bases" and
would be "free of nuclear weapons." Military Alliances were
disavowed as costing too much; they preferred to expend their
limited resources on "the more compelling and productive task
of economic and social reconstruction..." A zone of peace
would, "arrest" an arms race in that area and to this purpose
they declared that
(T)he Indian Ocean, within limits to be determined,
together with the air space above and the ocean
floor subjacent thereto, is hereby designated for
all time as a Zone of Peace. ^o
-^
v
"Eleven Nation Draft Resolution Submitted to the First
Committee of the General Assembly: Declaration of the Indian
Ocean as a Zone of Peace, November 30, 1971," ACDA, Documents
on Disarmament 1971 « pp. 807-808. The original states were
Ceylon, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Somalia, Uganda, Tanzania, Yemen,
Zambia, and later Burundi and Swaziland. These 11 were sub-
sequently joined, by India and Yugoslavia. This Resolution
is herein after referred to as the "Indian Ocean Zone of
Peace Resolution of 30 November 1971."
-5
'The Lusaka Declaration of the Third Conference of Heads
of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries of September 1970,
-> "Indian Ocean Zone of Peace Resolution of 30 November
1971 " ACDA, Documents on Disarmament 1971 , p. 808.
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This Resolution further asked for Great Power consulta-
tions to halt "further escalation and expansion of their mili-
tary presence" there, and to eliminate existing military bases,
installations, supply facilities, and any nuclear weapons or
weapons of mass destruction in the Zone of Peace. They stated
finally that
(W)arships and military aircraft may not use the
Indian Ocean for any threat or use of force against
the sovereignty, territorial integrity and inde-
pendence of any littoral or hinterland State of the
Indian Ocean in contravention of the purposes and
principles of the Charter of the United Nations
and that
(S)ubject to the foregoing, the right to free
and unimpeded use of the zone by vessels of all
nations is unaffected. 7n
After a little more than two weeks of debate, the General
Assembly adopted a slightly revised Indian Ocean Peace Zone
resolution. Unfortunately, the notion of a Zone of Peace
failed to define that zone ("within limits to be determined"),
thus perhaps fatally weakening the concept even before it was
adopted. The Resolution does not define bases or installa-
tions or facilities of the Great Powers who must remove these
units, nor does it name the Great Powers, some of which may
be merely protecting their own territories within this
39
-^"Indian Ocean Zone of Peace Resolution of 30 November
1971," ACDA, Documents on Disarmament 1971 , p. 809.
^"General Assembly Resolution 2832 (XXVI): Declaration
of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, December 16, 1971,"
in ACDA, Documents on Disarmament 1971 , pp. 901-903.
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undelimited area. Of the nuclear powers, only the People's
Republic of China supported the proposal; the other four
abstained and no nation voted against the Resolution. Further
work within the United Nations has been done on this considera-
tion, but definition of terms, both geographic and territorial,
is difficult, and runs into other international laws and agree-
ments, as the High Seas Treaty, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, and various bilateral and multilateral security agree-
ments. Although the myriad problems have been noted, few
solutions seem to be available. *"
The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Accords of 1972
Even while the Seabed Treaty of 1971 was being negotiated
in Geneva, another, bilateral, arms control attempt was being
pursued by the United. States and the Soviet Union. In January
of 1967, President Johnson wrote to Premier Kosygin saying
that the Soviet anti-ballistic missile system then being built
by the Soviet Union would cause the United States in turn to
seek to overcome it with increased penetration capabilities.
1 1
^ France and Great Britain have territories which may be
included in the Zone of Peace and may desire or need to forti-
fy these places. If, however, Great Powers means the United
States and the Soviet Union, then neither has any national
territory within the areas, although both have temporary and
permanent military and naval units there. If "Great" means
nuclear, then France and Great Britain are caught in a diffi-
cult situation if they accept this Zone.
For an interesting examination of this, see: United.
Nations General Assembly, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on
the Indian Ocean . Official Records, Twenty-Eighth Session,
Supplement No. 29 (A/9029), United. Nations, New York, 1973,
especially the Sri Lanka working paper and the excerpts from
statements made during the general debate, pp. 5~23.
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A United States increase in its offensive capabilities and de-
fenses would then generate a similar Soviet response. Premier
Kosygin responded that the Soviets were "prepared, to continue
the exchange of views" on this matter. -* These exchanges of
views proceeded at a leisurely pace, but in August of 1968
the Soviet Union invited President Johnson to visit Moscow in
October to begin the talks. *" The Soviet move into Czechoslo-
vakia that same month ended any hopes of an October visit,
although President Johnson tried to reschedule the meeting
later in the fall. The Soviets were not interested then, pre-
u 5ferring to deal with the incoming administration. ^ President
Nixon, in turn, desired to review the whole situation which
meant a further delay until the late fall of 1969.
The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks started in 1969 and
alternated between Helsinki and Vienna from then until May of
1972, when President Nixon travelled to Moscow to sign the bi-
lateral accords between the two superpowers. In the last few
months of negotiations the question of the submarine launched
W2)Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point—Perspective of
the Presidency 1965-1969 , Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New
York, 1971, pp. 479-480.
^Johnson, The Vantage Point... , pp. 485-488.
45^Bernard Gwertzman, "Five Year Effort for an Arms Curb
Began with Secret Johnson Letter to Kosygin," The New York
Times , May Z7 , 1972, p. 9.
* For an excellent chronicle of the story of the Strate-
gic Arms Limitation Talks, including the 1960' s background
information, see: John Newhouse, Cold Dawn— The Story of SALT
.
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1973, particularly
Chapters 2 and 3 for background and. initial maneuverings.
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ballistic missiles became a crucial issue.
(S)ome American negotiators reportedly fear that
the Kremlin has invested so much capital in de-
veloping new undersea weapons and construction
facilities that it will continue to reject Ameri-
can proposals for a ceiling on submarine-based
missiles.
, n
A slightly different view as to why no agreement could be
reached on strategic missile submarine launchers surfaced in
May. The Soviet Union reportedly refused to consider any
underwater limitations unless the United States agreed to in-
clude forward-based tactical aircraft in Europe and aboard
i Q
carriers in the Mediterranean Sea. u Yet a third reason may
have been that the Soviet Union was sufficiently inferior in
submarine technology and development that she was unwilling to
formalize this inferiority by treaty or agreement.
^
At the same time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff apparently
told President Nixon that they "could not support an offensive
arms agreement unless submarine launched missiles were in-
50
eluded."^ President Nixon sent Mr. Kissinger on a secret trip
^" Hedrick Smith, "Deadlock on Submarines Said to Persist
in Vienna," The New York Times , January 12, 1972, pp. 1, 13.




f Robert B. Semple, Jr., "U.S. Voices Hope of Expanded
Pact on Limiting Arms," The New York Times , May 2, 1972,
PP. 1, 5.
^Newhouse, Cold Dawn. .
.
, p. 239.
^Bernard Gwertzman, "Strategic Arms Talks: Long Road to
Success," The New York Times
?
June 18, 1972, pp. 1, 16. See
also: Bernard Gwertzman, "Nixon Says Pact on Arms Depends on
Moscow Trip," The New York Times , March 25, 1972, pp. 1, 5, in
which is stated the fact that the United States was demanding
inclusion of SLBM's in the accord on offensive weapons.

73.
to Moscow and persuaded the Soviet Union to include submarines
in the accord.
In doing a deal with the Americans on offense,
Brezhnev was influenced much less by strategic
calculation than by the politics of his foreign
policy. Nixon and Kissinger were right to in-
sist that he accept a link between offense and
defense. ci
The summit meeting in Moscow in the latter part of May
generated several agreements between the two sides including
such things as "measures designed to establish more favorable
conditions for developing commercial and other economic ties";
"increased scientific and. technical co-operation on the basis
of mutual benefit and shared effort"; "further bilateral co-
operation in space"; "an agreement on health co-operation...
on the common enemies, disease and disability"; and "a programme
of co-operation in the protection and enhancement of man's
52
environment."^ At the summit, the leaders also took note of
53
other international situations. ^ They also outlined 12 basic
principles of relations ranging from peaceful co-existence, to
continued exchanges of views, to obligations to their
5k
allies. All of these introductory statements, however, were
preliminary to the heart of the meeting, the strategic arms
^ Newhouse, Cold Dawn. .
.
. pp. 2if3-2Zf6 and 262.
-^"Communique of 29 May 1972," in Survival , Vol. 14,




," Survival , pp. 189-191.
-^"Basic Principles of Relations," Survival , Vol. 1Zf,
No. 4, July/August 1972, pp. 191-192.
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limitation agreements. These consist of a treaty limiting
anti-ballistic missile systems, an interim agreement of inter-
continental land-based and submarine-launched ballistic
missiles, and agreed interpretations, common understandings,
55
and unilateral statements relating to the agreement. y
The Anti-Ballistic Missile System Treaty, among other
things, prohibits the development, testing, or deploying of ABM
systems or components which are "sea-based, air-based, space-
based, or mobile-land based" (Article 5). The rest of the
Treaty discusses limits and prohibitions of land, based, systems,
using "national technical means of verification" (Article 12).
The Interim Agreement and. Protocol, on the other hand, deal
extensively with maritime arms problems, both in and of them-
selves, and as they are linked, to land based weapons systems.
The Soviet Union and the United States, desirous of
creating "more favorable conditions for active negotiations on
limiting strategic arms" and a "relaxation of international
tensions," made several agreements on ballistic missiles.
There will be no construction of additional land-based inter-
continental ballistic missiles and severe limits on conversions
from "light" to "heavy" ICBM's (Articles 1 and. 2). Article 3
states that
?y\\ Treaty on Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of 26 May
1972;" "Interim Agreement and Protocol on Strategic Offensive
Missiles of 26 May 1972;" and "Agreed Interpretations, Common
Understandings and Unilateral Agreements," in Survival, Vol.
H, No. 4, July/August 1972, pp. 192-194, 195-196, 196-199,
respectively. Unless otherwise indicated, the following analy-
sis uses these source documents.
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The parties undertake to limit submarine-launched
ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and modern
ballistic missile submarines to the numbers
operational and under construction on the date of
signature of this interim agreement, and in addi-
tion launchers and submarines constructed under
procedures established by the parties as replace-
ments for an equal number of ICBM launchers of
older types deployed prior to 19&4 or for
launchers on older submarines.
The numbers agreed to in the Protocol are for the same period
as the agreement, five years, and are specific for both sides.
The United States cannot have more than 710 submarine ballistic
missile launchers on 44 modern ballistic missile submarines,
while the Soviet Union is limited to 950 launchers "on 62 sub-
marines. There are also numerical replacement limits stipulated
(at a slightly lower level) for the launchers put on nuclear
56powered submarines, but the hull counts remain the same.
Again "national technical means of verification are used,"
with both parties refraining from "deliberate concealment
measures" (Article 5).
The Agreed Interpretations pertain almost entirely to the
anti-ballistic missile system treaty, although two interpreta-
tions deal with the time frame for dismantling old ICBM' s or
SLBM's when these are replaced by new submarines. All of the
Common Understandings refer to the ABM Treaty also, from silo
dimensions, to test ranges, to mobile systems. Two of the Uni-
lateral Statements concern the Interim Agreement. One is an
emphasis by the United States on Article 5> which discusses
__
y For a description of the process of arriving at these





verification and abstention from use of deliberate concealment
measures, "including in particular their application to fitting
57
out or berthing submarines. "^' The only Soviet unilateral
statement made deals with submarines. This paragraph links
the total number of United States submarines with those of
their NATO allies (Great Britain and France are not mentioned
by name). The Soviet Union
Agrees that for the period of effectiveness of
the interim 'freeze' agreement the US and its
NATO allies have up to 50 such submarines with
a total of up to 800 ballistic missile launchers




The Soviet Union reserves the right to increase its numbers by
the same number of combined United States and NATO partner
totals above the stated Soviet ceilings. This is the only way
the Soviet Union can at least "partially compensate" for the
other western ballistic missile submariners and United States
submarine bases overseas. The United States rejected the
"validity" of the Soviet statement, preferring to consider
these as bi-lateral accords, not affecting the Allies' arms.
The Interim Agreement, of greater import here, is as im-
portant for what it does not cover as for what it does include.
It temporarily freezes the numbers of intercontinental and sub-
marine launched ballistic missile launchers to agreed upon
numbers. It also limits the numbers of modern ballistic
^"Unilateral Statement (A)(c)," p. 1 98 of Survival ,
Vol. 1 i+, No. k, July/August 1972.
58„ Unilateral Statement B," p. 198 of Survival .
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missile submarines within stated totals. It does not cover
any other types of ships or submarines, nor does it discuss
other weapons of submarines, such as cruise missiles or tor-
pedoes, as they are not considered "strategic." By the same
token, it can be argued that ballistic missile submarines
should, not be considered a true part of maritime warfare be-
cause they are merely the platforms for carrying missiles.
They do not participate in "traditional" sea warfare, rather
they are mobile silos for missiles eventually to be used, not
by the ship herself for intership combat (or even shore
support) , but by national command authorities on pre-selected
59targets. This Agreement links the land- and. sea-based inter-
continental missiles through the exchange numbers and total
figures, thus perhaps reinforcing the above theory. It does
not link other types of ships or v/eapons systems either
strategic or nuclear. It is a bilateral effort—other parti-
cipants are neither required, nor desired, except for the
Soviet unilateral statement concerning other NATO submarines
and launchers. Neither of those countries has accepted this
view—nor has the United States.
The Interim Agreement and. the companion Treaty are very
narrow in their scope.
The arms race will go on, not only in the regular
army, navy and air force weaponry that is un-
affected by the accord, but also in the quality
50
^ yFor an excellent statement of this argument, see:
Edward Wegener, "Theory of Naval Strategy in the Nuclear Age,"
Naval Review 1972, United States Naval Institute Proceedings ,
Vol. 98, No. 831, May 1972, pp. 190-207.

78.
of nuclear warheads— that is, their size and accu-
racy and evasive skills—and in the arts of anti-
submarine warfare and even in the technology of
the missile defense systems that the treaty is to
limit severely at inadequate levels.^
The political reasons for the Treaty and the Interim Agreement
are many and varied, but the results are narrow in scope and
limited in objective. Perhaps it can be said here (as it
has been of other agreements) , that both sides agreed to give
up, or not build, or not protect those things which they had
no intention of keeping, building, or protecting in the first
place. They may be viewed as quantitative, limiting a specific
type of weapon and a specific platform for that weapon.
In addition to the already mentioned accords, another
document was signed between the two states having to do with
the maritime atmosphere. It is the Agreement on Prevention of
Incidents Involving Warships. In it both parties want
"safety of navigation" of their naval ships and aircraft and
are "guided by the principles and rules of international law."
Article 1 defines v/arships, auxiliary naval ships, aircraft,
Max Frankel, "A First Step, But a Major Stride," The
New York Times , May 27, 1972, pp. 1, 9. See also: Robert B.
Semple, Jr., "Questions and Answers on Arms Pacts," The New
York Times , June M\. t 1972, p. 18. He comments on the lack of
qualitative agreements and says, additionally, that the
Soviets may have refused an agreement on mobile land-based
ICBM's because they feel the U.S. submarine "fleet has better
positions in various bases around the world than the Soviet
fleet."
^Hedrick Smith, "Soviet Says Arms Accords Show U.S.
Accepts Parity," The New York Times , May 28, 1972, p. 2Zf .
62 t , Text £. u.S. -Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of
Incidents Involving Warships," The New York Times , May 26,




and naval formations. All commanding officers are to be in-
structed in the "rules of the road" ("the letter and the spirit
of the international regulations for preventing collisions at
sea") (Article 2). Articles 3 and 4 described the measures to
be taken to avoid collisions at sea by ships and aircraft.
This three year agreement exhorts both parties to use signals,
radio, and international codes to warn of immediate or planned
exercises, maneuvers, or "actions on the high seas which re-
present a danger to navigation or aircraft in flight" (Article
6).
Although not considered an arms control or arms restraint
document, this accord is looked at as the first "military"
65
agreement since World War II between the two parties. ^ It
acknowledges that potential hazards do exist in this naval
environment and that lack of restraint could lead to a more
serious situation in the maritime arena. It has been included,
for this reason.
These, then, were the significant treaties and agreements
pertaining to the maritime areas of interest as they relate to
arms controls and/or restraints since World War II. There
have been other proposals made or comments upon ocean aspects
-^Robert B. Semple, Jr., "Talks in Moscow Seek to Develop
U.S. -Soviet Trade," The New York Times , May 26, 1972, pp. 1,
4. Discussions with an ACDA representative in February 1974
indicate that the Prevention of Incidents at Sea Agreement is
merely a further formalization of already-recognized inter-
national law. It is not new and thus cannot be considered as
an arms control measure. It does not appear in any ACDA or




of arms problems which merit mention in this same time frame.
The list of items reviewed is neither deep nor extensive.
Rather, it may provide a small picture of the types of pro-
posals which have been made.
Other Commentaries
In 1962, the United States submitted to the Eighteen
Nation Disarmament Committee a proposal on general and complete
disarmament. ^ Without examining the philosophy of the draft
treaty, the maritime proposals are worth noting. For example,
30 percent reductions of armed combat aircraft, submarine-
launched missiles, and "combatant ships with standard dis-
placement of 400 tons or greater of the following classes:
aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyer types and
submarines," would be executed according to a fixed time
schedule. The aircraft, missiles, and ships would be cate-
gorized by armaments and types. Future production of these
weapons systems would be based on destruction of existing
systems according to an agreed-upon formula. Armed forces
levels of personnel would be limited or reduced to 2.1 million
^""United States Proposal Submitted to the Eighteen Nation
Disarmament Committee: Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty
on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World, April
18, 1962," in United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
Documents on Disarmament 1962 , U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D. C. , 1963 » PP» 351-382. Unless otherwise indi-
cated, all references to this draft treaty are from this
source, herein after referred to as the "U.S. General and Com-
plete Disarmament Proposed Treaty 1962," ACDA, Documents on
Disarmament 1962 . An earlier proposal called, "Programme for
General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World," was sub-
mitted by the U.S. in 1961. See: United States Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament 1961 , U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1962, pp. ^75-/4.82.
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for the United States and the Soviet Union and to other speci-
fied levels for other signatories. Subsequent stages of reduc-
tions were similarly designed with percentage reductions of
weapons systems and personnel. Specific proposals were made
for nuclear weapons, military bases and facilities, military
research and development, and. the strengthening of international
peacekeeping arrangements during these stages of national re-
ductions. The remainder of the draft treaty discussed the
methods, procedures, and international machinery to be used in
achieving these goals.
A previously submitted Soviet draft treaty ^ called for
the scheduled, elimination of: "(a) 11 military aircraft capable
of delivering nuclear weapons" ; "all surface warships, capable
of being used as vehicles for nuclear weapons, and. submarines
of any class or type"; and all bases, facilities, or fields
used in support of a training for these weapons systems. All
foreign bases would be dismantled, and all troops stationed
overseas would be withdrawn. Overall defense strengths of the
United States and the Soviet Union would be reduced initially
to 1.7 million each, with other parties having agreed limits.
Conventional arms production, military expenditures, and home-
based military equipments and facilities would, be reduced and
in some cases destroyed, according to a schedule. This draft
6s^
"Soviet Proposal Submitted to the Eighteen Nation Dis-
armament Committee: Draft Treaty on General and Complete Dis-
armament Under Strict International Control, March 15, 1962,"
in ACDA, Documents on Disarmament 1962 , pp. 103~127. Unless
otherwise indicated, all references to this draft treaty are
from this source. This is herein after referred to as the
"Soviet General and Complete Disarmament Proposed Treaty 1962,"
ACDA, Documents on Disarmament 1962 .
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treaty also provided for international machinery to supervise,
run, and check the disarmament efforts world-wide. The Soviet
proposal speaks of international organization "inspectors" and
"independent and unrestricted control over the implementation
of the present Treaty." On the other hand, the United States
proposal states the international organization's "inspectors
would have unrestricted access without veto to all places as
necessary for the purpose of effective verification."
At the same time as the United States and the Soviet
Union were making their global proposals, the Polish govern-
ment tabled a more modest document concerning only central
Europe. This Plan did not specify types of weapons or sys-
tems or platforms, nor did it specify that the "zone" included
the territorial waters of the states named.
The nuclear-free zone proposal appeared again a year
later in a Soviet note to the Department of State in which the
former expressed deep concern over the "creation of a NATO
nuclear force which would give the West German Bundeswehr
access to atomic weapons," and "the deployment of United
rz
"Polish Memorandum Submitted to the Committee of the
Whole of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Rapacki
Plan for Denuclearized and Limited Armaments Zone in Europe,
March 28, 1962," ACDA, Documents on Disarmament 1962
,
pp. 201-205, herein after referred to as the "Rapacki Plan,"
ACDA, Documents on Disarmament 1962 .
Poland, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic,
and the Federal Republic of Germany. The following year,
Poland included territorial waters and air space in the Rapacki
Plan. See: "Memorandum by the Polish Government on Freezing
Nuclear and Thermonuclear Weapons in Central Europe, February
21)., 1964," in United States Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, Documents on Disarmament 1964 . U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, Washington, D. C.
, 1965, pp. ^l)"^*
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States nuclear submarines equipped with Polaris nuclear mis-
siles in the Mediterranean area." To allay the fears of the
littoral states of the Mediterranean and to comply with the
declaration of Africa as a nuclear-free zone, the Soviet Union
"proposes that the whole area of the Mediterranean Sea should
be declared, a zone free from nuclear missile weapons." The
American reply was pointed in its refusal to entertain the
Soviet proposal, because the latter sought only to change the
existing military situation in the Mediterranean to gain an
advantage. The United States preferred to examine efforts
aimed at "decelerating and halting the arras race" not just
those aimed at unbalancing the military scales and tipping
69them in favor of one side. y
Earlier that year the Soviet Union had proposed that
"foreign territories" not be used for bases for nuclear strate-
gic weapons systems, including "submarines carrying nuclear and
rocket weapons" and "aircraft carriers having on board air-
SB '.
"Soviet Note to the United States on Nuclear-Free Zone
in Mediterranean, May 20, 1963," in United. States Arms Con-
trol and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament 1965 ,




"Note From the United States to the Soviet Union:
Nuclear-Free Zone in the Mediterranean, June 21+, 1963," in
ACDA, Documents on Disarmament 1965, pp. 2/+2-243. At about
the same time, the Finnish government called for a nuclear-
free zone in Scandinavia with Finland, Sweden, Norway, and
Denmark pledging "themselves not to acquire nuclear weapons
or allow such weapons on their territory." Territory was not
defined. "Kekkonen Renews Plea for Atom Ban," The New York




craft armed with nuclear weapons." The United States never
replied directly to the Soviet proposal, but the British did,
saying that the
Polaris delivery system is becoming... a major
factor in maintaining the peace, however uneasy
a peace it is, which exists today. ...Polaris
is, in fact, a most substantial move in the
direction of choosing a delivery system which
makes war by accident, or war by miscalculation,
far less likely. „*
This year 196^ was notable for its several proposals re-
commending budgetary reductions as a means of restraining
armaments expenditures, but none of these proposals pertained
directly or specifically to naval or maritime matters. Simi-
lar general statements were made about reducing "delivery
vehicles" for nuclear missiles, but they, too, did not discuss
ships or naval weapons systems by name. Indeed, it appears
that the primary concern was still with land-based missiles
70
"Soviet Draft Declaration Submitted to the Eighteen
Nation Disarmament Committee: Renunciation of Use of Foreign
Territories for Stationing Strategical Means of Delivery of
Nuclear Weapons, February 12, 1963," in ACDA, Documents on
Disarmament 17&5, p. k9
»
71
"Statement by the British Representative (Godber) to
the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee /Extract/, March 29,





Vice-President Humphrey, the following year, mentioned
that among other places, the Near (Middle) East might be an
area ripe for regional nuclear arms control, but did not
73further define the area or the weapons involved. '^ Later in
1965> a White House Committee recommended
That the United States encourage the development
of nuclear-free zones in Latin America, Africa,
and the Near East, beginning with a U.S. -Soviet
Treaty establishing a zone of nuclear and conven-
tional arms limitation under U.N. inspection in
the Bering Straits and. including comparable areas
in Alaska and Siberia.™
No responses were made or initiatives taken on these proposals
and they died.
These, then, are some examples of post- 1945 proposals
?2For examples see the following, all from: United States
Arms Control and. Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament
1964 , U.S. Government Printing Office, V/ashington, D.C., 1965.
"Statement by the Soviet Representative (Tsarapkin) to the
Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Gromyko Delivery
Vehicles Proposals, February 4, 1964V 1 PP« 23-32. "Statement
by ACDA Director Foster to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament
Committee: Reduction of Delivery Vehicles, February 11, 1964,"
PP. 37~42. "Brazilian Working Paper Submitted to the Eighteen
Nation Disarmament Committee: Application of Savings on Mili-
tary Expenditures, February 13, 1964," pp. 42-44. "Statement
by the Soviet Representative (Tsarapkin) to the Eighteen
Nation Disarmament Committee: Reduction of Military Budgets,
February 20, 1964," pp. 49-52. "Memoranda Submitted to the
Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee by Brazil, Burma, Ethi-
opia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, and. the United Arab
Republic, September 14, 1964," pp. 403~427.
'-^"Peace on Earth," The Department of State Bulletin
,
Vol. 52, No. 1341, March 8, 1965, p. 329.
'"Report of the Committee on Arms Control and Disarma-
ment of the National Citizens' Commission on International Co-
operation, November 28, 1965," in United. States Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament 19o5 « U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1966, p. 578.
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that could directly affect the maritime forces of a state or
states. They are neither complete nor extensively examined.
They are merely representative of the various discussions
generated in the political arenas concerning various maritime
arms control problems and proposed, solutions.
Summary
The arms control agreements and attempts following World
War II run the gamut from general and complete world-wide
disarmament to small specific accords treating a single area
or a single weapons system.
Total disarmament for a specific country was tried with
Germany and Japan, but it failed for various political reasons,
not the least of which was that their guarantors (the Allies)
could not agree among themselves. These failures were followed
by United Nations attempts at "reductions" of armaments, with
international control of specific weapons through control of
all atomic energy production.
The Law of the Sea treaties broadened in scope, but left
many loopholes or areas untouched by any regulations because
the parties could, not agree. The Territorial Sea Treaty does
not define by distance that sea although it says what can and
cannot be done '.there. The coastal state may prohibit warships
under certain circumstances, but v/hat happens if the flag
state does not recognize that territorial sea claims of the
coastal state? On the other hand, the contiguous zone is care-
fully structured, but it only works if the coastal state's
territorial sea is 12 miles or less. The High Seas Treaty is
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rather specific as to definition and conduct, but where does
it begin? Similar, important questions may be asked about the
Continental Shelf Treaty and definitions of "exploitable
depths," etc.
These treaties were fairly broad in scope and occasionally
specific in nature, but more generally may be viewed as super-
ficial. They preferred the 'broad brush' treatment, leaving
out or ignoring those details not susceptible to agreement by
the signatories. Because of these omissions, these treaties
tend to be only marginally effective as arms restraints mea-
sures or models for future considerations. They show better
what not to do, than provide a guide for subsequent agreements.
The notions of nuclear-free or denuclearized zones, including
oceans as well as land, gained, in popularity and. were pursued.
for several years. Although the African Resolution was initial-
ly a reaction to the French land tests, it did include the
"territorial seas" of the African states. These were not
further defined, nor were the prohibitions from these waters
adequately delineated. The Latin American nuclear-free zone,
on the other hand, was most explicit as to the geographical
waters included, with latitude and longitude specified, on a
map. Its territorial imperatives were so great that they
included much water surrounding islands and lands belonging
to states not desirous of being restrained by such a Treaty.
Because of the Panama Canal Zone and Puerto Rico, for example,
the United. States did not sign that accord. This Zone included
air space and, if adhered to, prevents planes and ships from
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navigating through great portions of the southern Western
Hemisphere. The specificity of the Latin American Zone is not
repeated in the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace proposal; it merely
states it has "limits to be determined." It also does not
acknowledge that nuclear powers may not desire to exclude from
their territories physically v/ithin the region, all future
possible nuclear weapons, whether for transit, storage, or
stock piling.
The Baltic Continental Shelf declaration seems to treat
that area as a sort of 'private sea' to be used for peaceful
purposes only, whatever that may mean.
The Seabed Arms Control Treaty is more definitive in its
prohibitions than some of the other accords, but still uses the
loose wording of the High Seas Treaty to describe its area of
impact. It does not reduce any weapons systems— it merely
prohibits their possible use in an area in which (so far) there
has not been much interest, anyway.
The strategic arms limitation Interim Agreement differs
dramatically from most prior Agreements in that it is very
narrow in scope, is very tightly drawn, and covers a short
period, of time. It limits ships and. launchers by numbers and
by type, using national means of verification. The Chicken- of-
the-Sea accord, another signed at the summit meeting, merely
codifies some generally accepted rules of the road in inter-
national law.
The general and complete disarmament proposals generated
primarily at the continuing Geneva conferences, are world-wide
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in application but very specific as to weapons systems and
types. They "re defined by function, mission, dimension, and
weight. These also include strict personnel controls of mili-
tary and. civilian personnel comprising a state's armed, forces.
They do not seem to have drawn much sustained, interest over
the years and may be set forth for propaganda reasons only.
Other, more geographically modest, proposals have induced a
bit more concern, but usually within those areas affected
(central Europe, the Mediterranean, Scandinavia, and the Middle
East, the Bering Straits). Other proposals have tried to get
at arms restraints through budgetary reductions or limitations
on delivery vehicles, without much response.
The grand, schemes of the post- World. War I era seem to
have been traded, in for more geographically specific and tech-
nically modest proposals, some successfully achieved; some not.
Still, the political will of the participants is uppermost,
with states willingly giving up what they do not have and. are
not interested in obtaining, while refusing to limit those
items which they desire to increase. Fewer treaties and. other
accords have been made in the maritime field of arms controls
since World. War II; but by the same token, fewer have been
violated and. there has not been a global conflict for almost
30 years. Perhaps from this perspective, then, these accords
have merit and have proved themselves generally beneficial to
the world, but they still say little for the many small wars
which have taken place in the same time frame.
As in the previous chapter, the post-World. War II review
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finds the forces militating against arras restraints the same,
although the weapons systems and. the participants have changed,
somewhat. Political will, the perceptions of threat and inter-
national stability, the economic pressures, and the representa-
tives all affect the efforts surrounding arms control negotia-
tions. An examination of arms control attempts in areas in-
directly related to the maritime arena (next chapter) will show
similar responses. Costs of extensive armaments encourage
nations to seek controls of some sort, but international in-
stabilities and. the divergent desires of individual partici-
pants dilute or wash out these accords. Agreements frequently
are made too explicit or complicated, to be enforced or are
made too general to be worthwhile. The patterns of maritime
arms control have been altered somewhat by time and circum-




OTHER AGREEMENTS, ACCORDS, AND STATEMENTS SINCE
WORLD WAR II THAT INDIRECTLY AFFECT THE
MARITIME ARENA
Western publics, especially in England and
the United States, tend to posit an anti-
thesis between power and morality, between
the soldier and civilization, between 'evil'
expenditures for military defense and 'good'
expenditures for economic development and
welfare. ...The advent of nuclear, chemical
and biological weapons, .. .has made general
disarmament appear to many a more desirable
goal than ever before in history.
,
The various documents briefly examined, here are not
directly related to maritime arms control efforts because they
do not pertain to or attempt to limit, reduce, or otherwise
constrain naval armaments or their uses. Rather, these re-
lated matters touch on the realm of the oceans and/or their
use, or contribute concepts which might be transferred to the
maritime atmosphere in some aspect. The examinations are
cursory and merely provide the flavor of the situation.
The Truman Proclamations of 1945
In the latter part of September 1945» President Truman
made several decisions that were to affect greatly the uses of
the oceans three decades later. By Proclamation, the President
established a United States policy concerning off-shore natural
James E. Dougherty, How to Think about Arms Control and
Disarmament , National Strategy Information Center, Crane,





resources. The reasons were several: because of a "world-
wide need for new sources of petroleum and other minerals...";
because "such resources underlie many parts of the continental
shelf..."; because "recognized jurisdiction over these re-
sources is required in the interests of their conservation and
prudent utilization..."; and because the "continental shelf may
be regarded as an extension of the land-mass of the coastal
nation to and thus naturally appurtenant to it...." For these
reasons, President Truman declared that
The Government of the United States regards
the natural resources of the subsoil and sea
bed of the continental shelf beneath the high
seas but contiguous to the coasts of the
United States as appertaining to the United
States, subject to its jurisdiction and con-
trol. ...The character as high seas of the
waters above the continental shelf and the
right to their free and unimpeded navigation
are in no way thus affected.
A press release accompanying the Proclamation indicated
that the "submerged land which is contiguous to the continent
and which is covered by no more than 100 fathoms (600 feet) of
water is considered as the continental shelf." It was felt
that perhaps "oil deposits extend beyond this traditional
/three miles/ limit of national jurisdiction." The President
Proclamation 2667—Policy of the United States with Re-
spect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and the Sea Bed
of the Continental Shelf," Federal Register , Vol. 10, No. 193,
October 2, 1945, p. 12303. The Proclamation is dated Septem-
ber 28, 1945. Unless otherwise indicated, all references are
to this source.
•^National Archives and Records Service, General Services
Administration, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United
States—Harry S. Truman 1945 « U.S. Government Printing Office,




expressly eschewed any abridgement of the right of free and
unimpeded ship passage, nor did he extend the territorial sea
limits. He merely wanted to "make possible orderly develop-
ment of these resources."
That same day, the President also proclaimed the right
to establish conservation zones in those
areas of the high seas contiguous to the
coasts of the United States wherein fish-
ing activities have been or may be de-
veloped and maintained on a substantial
scale.... The character as high seas of
the areas in which such conservation
zones are established and the right to
their free and unimpeded navigation are in
no way thus affected..
In both of these proclamations, President Truman stipulated
that neither of these policies would change, affect, or modify
the "character as high seas of the area" concerned. In fact,
that is not true because the rush to territorial seas in ex-
cess of three miles commenced after 1%5 and is based in large
measure on the Truman Proclamation of that year. The more
recent extension of "areas of jurisdiction," "economic zones
of sovereignty," "patrimonial seas," and other "limited juris-
diction" areas has become an integral part of the continuing
diplomatic conversation concerning the oceans and their uses
^Proclamation 2668—Policy of the United States With Re-
spect to Coastal Fisheries in Certain Areas of the High Seas,"
Federal Register , Vol. 10, No. 193, October 2, 1945, p. 12304.
The Proclamation is dated September 28, 1945. Unless other-





Although he expressly stated that the high seas were not
affected by these policies, President Truman must have anti-
cipated at least some possible problems because he directed
that the fishery conservation zones be established by the
c
Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of State. It
seems evident that the United States policies would, in truth,
intrude into an area previously considered as being governed
by international law and not subject to unilateral national
usurpation. At any rate, if President Truman had some antici-
pation of future complications arising from his decisions, he
was justified in his apprehensions. Unilateral action or
-^Louis Henkin, "Changing Law for the Changing Seas," in
Edmund A. Gullion, editor, Uses of the Seas , Prentice-Hall,
Incorporated, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1968, pp. 69-97,
esp. pp. 72-76. See also Wolfgang Friedman, "The Law of the
Sea: Past, Present and Future," in John W. Logue, editor,
The Fate of the Oceans , World Order Research Institute, Villa-
nova University Press, Villanova, Pennsylvania, 1972, pp. 100-
135; in which he states, "(T)he seas have not, until recently
been the property of or under the exclusive jurisdiction of
any state.... The great achievement of the early seventeenth
century, one seemingly secure for the last few centuries, was
to gain acceptance of the doctrine that the sea is nobody's
property. This meant that ships could sail all over the seas,
and fisherman could fish all over the seas.... But a new era
has started. V/e can date it, I think, very close to the
famous Truman Proclamation of 1945 which proclaimed the exclu-
sive sovereignty of the United States over the resources of
the seabed of the so-called continental shelf. In a parallel
statement the continental shelf was defined as the seabed out
to a depth of roughly two hundred meters. Yes, the Truman
Proclamation started a revolution. For in its wake there came
a flood of national claims to exclusive navigation and fishery
rights and finally to full sovereignty over wide areas of the
seas.", p. 101.
c
"Executive Order 9634—Providing for the Establishment
of Fishery Conservation Zones," Federal Register , Vol. 10,




"creeping jurisdiction" is the essence of the problem in the
current United Nations Law of the Sea Conference which will
be examined shortly.
Atomic Energy Control Attempts
The Soviet Union presented a draft convention in 1946 for
eliminating "the production and employment of weapons based on
7the use of atomic energy...." This very simple proposal
called for the prohibition of the use of atomic weapons, pro-
hibition of the production or storing of these weapons, and
the destruction of all existing weapons (not further defined)
within three months (Article 1). The approach of the United
States differed in that she preferred the international con-
trol of atomic energy. The United Nations, through its Inter-
national Atomic Development Authority, would have "managerial
control or ownership of all atomic energy activities potential-
ly dangerous to world security" and the power to control,
o
inspect and license all other atomic activities. After the
'"Draft International Convention to Prohibit the Produc-
tion and Employment of Weapons Based on the Use of Atomic
Energy for the Purpose of Mass Destruction: Proposal by the
U.S.S.R., June 19, 1946," in U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee
on Foreign Relations, Disarmament and Security—A Collection
of Documents 1919-1933 , 84th Congress, 2nd. Session, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1956, pp. 225-
226. Unless otherwise indicated, all references are to this
source.
o
"United States Proposals for the International Control
of Atomic Energy: Statement of the United States Representa-
tive (Baruch) to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission,
June 1/f, 1946," in U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations, Disarmament and Security— A Collection of Documents
1919-1955, pp. 189-196, esp. p. 191. Unless otherwise indi-
cated, all references are to this source.
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implementation of control by this international authority, the
United States then proposed to stop the manufacture of bombs
and the disposal of existing stockpiles of weapons. Neither
effort produced any substantive results and the two merely
continued presenting mutually unacceptable proposals. The
first treaty of indirect importance came more than ten years
after initial attempts were made to control atomic energy
weapons.
The Antarctic Treaty of 1959
The Antarctic Treaty was signed in late 1959 by twelve
nations, including the four nuclear powers. The signatories
desired that "Antarctica shall continue forever to be used ex-
clusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene
Q
or object of international discord...." Although the Treaty
does allow the use of military personnel and equipment for
"scientific research or for any other peaceful purpose" they
may not be used to establish any military bases or fortifica-
tions, or to conduct maneuvers or weapons tests (Article 1).
The emphasis in the Treaty is on freedom of scientific re-
search in the Antarctic and exchange of information developed
through these efforts. Nuclear explosions and the disposal
of radioactive wastes are specifically prohibited and the
geographic area is carefully drawn ("the area south of 60
South Latitude") (Articles 5 and 6). The remainder of the
""The Antarctic Treaty," in Department of State, United
States Treaties—Treaties and Other International Acts Series
4771-4834 . U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
,
1961 , TIAS 4780. Unless otherwise indicated, all references
are to this source.
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Treaty discusses reporting procedures for exchange of informa-
tion, settlement of disputes, and housekeeping functions. Of
import are the geographic limits— carefully defined,— the total
ban on nuclear devices of any sort in the area, and the complete
denial of "any measures of a military nature" within the 60
South Latitude area, except that
nothing in the present Treaty shall prejudice
or in any way affect the rights, or the exer-
cise of the rights, of any State under inter-
national law with regard to the high seas
within that area. (Article 6)
The talks leading to this treaty were started in early
1958 at the urging of the United States to settle potential
disputes and allay fears of future military activity in the
area. From the time the Soviet Union's expeditions had been
active in the area after World War II, several countries
closest to the Antarctic expressed worries about the use of
the area for potential missile sites. This, coupled with the
fact that the Antarctic is the "breeding ground for much of
their weather" patterns and therefore a potential hazard for
10Walter Sullivan, "12 Countries Vow to Bar Warfare from
Antarctica," The New York Times , October 16, 1959, PP. 1, 3.
1
1
Philip L. Jessup and Howard J. Taubenfeld, Controls for
Outer Space and the Antarctic Analogy , Columbia University
Press, New York, 1959, "Part II: International Controls for
the Antarctic," pp. 137-190. In 1952, the Argentine Navy
actually fired on the Royal Navy due to territorial disputes
in the Antarctic, see p. 149. However in another article,
"Antarctic Pact Grew from I.G.Y. ," The New York Times , Decem-
ber 2, 1959, p. k7 t states that the Argentines and British
fired shots as early as 19^8.
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i pfallout, made a treaty very attractive to several nations.
Athough the Treaty is simple in language and limited but de-
finite in its prohibitions, it still gives way to the freedom
of the seas concepts and, therefore, is not absolute in its
authority. It is, however, an example of geographic limits
and military systems exclusions. A subsequent treaty approached
the arras control problem from a different perspective, pre-
ferring to prohibit and limit nuclear testing rather than
weapons systems.
The 1963 Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
The Partial Test Ban Treaty ^ was considered by many as
the first major east-west accord since the signing of the
Austrian State Treaty in 1955 and came after more than five
years of negotiations. ^ The original parties to the Treaty
1 pEspecially Australia, New Zealand, Chile, Argentina and
South Africa, all of whom signed the Treaty. See also,
"Antarctic Pact Grew from I.G.Y. ," The New York Times , p. 47.
An earlier (1948) U.S. proposal for an international solution
to the Antarctic problem of conflicting claims was shelved
after the U.S.S.R. objected because she had not been initially
consulted in the negotiating process.
-^"Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere,
in Outer Space and Under Water," in Department of State, United
States Treaties and Other International Agreements , Vol. 14,
Part 2, 1963, TIAS 5433, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C., 1964, PP. 1313-1387, herein after referred
to as the "Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty," TIAS 5433. Un-
less otherwise indicated all references are to this source.
^Seymour Topping, "U.S., Soviet and Britain Reach Atom
Accord that Bars All But Underground Tests, in Major Step
Toward Easing Tensions," The New York Times « July 26, 1963,
pp. 1, 8. The Antarctic Treaty of 1959 was not considered




(the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union) ac-
knowledged as their "principal aim the speediest possible
achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarma-
ment under strict international control." To obtain this goal,
the three of them, plus 101 subsequent signatories y agreed
to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out
any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any
other nuclear explosion, at any place under
its jurisdiction or control: in the at atmo-
sphere; beyond its limits including outer
space; or underwater, including territorial
waters or high seas or
in any other environment from which radioactive fallout might
extend outside the testing state's territorial limits or
jurisdiction (Article 1). The Treaty is of unlimited duration,
open to others for signature, may be amended, and may be abro-
gated if "extraordinary events" "have jeopardized the supreme
interests" of a participant (Articles \\, 3, and 4). There are
no references to verification or procedures to be used if a
violation is suspected. And it does not cover underground
nuclear weapons or devices testing through explosions.
Underground tests were not included because the Soviet
Union would not "accept international on-site inspection to
1
6
verify the nature of seismic disturbances." On the other
1 5There are 104 signatories at present. See: Department
of State, Treaties in Force—A List of Treaties and Other
International Agreements of the United States in Force January
1. 1974 . U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
1974, p. 365. However, Dougherty, How to Think About Arms
Control and Disarmament , says 120 states on p. 135.
1
6
Topping, "U.S., Soviet and Britain Reach Atom Accord...,"
The New York Times , p. 1.
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hand, the desire among the original parties "to limit member-
ship in the 'club' of nuclear powers propelled" the three of
them toward agreement on the partial test ban, despite Soviet
desires for a tandem non-aggression pact between the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Treaty Organiza-
tion. The second Agreement was an attempt to gain recognition
for the post-World War II status quo in Europe, especially
17Eastern Europe.
This Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty has little direct
effect on the problems of maritime arms controls and/or re-
straints because underwater nuclear tests have not been seri-
ously contemplated and. they are very easy to detect if used,
1 R
thanks to the extreme sound propagation of water as a medium.
It does not limit the use of nuclear weapons in defense of the
United States or her Allies, according to the then Secretary
1Q
of State, Dean Rusk. ? On balance, its effect seems to be more
psychological and ecological than substantive from an arms
restraint perspective, in that its main purpose was to stop
the radioactive pollution of the atmosphere while merely mak-
ing weapons tests more inconvenient and expensive. A sub-
sequent treaty was more substantial in its effects on weapons
systems.
1 7
'"Major Powers Wary of Spread of Atomic Weapons to
Others," The New York Times , July 26, 1963, p. 9.
1
8
John A. Osmundsen, "Risks Substantial for Any Violator,"
The New York Times , July 26, 1963.
"Dougherty, How to Think About Arms Control and Disarma-
ment , pp. 134-135.
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The Outer Space Treaty of 1967
Although actually signed in January of 1967, the Outer
Space Treaty was unanimously approved by the United Nations
20General Assembly in the preceeding December, having been
negotiated within that organization. It is important here as
an example of exclusionary measures in a geographic area be-
cause it prevents the placement in orbit of any objects carry-
ing nuclear weapons; nor may these objects be placed on celes-
tial bodies or otherwise stationed in space (Article k) .
Other weapons of mass destruction are similarly excluded from
outer space and celestial bodies. The Treaty is multilateral,
emphasizing and encouraging peaceful scientific research and
exchange of information, especially among and for astronauts.
It does not prohibit or even restrict the use of space for
military reconaissance missions for data collection or verifi-
cation. This latter fact, of course, can have important rami-
fications for maritime matters because satellite data can indi-
cate the locations of various surface ships from their con-
struction to their daily deployment. Present technology may
progress sufficiently to enable heat-sensitive photographic
equipment to detect submerged submarines on cruise in the
PC)
Kathleen Teltsch, "Translation Woe Plagues U.N. Pact,"
The New York Times , January 15, 1967, p. 5.
pi
"Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies," in Department of State,
United States Treaties and Other International Agreements
,
Vol. 18, Part 3, 1967, TIAS 6347, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C., 1968, pp. 2410-2498, herein after
referred to as the "Outer Space Treaty," TIAS 6347. Unless
otherwise indicated all references are to this source.
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future, but these activities are not discussed in this
22
treaty.
Mutual Balanced Force Reductions—Or Mutual Reductions of
Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe
What started out as the MBFR talks are now called the
MURFAAMCE conversations. They are no longer balanced, but
they are still force reduction talks. In the preliminary dis-
cussions in the Winter and Spring of 1973 between the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization members and those of the Warsaw
Treaty Organization, the status of Hungary was an initial
23
stumbling block. ^ The NATO Allies desired to have Hungary
included in the talks of arms reductions because of her central
location. The Warsaw Pact members immediately responded by
demanding the inclusion of Italy, primarily because part of
the United. States Sixth Fleet is home ported in Gaeta and
Naples, thus including the fleet assets in possible talks. ^
This apparently forced the NATO negotiators to accept Hungary
22
See: Ted Greenwood, "Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and
Arms Control," The International Institute for Strategic
Studies , London, June 1972, Adelphi Paper No. 88, and Paul
Cohen, "The Erosion of Surface Naval Power," Foreign Affairs ,
Vol. 49, No. 2, January 1971, in which, among other things,
they discuss expanding technologies for surveillance such as
satellites, p. 334.
-'Craig R. Whitney, "Formal Talks on Troop Reductions
in Europe Open in Vienna," The New York Times , October 31,
1973, P. 12.
^Discussion with a senior civilian in the Ministry of De-
fense, United Kingdom, London, Spring 1974.
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25in a "nondecisionmaking" status only, y because they did not
want to include maritime functions, especially those of the
Sixth Fleet, in these talks. The problems of the forward
based systems, especially those carriers with nuclear-capable
planes and ballistic missile submarines and their forward
bases at Rota and Holy Loch, have been excluded successfully
26from various negotiations so far.
On the other hand, some sources indicate that the "Hun-
garian Connection" was not intimately linked with Italy and
the inclusion of the Sixth Fleet in these force reductions
talks, but rather that the NATO Allies preferred to keep the
discussions focused on a small, more manageable, geographic
area, namely Central Europe. If the Warsaw Pact members in-
sisted on including such outlying NATO countries as Italy for
Hungary, then the NATO negotiators would have to include such
nations as Norway and Turkey, thus enlarging the scope beyond
Central Europe and closer to the European Security Conference.
^Dana A. Schmidt, "NATO Allies of U.S. Face Stern Talk,"
The Christian Science Monitor , November 7, 1973, P. 9. Other
countries in a "nondecisionmaking" status at the meetings are:
Rumania and Bulgaria; Italy, Norway, Denmark, Greece and
Turkey.
p/*
See Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., "The United States and
Europe: Partners in a Multipolar World?," Orbis, Vol. 17,
No. 1, Spring 1973, p. 45, for comments on the FBS issue. See
also, Andrew J. Pierre, "Can Europe's Security be 'Decoupled'
from America," Foreign Affairs
.
Vol. 51, No. 4, July 1972,
pp. 761-777; John Newhouse, "Stuck Fast," Foreign Affairs .
Vol. 51, No. 2, January 1973, PP. 353-3t>6; and Robert R.
Bowie, "The Bargaining Aspects of Arms Control: The SALT Ex-
perience," in William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff,
Jr., editors, SALT— Implications for Arms Control in the 1970s ,
University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 1973, p. 131 for




When NATO backed off from Hungary, the WTO dropped Italy. 27
As the talks progressed in the Fall of 1973, the focus
continued to be on the Central European theater with both sides
making substantive, if different, proposals. The Western nego-
tiators proposed a ceiling of 700,000 troops for both sides,
including stationed and indigenous personnel, while the Warsaw
Pact Allies preferred a 15 percent reduction on each side in
pQ
two stages. The talks continued without*such progress, re-
cessing for much of the summer of 1974, and were scheduled to
reopen in September of 1974.
"
The European Security Conference or the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe
Although the forces influencing the generation of such a
conference were building for several years, the first formal
meeting took place in Helsinki in November 1972 to discuss
27
'Discussion with a senior United States Navy officer in
Brussels in Spring 1974.
2
°"West Called 'Not Helpful' In Talks on Troop Cuts," The
New York Times , December 14, 1973, p. 3. Also, discussion
with a senior civilian in the Ministry of Defense United
Kingdom, London, Spring 1974.
^For a sample of the progress, see the following arti-
cles: Christopher S. Wren, "Soviet Says NATO Blocks Gains in
Troop-Cut Parley," The New York Times , December 18, 1973,
p. 3; "East Bloc Nations Again Bar West's Troop-Reduction
Plan," The New York Times , January 18, 1974, p. 3; "MBFR Dead-
lock," editorial, The New York Times , February 6, 1974, p. J>2-\
Leslie H. Gelb, "East and West Far Apart At Talks on Cuts in
Force," The New York Times . February 8, 1974, p. 3; "Troop
Talks in Vienna Inching Ahead," The New York Times , June 3,
1974, P. 4; and Eric Bourne, "NATO Ponders Nuclear Arms Cut
Offer," The Christian Science Monitor , July 19, 1974, p. 2.
The last article suggests that the NATO Allies may be willing
to include some tactical nuclear weapons and aircraft as possi-
ble bargaining chips to induce forward movement in the talks.
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agenda items and future location. The main themes of this
Conference, moved to Vienna, are:
(1) security, including general principles
for reducing military-related tensions
in Europe and the Mediterranean as well
as 'confidence building' measures; (2)





The inclusion of the Mediterranean in these talks, of course,
creates the distinct possibility that the Sixth Fleet, as well
as littoral nations' naval assets, could become an agenda
item. By the same token, whether or not the Mediterranean
navies are discussed, there is no known stipulation prohibiting
the general discussion of maritime arms controls or restraints
at this Conference. That they will or even might be considered
is another question entirely.
Although
the Western powers have correctly estab-
lished a link between the political prob-
lems of the security conference and the
reduction of armaments and armed forces
^ For an excellent history of the background leading to
the CSCE, see: Mojmir Povlny, "The Soviet Union and the
European Security Conference," Orbis, Vol. 18, No. 1, Spring
1974, PP. 201-230.
31
"Reflections on the Quarter— The Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe," Orbis, Vol. 17, No. 2, Spring
1973, pp. 30Zf-308.
32
Dorn Mintoff, of Malta, demanded and got from the Con-
ference an agreement to hear from the southern Mediterranean
(non-European) littoral states their views on security. In
addition to Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria, Israel, at the
insistence of some Western European nations, also presented
her views. See: "Reflections on the Quarter—Negotiating






.they have been wrong about
the order of business in wishing to settle
arms cuts first. Once they conceded to
the Soviets that there v/as a political
issue for the CSCE to handle, they were
trapped by the age-old maxim that poli-
tical accommodation must come before any
armaments regulation. -?-?
Perhaps the perceived lack of progress at the Conference ^ can
be attributed to this theory that neither side will make the
first concession. Others see little possibility of any sub-
stantive arms measures at the European security conference,
not because neither side will make the first move, but rather
because the large numbers of representatives (including neu-
trals) makes this type of discussion unproductive. Some specu-
lation has arisen about 'confidence building' measures such as
"observers at transportation points or pre-announcements of
military exercises," but
except for broad statements supporting non-
aggression, agreements limiting the size or
use of military forces are unlikely^c
at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. If,
in the unlikely event that arms restraints of any sort are
^Povolny, "The Soviet Union and the European Security
Conference," Orbis « p. 230.
^See: C.L. Sulzberger, "Nothing Ado About Much," The
New York Times , May 26, 1974, Sec. 4, p. 15; "Windup of
European Conference on Security Is Now in Doubt," The New York
Times . May 26, 1974, p. 10; and "East-West European Meetings
Reported Stalled on All Issues," The New York Times , June 9,
1974, P. 6.
^Barry Carter, "What Next in Arms Control?," Orbis,
Vol. 17, No. 1, Spring 1973, p. 177.
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discussed, the possibility that they will be of the maritime
variety is even less probable, given the post-World War II
emphasis of arms restraint measures on land forces rather
36than sea forces. Recent reports indicate that the issues
are the freedom of movement of peoples and ideas across borders
versus the interference in internal politics, and that arms
37
restraint measures are not being discussed.
The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks , 1975 and 1974
The maritime aspects of the first phase of the Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks have been reviewed in Chapter II, but
the more recent SALT agreements are worth noting also, as are
the speculations prior to their announcement in June 1973 and
^ For more information on and discussions of the security
conference in Europe see the following: Karl Kaiser, "Europe
and America" A Critical Choice," Foreign Affairs , Vol. 52,
No. 4, July 1974, PP. 725-741 ; "Reflections on the Quarter
—
U.S. -European Relations in an Era of Negotiations," Orbis,
Vol. 16, No. 4, Winter 1974, PP. 841-844; W. Multan and A.
Towpik, "Western Arms Control Policies in Europe Seen from the
East," Survival
. Vol. 16, No. 3, May/June 1974, PP. 127-132
(reprinted from Europa-Archiv , April 1974); Pfaltzgraff, "The
United States and Europe: Partners...," Orbis , pp. 31-50;
Wilfred L. Kohl and William Taubman, "American Policy Toward
Europe: The Next Phase," Orbis , Vol. 17, No. 1, Spring 1973,
pp. 51-74; and for the final recommendations of the Helsinki
consultations see "Documentation—European Security," Survival ,
Vol. 15, No. 5, September/October 1973, pp. 236-240.
57^ f Paul Wohl, "Prospects Grow Dim for Europe Summit," The
Christian Science Monitor , August 9, 1974, p. 4. See also:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, World Arma-
ments and Disarmament—SIPRI Yearbook 1973 % Almqvist and
Wiksell, Stockholm, 1973, which says in part, "The problem /of
security in Europe/ has been a difference in approach to the
whole issue by the two military alliances; in their considera-
tions of the question of security in Europe, NATO countries,
with the exception of France, have generally given priority to
the problems of reduction of forces; Warsaw Treaty countries
have more strongly emphasized the need for discussing politi-




Much discussion has appeared recently about the greater
'stability' of sea-based strategic systems due to their essen-
tial military invulnerability, greater flexibility of use, in-
creased area coverage, and insulation from excessive political
snipping. On the other hand
Their main disadvantage is their vulnerability
to missiles launched from submerged, airborne
or surface platforms. A lesser one is that war
at sea, fought in isolation from any land
battle, could become nuclear, while the battle
ashore might not.^o
According to others, sea-based systems have greater "arms con-
trolability" owing to their warning time and their lack of
vulnerability to attack themselves. These facets have poli-
tical as well as military usefulness. y In addition to the
submarine launched ballistic missiles, one may consider as
forward-based systems some Western land, sea, and air assets
because they can reach the Soviet Union with some theater
-'Stephen T. De La Mater, "The Role of the Carrier in the
Control of the Seas." Naval Review 1972, U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings , Vol. 98, No. 831 , May 1972, p. 11 if. For a broader
picture of the advantages and pitfalls of a SALT II agreement,
see: Walter C. Clemens, Jr., "SALT II: Can it Succeed?," The
Christian Science Monitor , October 5» 1973> p. 20.
39
-^Kintner and Pfaltzgraff, editors, SALT— Implications
for Arms Control in the 1970s , p. 116.
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nuclear weapons and airplanes armed with nuclear weapons.
Without getting into the discussion of what constitutes a
forward-based system, especially those pertaining to the Navy,
one may examine some of the thoughts on recent SALT possibili-
ties as they related to the maritime mode of arms controls,
restraints, or reductions. Since the United. States has been
viewed as having the advantage over the Soviet Union in anti-
submarine warfare techniques and capabilities, some authors
think an agreement might include geographic restrictions on
nuclear powered attack submarines, monitored by sonar barriers,
or limits on the numbers of these hunter-killer submarines.
Besides these proposals, others advocate the prohibition of
continuous tracking of ballistic missile submarines by other
submarines or surface ships. •* Yet a different writer states
^ For some excellent commentary on this subject, see:
Bowie, "The Bargaining Aspects of Arms Control: The SALT Ex-
perience," in Kintner and Pfaltzgraff, editors, SALT— Implica-
tions for Arms Control... , pp. 131-133; Pierre, "Can Europe's
Security be 'Decoupled' from America," Foreign Affairs , p. 766,
in which he states that the Soviet Union defines strategic
forces as all those capable of reaching the homeland of the
other. Thus, some aircraft in Europe and aboard Sixth Fleet
carriers are considered strategic FBS; Alton H. Quanbeck and
Barry M. Blechman, Strategic Forces: Issues for the Mid-
Seventies , The Brookings Institution, Washington, 1973, p. 17;
Pfaltzgraff, "The United States and Europe: Partners in a
Multipolar World?," Orbis, p. 4-5.
^ Jerome H. Kahan, "Limited Agreements and Long-Term
Stability: A Positive View Toward SALT," Stanford Journal of
International Studies , Vol. 7, Spring 1972, p. 73; Walter C.
Clemens, Jr., "SALT II—Who's Got What?," The Christian Science
Monitor , October 2, 1973, p. 12.
^ Kahan, "Limited Agreements and Long Terra Stability...,"
P. 79.
^Herbert Scoville, Jr., "Beyond SALT One," Foreign




SALT'S second phase, however, will touch
issues closer to home, notably America's
forward-based nuclear-capable aircraft on
which West Europeans rely to offset Soviet
missiles targeted on their cities.,
,
On a slightly different course, another author preferred
to prohibit the deployment of "ocean systems that could have
an ASW capability." He would prohibit sonar arrays in oceans
and maintain geographic areas free of military systems all to-
gether, while other areas would be acknowledged as being under
the uncontested control of one or another major power.^ The
concept of certain geographic sanctuaries is seen in the no-
tion of "safe passage for missile-launching submarines along
designated routes to the open ocean" from their bases. No de-
finition of open ocean is provided, but this writer does dis-
tinguish between the inviolability of SLBM boats and "the ac-
tive conduct of a tactical, nonnuclear and antisubmarine
war."^ In other words, he maintains that technology and agree-
ments can be developed to differentiate between strategic (or
^\John Newhouse, "Stuck Fast," Foreign Affairs , Vol. 51,
No. 2, January 1973, p. 355. Pierre, in "Can Europe's Securi-
ty be 'Decoupled' from America," calls for a trade-off of these
two— the U.S. FBS for the medium and intermediate range ballis-
tic missiles targeted on Western Europe by the U.S.S.R.
,
p. 767. See also: Leslie H. Gelb, "Jackson Sees U.S. -Soviet
Arms' Impasse," The New York Times , December 5, 1973, p. 4.
^Bernard T. Feld, "ASW—the ABM of the 1970's?," Stan-
ford Journal of International Studies , Vol. 7, Spring 1972,
P. 94.
U.GH Richard L. Garwin, "Antisubmarine Warfare and National
Security," Scientific American , Vol. 227, July 1972, p. 15.
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nuclear) ASW and its uses and tactical (or nonnuclear) ASW and
its uses, by such measures as: no active tracking of missile
submarines; ocean sanctuaries for these boats; the safe con-
duct routes mentioned, especially during a conventional war;
and the carrying of a buoy by the SLBM boats which emits a
signal indicating that they are SLBMs and that therefore, in a
conventional war, they receive safe conduct rights. 4 ' Another
set of writers has expressed great interest in a future SALT
agreement centering around the limits of sea-based cruise
missiles, either on their own or as a trade-off with land-based
i o
bombers or missiles targeted in Europe.
There are, of course, other aspects of the SALT agree-
ments besides those affecting the sea-based portions of the
United States and Soviet defense structures, such as the in-
creased accuracy of missiles (both sea- and land-based), the
modification of nuclear targeting strategy from counter-value
to include counter-force targets, the budgetary constraints
impinging on both sides, and the technological developments
including 'pop-up' missiles and maneuverable re-entry vehicles.
But these are indirectly related to the maritime problems and,
^"'Garwin, "Antisubmarine Warfare...," p. 25.
i o4 Quanbeck and Blechman, "Strategic Forces...," Brook-





therefore, are mentioned although not discussed in here. J
The most recent Strategic Arms Limitation Talks of Novem-
ber 1974 produced an "agreement to agree" on a future written
accord covering the limitation of strategic offensive wea-
50pons. The written agreement between the Soviet Union and
the United States does not specify the limits on strategic
arms; rather it states that,
Both sides will be entitled to have a certain
agreed aggregate number of I.C.B.M. 's and
S.L.B.M. 's equipped with independently target-
able warheads (M. I.R.V. • s)
.
^
Since the first announcement of the SALT II agreement, subse-
quent reports have indicated each side may have new permitted
^ 7For some greater explanations see: Leslie H. Gelb,
"There Are Some Dangerous Curves on the Road to an Accommoda-
tion," The New York Times , December 9, 1973, Section 4, p. 3;
Leslie H. Gelb, "Arms Parley Splits Nixon Administration,"
The New York Times , December 9, 1973, p. 3; "Cut in U.S. and
Soviet Arsenals Urged in Moscow," The New York Times , December
20, 1973, p. 6; "SALT Bog...," The New York Times . January 7,
1974, p. 30; Charles W. Yost, "Up the Arms Escalator," The
Christian Science Monitor, January 10, 1974, p. 12; Leslie H.
Gelb, "Arms Talks Resume Feb. 19; U.S. Officials Split on Pos-
ture," The New York Times , February 6, 1974, p. 1; "The Round
of Arms Talks," The Washington Post , February 22, 1974, p. 22;
John W. Finney, "U.S. Won't Insist on Numerical Parity in Arms
Talks with Soviet," The New York Times , March 4, 1974, p. 14;
Leslie H. Gelb, "'New Ideas' May Help Get SALT Moving," The
New York Times , March 24, 1974, Section 4, p. 3; and J. Snouck-
Hurgronje, "Superpower Naval Rivalry," The Christian Science
Monitor , June 14, 1974, p. F8; Flora Lewis, "Kissinger Looks
to Public Debate on Moscow Ties," The New York Times , July 7,
1974, PP. 1, 12; Leslie H. Gelb, "Summit Talks Foundered on
MIRV," The New York Times , July 9, 1974, PP. 1, 6; and Charles
W. Yost, "The Arms Race After the Summit," The Christian
Science Monitor
. July 18, 1974, P. 16.
^ See "Text of the Nuclear Arms Agreement," The New York
Times , November 25, 1974, p. 14.




levels of 2400 delivery vehicles, of which 1320 may be equipped
with multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles
52(MIRVs). This may have great import for maritime arms
control efforts because the SALT II Agreement includes, for
each side, "essentially the freedom to mix" its land- and
53
sea-based and bomber-delivered weapons. ^ This could mean
for either or both parties an increase in the number of SLBM
submarines and/or an increase in their launching capacity.
That increase could easily precipitate increased anti-sub-
marine efforts in the form of more ASW planes, surface ships,
submarines, and detection equipment. Thus the SALT II Agree-
ment may, in fact, increase the arms building in certain
aspects of the maritime arena, rather than restrain or decrease
^ "Spurring the Arms Race," The New York Times , December
4i 1974, p. kz.
-^John Herbers, "Ford, Brezhnev Agree to Curb Offensive
Nuclear Weapons; Final Pact Would Run to 1985," The New York




these efforts. ^ It is too early to determine exactly what
steps either state may take in the future.
5/,
^For a more complete discussion of the SALT II negoti-
ation and its implications see also: Godfrey Sperling, Jr.,
"Ford-Brezhnev 'breakthrough'—New Yope for Arms Talks," The
Christian Science Monitor , November 25, 1974, PP. 1, 4; Dana
A. Schmidt, "Ford Adds Bombers to SALT Mix," The Christian
Science Monitor , November 25, 1974, pp. 1, 6; Hedrick Smith,
"A Gain Toward Detente," The New York Times , November 2.^, 1974,
PP. 1> 14; "Text of the Ford-Brezhnev Communique," The New
York Times , November 2.^ t 1974, P. 14; Bernard Gwertzman, "A-
Arms Accord Puts Limits at Below 2,500 Vechicles," The New
York Times , November 26, 1974, pp. 1, 6; Guy Halverson, "U.S.-
Soviet Arms Pact Debated," The Christian Science Monitor ,
November 29, 1974, p. 3; Hella Pick, "Caution on Arms 'Break-
through'," The Manchester Guardian Weekly , November 30, 1974,
p. 6; "U.S.-Soviet Agreement to Agree," The Manchester Guard-
ian Weekly , November 30, 1974, P. 1 ; Simon Winchester, "Tac-
tics of Fear," The Manchester Guardian Weekly , November 30,
1974, P. 8; "The Arms Pact Reduces Neither Terror Nor Costs,"
The New York Times . December 1, 1974, Section 4, p. 1; "SALT
Questions Remain," The Christian Science Monitor , December 4,
1974, P. 12; Bernard Gwertzman, "Kissinger, After Senate Brief-
ing, Calls Criticism of Arras Accord Surprising," The New York
Times , December 5, 1974, p. 3; John W. Finney, "Pentagon Chief
Sees Pact Leading to Arms Build-Up," The New York Times ,
December 7, 1974, PP. 1, 13; Bernard Gwertzman, "Kissinger
Warns Arm Pact Foes Imperil Detente," The New York Times ,
December 8, 1974, PP. 1, 10; Guy Halverson, "More Air-Sea
Mobility for U.S. Nuclear Force," The Christian Science Moni-
tor , December 9, 1974, PP. 1, 8; Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S.-
Soviet Arms Memo is Unresolved," The New York Times , December
10, 1974, P. 12; Herbert Scoville, Jr., "Two Positions:
Moving Backward on Arms Curbs, Forward with Energy," The New
York Times , December 12, 1974, p. 47; Victor Zorza, "Why
Vladivostok Pack May Be Best Possible," The Christian Science
Monitor
,
December 12, 1974, P. 1; David Fairhall, "Calculating
Modern Nuclear Maths," The Manchester Guardian Weekly , Decem-
ber 14, 1974, p. 15; Victor Zorza, "MIRV Hawks Shot Down in
Flight," The Manchester Guardian Weekly , December 21, 1974,
p. 9; Drew Middleton, "Vast A-Arms Gain by Russians Seen,"
The New York Times , January 12, 1975, p. 17; Leslie H. Gelb,
"Ford Briefs Team for A-Arms Pact," The New York Times , Janu-
ary 30, 1975, P. 6; James F. Clarity, "Soviet Says A-Curb
Would Aid U.S. Ties," The New York Times , February 5, 1975,
p. 13; John W. Finney, "Missile Build-Up Planned by U.S.,"
The New York Times , February 12, 1975, p. 5; Michael Getler,
"Soviet Arms Restraint Urged," The Washington Post , February
12, 1975, PP. A1 , A10; and Richard Burt, "Verification:
Crux of SALT Accord," The Christian Science Monitor , February
13, 1975, p. 2.
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The Law of the Sea Conference
Originally scheduled for the summer of 1973, the United
Nations Law of the Sea Conference finally met in full session
in June 1974 at Caracas, Venezuela." With initial meetings
at Geneva to establish administrative procedures, examine
background material, and prepare draft treaty articles^ in
1971, a final preliminary gathering convened in New York at
the end of last year to clarify the problems surrounding
territorial seas, economic zones, living resources, freedom
of the seas, and other political and economic pressures. *
'
The "common heritage of mankind," the term used by the United
Nations resolutions to describe the riches of the seas, began
losing ground in the various meetings to the more material
interests of the individual states, including the United
^David Binder, "12-Mile Sea Limit May Be Set in '74,"
The New York Times , December 1, 1973, p. 3.
** General Assembly, United Nations, Report of the Com-
mittee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean
Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction , General
Assembly Official Records Twenty-Sixth Session, Supplement No.
21 (A/8421), United Nations, New York, 1971, pp. 4-5.
-"Kathleen Teltsch, "148 Nations Joining U.N. Parley on
Law of Sea Opening Today," The New York Times , December 3,
1973, p. 10. See also: Kathleen Teltsch, "Third U.N. Parley
on Sea Law Opens," The New York Times , December 4, 1973, p. 6;
"Sea Conference in Brief," The New York Times , December 4,
1973, p. 7; David Winder, "Protecting Neptune's Domain: UN





Of particular importance to this discussion are certain
aspects of the Conference, especially the width of the terri-
torial sea as it affects the use of international straits,
freedom of transit, coastal states rights in any "economic
zones" determined beyond territorial seas, and the restric-
tions of any international regime set up to oversee the har-
59
vesting of the deep ocean resources. Some other observers
see any restriction of the high seas freedom of maneuver or
the contribution by the developed nations through the interna-
tional seabed regime— "a kind of worldwide welfare system"—as
being both unnecessary and dangerous to national security and.
unlikely to benefit anybody. In other words, no agreement is
better than any agreement.
The width of the economic zone, which may go to 200 miles,
is not so important as the restrictions on foreign ships, both
' The best brief commentaries on the background of this
conference are: John R. Stevenson and Bernard H. Oxman, "The
Preparations for the Law of the Sea Conference," reprinted
from The American Journal of International Law , Vol. 68, No. 1,
January 1974, 32- pages; Evan Luard, "Who Gets What on the
Seabed?," Foreign Policy , No. 9, Winter 1972-73, pp. 132-147;
and. Ann L. Hollick, "Seabeds Make Strange Politics," Foreign
Policy , No. 9, Winter 1972-73, PP. 148-170. See also: "Whose
Heritage," The New York Times , December 30, 1973, Section 4,
p. 10, and Evan Luard, "Who Owns the Bottom of the Ocean?,"
The Sunday Times, (London), June 16, 1974, P. 16.
-^Richard N. Gardner, "It is Time to Consider the Fish's
Point of View," The New York Times , December 30, 1973, Sec-
tion 4, p. 7.
60Robert D. Heinl, Jr., "Sea Sovereignty in Danger,"
Navy Times , July 3, 1974, p. 13, and "Rich and Poor at Seabed
Parley Debate Way to Exploit Minerals," The New York Times ,
July 2, 1974, P. 8.
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civilian and governmental, transiting these zones. The
freedom of navigation issue, for example, could affect nuclear
powered aircraft carriers, surface ships, and submarines, and
nuclear weapons-equipped ships and their freedom of movement
if a state or states declared that pollution of their economic
zones included 'nuclear pollution'. This same argument might
appear if the international seabed regime were created to in-
clude these types of restrictions (or exclusions) within their
62
areas of jurisdictions. The acceptance of the 200 mile eco-
nomic zone by the United States (and Great Britain and the
Soviet Union) is dependent upon the freedom of transit within
these zones and a 12 mile territorial sea limit being accepted
by the other nations at the Law of the Sea Conference. The
12 mile territorial sea would also include freedom of passage
through the international straits of the world—no restrictions
on civilian, naval, or other governmental ships by unreason-
able pollution controls or other administrative procedures
designed to give those states' territorial seas through which
straits cut exclusionary or selective control over ships de-
siring to transit the straits. J
°^Ken 0. Botwright, "200-mile Fish Zone Expected with or
without UN Accord," Boston Sunday Globe
.
July 14, 1974, p. 18.
0<:
-Victor Zorza, "Scramble for Riches of Seas is Under
Way," The Christian Science Monitor . July 16, 1974, P. 5.
63"The Riches of the Sea," The New York Times , July 21,
1974, Section 4, p. 14; Evan Luard, "Protecting the Economy
of 200 Miles of Ocean," The New York Times . August 4, 1974,
Section 4, p. 5; Robert R. Bowie, "Managing the Oceans," The
Christian Science Monitor , August 7, 1974, p. 14; and James
N. Goodsell, "Disputes Slow Pact on Seas' Resources," The
Christian Science Monitor , August 15, 1974, p. 9.
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The Law of the Sea Conference, then, has potential im-
pact on maritime arms control considerations in three parti-
cular areas. Restrictions of freedom of navigation in a 200
(or other) mile economic zone would curtail the maneuverability
of naval and other maritime forces throughout the world.
Secondly, a 12 mile territorial sea that granted any sort of
restrictive measures to the coastal states bordering on the
worlds' international straits would severely curtail the
navies of the world and perhaps entail an alteration of stra-
tegic plans and alliance guarantees. The third potential
impact centers around the authority and scope of any inter-
national regime created to monitor, administer, or control the
exploitation of the seas' resources "for the benefit of all
mankind." The authority of this regime, including its degree
of control of navigation within vast areas of the high seas,
would be of utmost importance to the navies of the world.
Summary
As indicated at the beginning of this chapter, the treaties,
conferences, talks, and accords discussed here are examined
briefly and then only as they do or might affect the aspects
of maritime arms controls.
Almost immediately after World War II, President Truman
drew attention to the future importance of the oceans' economic
value by issuing his proclamations. On behalf of the United
States he claimed portions of the continental shelf in order
to exploit the natural resources in that area. His claim went
to approximately 100 fathoms depth and was intended to include
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off-shore oil deposits. The second of the two Presidential
proclamations dealt with the extension of fishing conservation
zones as necessary to protect the living resources off the
coast of the United States. Both of these innovations have
been appropriated for use by other coastal states and thus
provide much discussion material at the Law of the Sea Con-
ference. Decisions on the constitution of these areas may
materially affect the freedom of the high seas and the
maneuverability of the ships of the worlds' navies.
Much of the rest of the late 19^f0s and early 1950s was
spent, in the arms control arena, in trying to control the de-
velopment and use of atomic devices especially as they were
used in weapons systems. The Soviet Union preferred to
destroy all existing stockpiles of bombs (in as much as she
had few to destroy) and then implement an international organi-
zation to oversee the future production and use of these pro-
ducts. The United States, on the other hand, advocated the
complete control of all aspects of atomic endeavors (except
for actual mining) by the international regime first and then
the reduction and eventual demolition of atomic weapons. The
problems of inspection and verification were always bones of
contention between the two powers and equalled in difficulty
of solution the opposing approaches to the control of atomic
energy. Many proposals were made in various United Nations
forums over the years, but no controls were ever instituted
and each continued what amounted to monologues for public con-
sumption on the subject. It is apparent that the propaganda




The latter part of the decade of the 1950s saw the signing
of the Antarctic Treaty, which declared that the area described
in the treaty would "be used exclusively for peaceful pur-
poses." It prohibited all atomic weapons and atomic wastes,
emphasizing, rather, the use of the area for scientific re-
search and exchange of information. Part of the geographic
area described in the treaty included open water and another
article said that the treaty wording did not contravene any
of the traditional freedoms of the high seas. This loophole
is not particularly important in the Antarctic Treaty, but it
does illustrate the problems of juxtaposing an exclusionary
geographic treaty with an international tradition or concept,
such as freedom of the high seas. The diminution of the
strength of the Treaty could become very important if the
geographic area were transferred to oceans more heavily
travelled by the navies and other maritime interests of the
world. Loopholes in treaties covering geographic areas where
nuclear weapons could or would be used or tested frequently
almost assuredly make these loopholes more important than the
remainder of the treaty, and may actually make the treaty more
harmful than beneficial.
The Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, signed in 1963,
banned all nuclear device testing in the atmosphere, outer
space, and under water for the signatories. Those who did not
sign are not bound by the treaty— this may have strong impli-
cations for future maritime arms control considerations. Only
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those states which: (a) have no interest in doing what is to
be prohibited; or (b) have already done it, will be willing to
forego future rights to pursue that particular endeavor.
Additionally, this treaty may indicate by what it does not
prohibit, the types of maritime arms controls one might ex-
pect—ones that do not tread on tender or controversial diplo-
matic territory.
The 1967 Outer Space Treaty is another example of states
agreeing not to do those deeds which they were not planning to
do anyway. It prohibits the emplacement of weapons of mass
destruction in outer space but does not exclude military re-
connaissance from space. Military reconnaissance may prove of
great importance in future maritime considerations, particular-
ly for detection, tracking, and verification of ships on the
high seas, both surface and sub-surface.
The two multilateral conferences in Europe both concern
various aspects of security in that area, but neither the
force reductions talks nor the central European security talks
are discussing any aspects of naval or maritime considerations.
Although each conference has eschewed these subjects for dif-
ferent reasons the net result is the same. Maritime forces
continue to be excluded from these discussions.
The June 1 974 summit meeting of the Strategic Arms Limita-
tion Talks produced no important decisions having a direct im-
pact on the maritime arena. Many possible agreements involv-
ing sea-borne strategic forces were discussed in the open
literature, but none was implemented. It appears that the
Soviet Union presented a potentially very important maritime
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arras control procedure at this meeting. Mr. Brezhnev proposed
that both nations withdraw and ban from the Mediterranean Sea
all nuclear-armed warships (surface and submarine). ^ No
agreement was reached, perhaps because neither side has ever
admitted that it has nuclear equipped submarines or sea-based
aircraft in the Mediterranean. The United States may have
been disinclined to discuss this proposal because she would
be greatly disadvantaged by such an agreement. The Soviet
Union can retreat to the Black Sea, while the United States
naval forces would have to use Rota as the nearest base to the
Mediterranean Sea for any nuclear equipped ships or submarines.
Additionally, since the current Mediterranean problems
are centered at the eastern end of the area, the Soviets have
a short cruise, while the American ships have a 2000 mile dis-
tance to travel. Apparently the discussions, if they went very
far, did not consider the French nuclear submarines in the
Mediterranean, or the possible use, by other littoral states,
of small boats armed with small nuclear tipped surface-to-
surface or surface-to-air missiles. Nothing came of this pro-
posal.
On the other hand, the November 1974 'agreement to agree'
has a very great potential impact on the maritime arms re-
straint arena. In addition to setting high ceilings for
strategic missile vehicles and multiple independently targeted
re-entry vehicles, it allows an essential freedom to mix for
^Malcolm W. Browne, "War Still a Risk, Brezhnev Warns,"
The New York Times , July ZZ y 1974, p. 17.
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each state. This means either party could put major increased
emphasis on submarine-launched missiles. If that were to
occur, it might cause a consequent interest in anti-submarine
warfare. This could include aircraft, surface ships, attack
submarines, and electronic devices, all used to detect and
pinpoint SLBM submarines for tracking and/or attacking as
necessary. Any or all of these possibilities would militate
against maritime arms control considerations.
The Law of the Sea Conference had made no decisions as of
1974j but its potential impact is great. The extension of
the territorial seas to 12 miles (probably the outer limits
acceptable to the majority of the United Nations members), the
restrictions permitted coastal states within their economic
zones (probably up to 200 miles from shore), and the amount of
jurisdiction allowed an international regime if it oversees the
exploitation of natural resources beyond the limits of national
control could all limit the freedom of movement on the high
seas. This could cause changes in the use and maneuverability
of the nations' navies.
It seems, therefore, that the actual impact of these dis-
cussed items has been minimal so far, but the potential in
each of these areas is great, depending on future decisions,
especially in those conferences of a continuing nature. It is
obvious, however, that the forces which inhibit the implementa-
tion of many of these proposals are the same as before—lack
of political will, divergent national interests, fear of be-
coming militarily weaker than one's potential enemies, and
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insufficient common grounds for agreement. As will be evident
in the next chapter, too, these forces prey upon the maritime
planners of the North Atlantic Alliance (and the Warsaw Treaty




A CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF THE MARITIME SITUATION
REGARDING STRATEGIC USES OF THE SEAS
We have during my tenure arrived at the posi-
tion where the United States Navy, the odds
are, is not able to perform its mission, which
is the tougher mission of being able to con-
trol and use the seas, and where the odds are
that the Soviet Navy can carry out its mission
is war, the easier mission of cutting the sea
lines of communication. This is the result of
inadequate public support for adequate defense
budgets and the consequent reduction—in the
defense field.
1
Once one has examined the various arms control attempts
and procedures as they directly and indirectly relate to the
maritime situation, one must then consider the capabilities
and the intentions of the maritime force available within the
geographic areas being considered here. The North Atlantic
Treaty has certain defined geographic limits, binding itself
2by particular lines on a map. They exist and must be recog-
nized in any considerations of NATO maritime problems. It
is appropriate, therefore, to examine the regional situations
Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., "Meet the Press," National Broad-
casting Company , Merkle Press, Inc., Washington, D.C., Vol.
18, No. 26, June 30, 1974, p. 2. He also said, "If we are not
able to control and use the seas, we simply cannot have armies
and air forces operating overseas, since 94 percent of the
millions of tons that it takes to support ourselves and our






The waters covered by the North Atlantic Treaty include
the "North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer" and
the "Mediterranean Sea." For the complete text see: "Appen-
dix 4> The North Atlantic Treaty" and "Appendix 5, Protocol to
the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Greece and
Turkey," in North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Facts and




within NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization as they affect
and reflect the geography and the force structures of these
areas. The review starts with the Northern Flank, then moves
into the North Atlantic, Atlantic Ocean, Tropic of Cancer,
and the Southern Flank.
An examination, whether cursory or detailed, of the geo-
graphic considerations and the force structures of the NATO
area would be incomplete without some notion of the thought
behind the possible use of these forces. In order to provide
some little insight into the Warsaw Treaty Organization con-
cepts of maritime force employment and utility, the second part
of this chapter reviews in brief the pertinent public comments
of Admiral S.G. Gorshkov, Admiral of the Soviet Fleet. His
series of articles was originally published in the Soviet
naval journal Morskoi Sbornik , and later translated into
English. While these articles by Admiral Gorshkov represent
the thoughts of only one man (and there is some discussion as
to why they were written in the first place) , they provide at
least some perspective on Soviet, and therefore Warsaw Pact,
maritime philosophy. Part One assesses the geography and the




The Northern Flank of NATO may be considered to include
Norway and the surrounding seas; Denmark, the Federal Republic
of Germany and their surrounding seas both east and west; and
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the sea lines of communication running through these seas to
any or all of the countries involved. Much speculation has
surrounded the desires of the Soviet Union in this area. Many
have stated that the Soviets want year-round access to "warm
water" ports (ports not blocked or severely restricted by
winter ice such as those emptying into the Barents Sea or parts
of the Baltic Sea). Others have commented that the Soviet
maneuvers and intentions are oriented mostly in a defensive
mode regarding Norway.
The primary Soviet objective since 19^ has
been the prevention of Northern Norway be-
coming an Anglo-American base area..
This could be applied equally to Denmark, as her foreign
policy on this matter has followed Norway's closely. A
British writer puts the same thought a little differently.
Traditionally, the primary mission of the Russian
Navy has been to defend the homeland; and although
S.S. Kieler, "20th Century Scandinavia in a Maritime
Stragegic Light," unpublished thesis, Naval Command Course,
Naval War College, Newport, R.I. , June 1972, p. 53. See also:
B.C. Cuthbertson, "The Strategic Significance of the Northern
Cap," Journal of the Royal United Service Institute for De-
fense Studies , Vol. 117, No. 666, June 1972, pp. 45-^-6; F.P.U.
Croker, "Iceland and the Maritime Threat to NATO," Journal of
the Royal United Service Institute for Defense Studies , Vol.
117, No. 666, June 1972, p. 52; and Walter Walker, "Problems
of the Defense of NATO's Northern Flank," Journal of the Royal
United Service Institution , Vol. 115, No. 659, September 1970,
P. 17.
^"Johan J. Hoist, "The Soviet Union and Nordic Security,"
Cooperation and Conflict , Vol. 6, 1971, p. 139.




the nature of maritime warfare has undergone
fundamental changes, there is ample evidence
(including the statements of Soviet leaders)
that this still pertains today, although it
is now set in the context of mutual deterrence
and general nuclear war.,-
If one follows the above line of thought, then aggres-
sive moves by the Soviets, be they naval, land, or political,
are not only possible, but probable in one form or another.
An amphibious threat to North Norway occupies the thinking of
many strategists and military planners.
The possession of Tromso, Narvik, Trondheim,
Bergen, and Stavanger—would greatly help
Russia, as it did Germany in World War Two,
to wage war on allied shipping.
^
These amphibious landings might be coordinated with limited
land advances along the 115-mile Norwegian-Soviet border and
combined with complementary air and airborne operations to
o
takeover airfields preventing any outside assistance. In
this type of exercise, there would be little if any warning
Michael MccGwire, "Soviet Naval Capabilities and Inten-
tions," p. Zt1 . But see also: Drew Middleton, "Rifts and
Soviet Pressure Worry NATO," The New York Times , September 9,
1 97^, p. 3 » "The Soviet Government is pressing Norway for the
establishment of joint Norwegian-Soviet rule of the Spits-
bergen island group north of Norway—an action that would
further weaken NATO's position in a strategically important
area." Joint Control would thwart any allied surveillance in
that area.
7F.P.U. Croker, "The Maritime Defense of NATO Flanks,"
Royal United Service Institution . Vol. 11Zf, No. 653, March
1969, p. 35, See also: Walker, "Problems of the Defense of
NATO's Northern Flank," p. 17.
Claus G.M. Koren, "NATO's Northern Flank," Brassey's
Annual 1969 , edited by J.L. Moulton, F.A. Praeger, Publishers,
New York, 1969, p. 69.
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because the objectives would be limited and could be gained
quickly with little opposition. A small force could go in
very rapidly and occupy a discrete area without further expan-
sion. The Soviets could then bargain, from their new position,
for whatever political or military goals they desired, from
port rights or facilities on the Norwegian Sea to the demands
that Norway leave NATO because her membership in that organi-
zation was "threatening" to the Soviets. Soviet occupation
of the more populated southern portion of Norway would be,
perhaps, too difficult politically and militarily. She would
have to overfly other countries or give herself away by sail-
ing or flying substantial forces near Allied or neutral nations
long enough to be observed by early warning systems. Also,
the threat to or occupation of large population centers would
seem to be more provocative than possession of small outposts
or reserve airfields might be.
In the southern part of the Northern Flank, the Baltic
and its problems are both similar and dissimilar to those of
North Norway. The northern parts of the Federal Republic of
Germany and Denmark are very flat and susceptable to rapid
land or amphibious advances if there are no warnings. Quick
amphibious thrusts from either the German Democratic Republic
or Poland must be considered, as well as Soviet gunfire support
Q
from its missile-equipped forces. Most of the Baltic Sea
Bernd F. vonLoringhoven, "Conventional Defense and Nuclear
Deterrence—A German View," Brassey's Annual 1970 « edited by
J.L. Moulton, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1970, p. 22.
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coastline belongs to Warsaw Pact members or neutral nations,
but the exits through the Danish Straits and the Kiel Canal
are controlled by NATO members, thus perhaps engendering in
the Soviets a fear of future containment in the Baltic by the
Alliance members. This fear might generate a pre-emptive move
on the part of the Warsaw Pact navies to insure continued ac-
cess to the open waters of the North Sea and the Atlantic with
or without an accompanying land movement in Central Europe.
Any type of movement by the Soviets into the Northern
Flank area must be considered as provocative enough to warrant
responses from the NATO Central as well as Northern Commands;
so even a quick insertion of a few Warsaw Pact occupation
troops should not be calculated by that organization in isola-
12tion from surrounding areas and possible responses. In
other words, Soviet troops in North Norway would encounter
limited local defenses, but would trigger greater and immedi-
ate responses by the NATO troops of the Allied Command Europe
Mobile Force, a quick reaction unit designed to forestall just
such a consideration by the WTO.
In addition to her sparsely defended northern areas, Nor-
way has two other security problems of great portent. The
first involves negotiations with the Soviet Union on the
future utilization of the island of Spitsbergen, north of
1 o
Juha Tikka, "The Strategic Importance of the Baltic
Sea—A Finnish Review," unpublished thesis, Naval Command Course,
Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, Spring 1970, p. 2.
1l Koren, "NATO's Northern Flank," p. 69.




Norway. The second arena of potential difficulties is the
Norwegian Sea, in which oil has been discovered as much as 125
miles off the coast. *> The defense of these distant off-shore
oil fields by Norway is similar to the problem faced in the
North Sea oil exploration and exploitation by Great Britain,
Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands,
Norway. Because of their distance from the land, these areas
in both Seas and their wells, drilling rigs, and pipelines are
vulnerable to sabotage and destruction by sea or air military
units. ^ The present and future defense of these energy-
producing ocean areas increases the need for and. complicates
the employment of the navies of the Northern Flank countries,
especially in light of the changing international views of
the uses of the seas. These modifications may alter the use
of navies as military forces as well as the utilization of the
*»Off the Continental Shelf and into an Oil Bananza "
The Economist , Vol. 253, No. 6842, October 12, 1974, p. 68.
Oil has been discovered 125 miles west of the Lofoten Islands
of Norway. Actually, whether or not this oil "belongs" to
Norway is a question because of its distance from land and
its great depth
—
3000 feet to 4500 feet. This location, geo-
logically, is not a part of the continental shelf. "The
Norwegians are trying to say that their jurisdiction extends
for as far out as drilling is technically possible. But
there is no international formula for settling borderline
cases of this kind...."
^"International Defense Digest—Defense of North Sea
Oil," International Defense Review , Vol. 7, No. 1, February
1974, PP. 23-24. "The Royal Navy has immediate demands for
safekeeping rigs, pipelines, etc., against sabotage, and its
clear that pipeline junction points on the coast will be
particularly vulnerable. The RN also has longer-term require-
ments for all-around maritime defense in the event of war,"
pp. 23-24. See also P.E.C. Berger, "The Royal Navy: A Con-
cept of Maritime Operations," Journal of the Royal United
Services for Defense Studies , Vol. 119, No. 3, September
1974, pp. 9-18 for a fuller discussion of the maritime prob-





The Arctic archipelago of Spitsbergen is under Norwegian
sovereignty according to a 1920 treaty signed by some forty
1
6
countries, but that same accord permits the Soviet Union to
mine the Islands' rich coal deposits jointly with Norway.
(About three quarters of the total population lives in Soviet
mining camps.) Recently, the Soviet Union has requested joint
rule over the Islands, and a definition of national rights to
the exploitation of the continental shelf around Spitsbergen.
Oil is believed to exist on the shelf; Oslo
contends that it is an extension of Norway's
continental shelf and not open to negotiation.
But the Russians, it is thought, want joint




These moves would require the abrogation of the 1920 Treaty and
the division of the potential oil fields of the Barents Sea
between Norway and the Soviet Union. Either or both of these
changes could have a negative effect on the security of Norway
and the North Atlantic Alliance.
The present Spitsbergen Treaty allows all the signatories
1 5jFor an excellent discussion of the recent United Nations
Law of the Sea Conference and its effects on the employment of
naval forces, see Elizabeth Young, "New Laws for Old Navies:
Military Implications of the Law of the Sea," Survival , Vol.
16, No. 6, November/December 1974, pp. 262-26?.
1
°"Status of Spitsbergen (Svalbard) Treaty Signed at Paris
February 9, 1920," Treaties and Other International Agreements
of the United States of America 1776-1949 , Vol. 2, Multilateral
1918-1930, Department of State, Washington, D.C. t 1969,
pp. 269-277.
1 7
'Drew Middleton, "Oslo Expects Soviet to Ask Joint
Spitsbergen Rule," The New York Times , October 6, 1974, P. 10.
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(including the United States) to explore the area for coal and
other natural resources, although at present only Norway and
the Soviet Union are so doing. The possibility of oil develop-
ment in that region could bring in several NATO nations to
drill for the precious commodity. This could threaten the
warm water exit of the Soviet Northern Fleet and could bring
Western countries' activities uncomfortably close to the
strategic naval base at Murmansk—a situation not at all to
1 o
the liking of the Soviets. The Soviets would prefer either
joint sovereignty or Norwegian sovereignty (with negotiated
Soviet rights) to the present multi-party 1920 Treaty. In
either of these situations, the Soviet Union would have only
one nation with which to contend—a nation not unaware of
Soviet military strength in the area. It must also be noted
that reconsideration of the Treaty might also be in the
interest of Norway, which is desirous of gaining as much po-
tential oil area as possible in any division of the Barents
19Sea with the Soviet Union. y In both the Norwegian and Barents
Seas, the Norwegians have some complicated and difficult de-
cisions to make. And whatever decisions are made, they will
TF>
Terry Robards, "Norwegians See Threat to Isles," The
New York Times , November 25, 1 974, p. 9. Other issues at these
Talks include fisheries limits and Moscow's revival of the
earlier proposal for a nuclear-free zone in Scandinavia.
(This proposal does not include the Soviet Kola peninsula or
the naval base at Murmansk.) See Elizabeth Pond, "Moscow-
Oslo Duel for Oil Under Arctic," The Christian Science Moni-
tor , November 26, 1974, p. 8.
1 97See Christopher S. Wren, "Moscow and Oslo Open Arctic
Talks," The New York Times , November 26, 1974, p. 11, and
"Nothing is Easy, Not Even Talks on Barents Sea," The New
York Times , December 1, 1974, Section 4, p. 2.
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affect Norway's position on future maritime arms control con-
siderations.
Assuming the Soviet Navy has a primary mission of defense
of the homeland, one can view their movement away from their
own shores as merely an extension of this overriding strategy.
Their tasks in support of this mission are five in number. In
sequential order they are:
1
.
to counter the nuclear powered ballistic
missile submarines;
2. to neutralize the carriers prior to air-
craft launch;
3. to enhance the Soviet strategic strike
capability;
i+. to gain command of the seas surrounding
the fleet operating areas, especially the
Baltic, Black, and Barents seas;
5. to provide maritime flank support for
coastal and inshore operations. ~~
Certainly these talks are not inherently harmful to the Allies
unless and until hostilities occur between the two sides, and
even then, the tasks enable an incremental approach to be
taken by opposing naval forces. In other words, according to
the tasks of the Soviet navy, hostilities are not an "all or
nothing" situation but rather the application of sufficient
force to protect and defend Soviet (and other Warsaw Pact)
territories and maneuver areas. They believe not in massive
retaliation, but in graduated responses to Western adventurism,
Forward deployment by the Soviet Navy, therefore, becomes




merely an attempt to push farther away from the home waters and
homeland, the NATO navies, especially the strategic forces in
21the nuclear ballistic missile boats, and strike aircraft.
The corollary of this concept gives the Navy greater areas of
maritime defense surrounding the land, thus increasing the
tasks of that branch of the armed forces. This expansion of
the defense perimeters pushes them into the formerly uncon-
22.tested waters of the Norwegian Sea, where they meet the NATO
forces. The Alliance navies had previously operated in these
waters alone, but now have company, thereby creating a vastly
changed situation.
If one follows the other self-defense concept of the
Soviet Union, that of Johan Hoist (see footnote 4) > one might
imagine a Soviet Union totally uninterested in expanding her
area of influence or operations. She wishes to prevent any
Western powers from pressing any closer with bases or other
threatening procedures. One reason the Norwegians have not
permitted foreign bases on their soil is the Soviet pressure
in the form of a periodic diplomatic offensive since World War
II. Norway informed the Soviet Union of this in an exchange
of notes, and in 1957> she made clear her policy of not stock-
23piling nuclear weapons. •* Denmark has had no such exchange of
21
MccGwire, "Soviet Naval Capabilities and Intentions,"
P. 38.
??
MccGwire, "Soviet Naval Capabilities and Intentions,"
p. 38.
^Einar Lochen, Norway in European and Atlantic Coopera-
tion , Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 196*f, pp. 15-16, 18.
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notes with the Soviets, but she has pursued a like policy for
the same reasons— similar internal political alignments and a
desire not to elicit additional pressures on the Scandinavian
nations—aligned or neutral. ^ Western bases or nuclear
weapons on Norwegian or Danish soil would for example increase
25pressures in Finland. y This Soviet defensive argument is
persuasive until one learns that the Soviet naval infantry
(marines) was reconstituted in 1964 and now consists of ten
to seventeen thousand troops. They are equipped, and trained
for contiguous coastal area seizure rather than long-range
27projection, which becomes pertinent when one notes that the
coasts of Norway, Denmark and the Federal Republic are all
amazingly close to the Soviet Union.
During a crisis in the Northern Flank area resupply of
material or supply of combatant forces from the United States
would take a week to ten days. Many analysts do not think
Norway could last seven to ten days in an all-out Soviet
^Walker, "Problems of the Defense of NATO's Northern
Flank," p. ZZ.
^Lochen, Norway in European and. Atlantic Co-operation
,
p. \l\. Part of Norway's reply says that she "does not intend
to enter into agreements with other countries which will com-
mit Norway to the establishment of bases on Norwegian territory
for the military forces of foreign countries as long as Norway
has not been attacked, or threatened with attack," p. 16.
pC
Norman Polmar, Soviet Naval Power: Challenge for the
1 970'
s
, National Strategy Information Center, New York, 1972
says 10,000, p. 76, while International Institute for Strate~>
gic Studies, The Military Balance 1973-1 974 * p. 7, says
17,000.
27
'The International Institute for Strategic Studies,
The Military Balance 1972-1973 , p. 8.
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conventional push against Norway. The Allied Command Europe
29Mobile Force is a quick reaction force to be flown into a
trouble spot immediately upon need. The ACE Mobile Force
being flown in could exacerbate rather than alleviate tensions
caused by a WTO incursion into NATO territory, thus making its
use debatable under some circumstances. It seems, therefore,
that even although the British Navy is only two days' steaming
time away, the Northern Flank, especially in North Norway, is
not adequately prepared to fend off a surprise attack by an
amphibious or air assault or both. Equally important but not
discussed here are the physical problems of operating in the
Norwegian Sea or the Baltic areas. The Norwegian Sea is ex-
tremely rough with high seas and difficult flying weather much
of the time. To a lesser degree the Baltic is similar, but
some areas are so shallow in the latter as to preclude some
types of operations, most notably submarine operations.
This northern area of NATO includes the waters of the
Barents, Norwegian, North and Baltic Seas and are the responsi-
bilities (primarily) of the navies of Norway, Great Britain,
_.
Interview with an Allied naval officer, Norfolk, Vir-
ginia, Spring 1973. Another Allied naval officer implied that
if the Soviet push were a "small" one, if she only occupied a
small piece of territory, the NATO ministers might take some
time to react to the situation, thus further delaying any naval
force, should that decision be taken. According to Cuthbertson
in "The Strategic Significance of the Northern Cap," the
"Swedes have made it abundantly clear that they would not fight
to preserve the territorial integrity of North Norway: their
aim would be only to preserve their own neutrality," p. 47.
^°The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Facts and
Figures « pp. 1 98- 199. The infantry troops for ACE Mobile Force
come from Canada, Italy, and Great Britain, while the air units
come from Belgium, Netherlands, and Great Britain, according to
Walker, "Problems of the Defense of NATO's Northern Flank," p. 17.
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Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States.
The Norwegian Navy is committed entirely to the mission
of defending her home waters and is, thus, not a far-seas
fleet, nor does she anticipate any extensive distant-water use
of her naval ships. The navy is designed primarily for inshore
warfare and coastal defense, with most of the emphasis placed
on mine warfare craft, torpedo boats, and fast gunboats, thus
enabling the use of fast "hit and run tactics."^ Air cover
is provided by the air force (as opposed to the navy). The
high seas fleet control of the sea lines of communication as
outlined in the Norwegian defense plans is provided by the NATO
Strike Fleet, essentially the multilateral Standing Force
Atlantic backed up by the United States Second Fleet in
Norfolk.^ 1
While steadily reducing her navy in numbers of ships and
men, Great Britain still earmarks all major ships for NATO in
time of war, although some ships are assigned to overseas
32
areas and would not be immediately available in an emergency.
Of specific importance to the northern area are two commando
ships and two assault ships, with Royal Marines embarked, which
^ B.C. Cuthbertson, "The Strategic Significance of the
Northern Cap," p. 47.
^Cuthbertson, "The Strategic Significance of the Northern
Cap," p. 47.
^Secretary of State for Defense, Statement on Defense
Estimates, 1972 , Cmnd. 4891, Her Majesty's Stationery Office,
London 1972, pp. 8-9.

139.
Great Britain has offered to NATO.-5 -5 She also has a frigate
permanently assigned to the Standing Naval Force Atlantic,
^
the naval element which is designed to provide a multinational
quick-reaction force to assist in time of emergency. The one
remaining British aircraft carrier v/ill stay in service until
the through-deck cruisers are completed in the middle 1970' s.
These new through-deck cruisers will carry helicopters,
Harriers, surface-to-air, and surface-to-surface missiles to
"cope with attacks by aircraft, warships and submarines."
But
(i)n European waters, air support for the NATO
fleets will continue to be provided primarily
by land-based aircraft. T[r
In summary, it has been said that with all its far-flung
^Walker, "Problems of the Defense of NATO's Northern
Flank," p. 17.
^^Malcolm Parry- Davies, "British Defense Policies,"
Military Review , Vol. 51, No. 11, November 1971, p. 14.
-^"The Next Sort of Warship," The Economist , Vol. 238,
No. 6652, February 20, 1971, p. 17. On the other hand, a
well-known British commentator states, "...(T)he Royal Navy
is lacking in air cover. The Royal Air Force provides magni-
ficent support with its Nimrod LRMP ,/long range maritime
patrol/ aircraft but fighter cover is another matter. The
1966 claim that the RAF would provide all that was needed was
doubted at the time and these doubts have been proved pain-
fully true in later exercises. It is a simple arithmatical
fact that one cannot protect ships beyond the range of land-
based fighters, and the limits of that range reaction time is
generally too great." John E. Moore, editor, Jane's Fighting
Ships 1973-74 . St. Giles House, London, 1973, p. 77 of the
"Foreward." A recent debate over the continued construction
of the through-deck cruiser seems to have been settled by the
latest defense review by the British Government. See "The
Ministers' Statement," The Manchester Guardian Weekly , Decem-
ber 7, 1974, p. 3, and "Ships Go, Dockyards Stay," The Man-
chester Guardian Weekly , December 7, 1974, p. 10.
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worldwide political commitments, the British government with
its present naval assets, may have difficulty in meeting them.
The balance between commitments and capabilities is "a delicate
one" at best.
The third country with a vital interest in the northern
area is Denmark. She sits astride the narrow entrances to the
Baltic Sea, but also has her entire western coast exposed to
the broad reaches of the North Sea. She shares the observation
of the Skagerrak with Norway, and the seaward defense of the
Kiel Canal with the Federal Republic of Germany. Although
most of the Danish Navy is concentrated in the Baltic and the
Kattegat, her missions include westward defense of the approaches
to the Baltic Sea.
The Navy's tasks are to prevent or hamper
enemy movement on the sea in order to secure
the use of the waterways and to protect Danish
sovereignty. ,„
To handle these essentially local defense matters, the Danish
Navy has small submarines, frigates, corvettes, torpedo-boats
and mine warfare craft, with some missile boats under construe-
tion. 38
Denmark shares her concern in the Baltic Sea with the
^6Moore, Jane's Fighting Ships 1973-74 , p. 77 of the
"Foreward."
-^Erik B. Johansen, "On NATO's Northern Flank," Military
Review , Vol. 51, No. 8, August 1971, pp. 67-68.
•^Moore, Jane's Fighting Ships 1973-74 , p. 75 of the




Federal Republic of Germany, the two NATO members who have a
part of the Baltic littoral. Until recently the Federal Re-
public's Navy operated almost exclusively within that sea, but
now she has joined Denmark and the other NATO partners in
operations in the North Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. ° The
prime missions of the Federal Republic's naval forces in the
Baltic center around coastline protection and exit blockade
by using "submarines, jet aircraft and small, fast surface
units." To fulfill these missions, the navy has destroyers,
frigates, corvettes, submarines, mine warfare craft, torpedo
boats, and others, including substantial building programs of
submarines and fast patrol boats. The Danish interests in
the Baltic revolve around controlling the exits and a sea or
land invasion from the east. Again, the mine warfare boats
are used for these purposes, as are the newly acquired missile
boats.
The northern area, which interests the navies of Norway,
^Minister of Defense, White Paper 1971/1972—The Security
of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Development of the
Federal Armed Forces , Press and Information Office, Bonn,
December, 1972, p. 31.
^Minister of Defense, White Paper 1971/1972—The Security
of the Federal Republic... , p. 147.
Zfl Moore, Jane's Fighting Ships 1973-74 , pp. 128-140 of the
text. See also, Raymond V.B. Blackman, editor, Jane's Fighting
Ships_ 1971-72 , McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1971
, p. 76,
in which he states that the trend toward smaller ships and fast
patrol craft are not peculiar to the Federal Republic and are
encouraged by the drastically increasing cost of larger ships.
^Balckman, Jane's Fighting Ships 1971-72 , p. 76.

142.
Great Britain, the Federal Republic of German, and the "surge"
or intermittent forces of the standing Naval Force Atlantic
and the United States Second Fleet, also provides maneuvering
space for the naval forces of the Soviet Union, the German
Democratic Republic, and Poland. These Warsaw Treaty Organi-
zation members have substantial naval interests in the area.
Two of the major fleets of the Soviet Union are lo-
cated in the northern and Baltic areas, while the GDR and Pol-
ish navies are used almost exclusively in the Baltic Sea. The
Soviet Northern Fleet, whose sailing routes are limited by
Arctic ice much of the year, has no other "choke point" re-
straining its freedom of movement; but this ice does force
ships fairly close to the northern coast of Norway, much to the
latter' s concern. This fleet contains more than 100 submarines,
as well as many cruisers, destroyers and destroyer- type ships,
patrol and torpedo boats, and numerous auxiliary and support
vessels. -^ The Northern Fleet also has its share of the naval
infantry, although exact figures are not available. These
troops are armed with standard infantry weapons and are based
on the Kola Peninsula, close to the joint border with Norway.
The WTO Baltic fleets can be tightly controlled in their
^Norman Polmar, Soviet Naval Power, Challenge for the
1970s , Appendix 6, p. 94 indicates 150 submarines, five
cruisers, 35 destroyers, 60 patrol and torpedo boats. "Vir-
tually all ballistic missile and cruise missile armed sub-
marines are assigned to the Northern and Pacific Fleets."
About 20 of the large surface ships carry surface-to-surface
or surface-to-air missiles. Moore, Jane's Fighting Ships
1975-74
. pp. 529-585, especially p. 530. See also Siegfried
Breyer, Guide to the Soviet Navy (translated by M. Henley),
United States Naval Institute, Annapolis 1970, for more in-
formation on the make-up of the four fleets.
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freedom of movement into ocean areas by the Danes and Swedes
who oversee the access routes. The Kiel Canal lies within
the Federal Republic of Germany, and Norway could, in an emer-
gency, certainly slow vessels entering through the Skagerak by
using ships, planes, and mines. Even with these restrictions,
the Soviet Baltic Fleet is still substantial and could pose a
serious threat to an adversary. It has submarines, cruisers,
many destroyers and destroyer- type ships, and substantial
numbers of patrol and torpedo boats. Neither of the other
two Warsaw Treaty members has a deep water navy, but both have
substantial assets for crisis situations within the Sea. The
GDR, according to one source, has only three destroyers and
escorts, while Poland has two destroyer- type ships and five
45
submarines. y Other analysts indicate greater assets for these
states, including coastal escorts, missile-equipped fast patrol
boats, torpedo boats, mine warfare craft, and landing craft,
all in considerable numbers.
Neither of these latter two countries is dependent on its
waterborne access routes and both could probably survive
^Moore, Jane's Fighting Ships 1973- 74 « p. 530. Many of
these are armed with missiles and are very fast, including
hydrofoils. International Institute for Strategic Studies,
The Military Balance 1975-1974 % p. 7 indicates 6 air cushion
vehicles but not which fleet they are in.
k5^United States Congress, Senate, Congressional Record ,
92nd Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 118, No. 94, June 12, 1972,
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 1972, p. S9185.
^ International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Mili-
tary Balance 1975-1974 . pp. 12 and 13 for the GDR and Polish
navies assets. See also, Moore, Jane's Fighting Ships 1973-74 *
pp. 141-144 and pp. 252-256 for greater detail on these vessels.
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without that portion of trade. But both Baltic coasts might
become important if an amphibious assault on the Federal Re-
public or Danish shores were contemplated.
The Greenland, Iceland, United Kingdom Gap
If hostilities between the Warsaw Pact members and the
NATO allies were to occur, one of the most important 'barriers'
would be Greenland, Iceland, United Kingdom—GIUK Gap. This
is an imaginary line running from Southern Greenland to Ice-
land, thence to the Faeroe Islands, and on to Great Britain.
This barrier can and is patrolled by Allied surveillance air-
craft and ships, looking for Warsaw Pact ships and aircraft.
In order to operate in the Atlantic waters, Soviet submarines
and surface ships would have to pass through this 'barrier'
line. Areas used for surveillance now by the NATO navies
could be used in a time of emergency to track, intercept, and
sink, enemy ships, both surface and submerged if necessary.
An examination of the map reveals the strategic location
of Iceland in the make-up of the GIUK Gap, as indicated
i o
earlier. The original treaty^" has yet to be renegotiated, and
^John G. Norris, "New Strategy for NATO's Northern Flank,"
Sea Power , Vol. 15, No. 11, December, 1972, pp. 13-14.
^ "Defense Agreement Pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty
betv/een the United States of America and the Republic of Ice-
land." Treaties and Other International Acts Series , (TIAS
2206). See also: "Defense of Iceland Pursuant to North Atlan-
tic Treaty," Treaties and Other International Acts Series ,
U.S. Department of State, Government Printing Office, Washing-
ton, D.C. 1956, p. 3716. (TIAS 3716). TIAS 2206 is the basic
document and TIAS 3716 is the exchange of diplomatic notes in
mid- 1 950 ' s which said the world situation was too serious to




periodic attempts have been made to oust the NATO forces there,
so far to no avail. It is not only the North Atlantic Alliance
members who are interested in Iceland; Soviet naval exercises
conducted semi-annually have extended through the Norwegian
Sea, around the waters of Iceland, and into the central posi-
tions of the Atlantic Ocean.
The forward defense zone /of the Soviet Union/
would quite clearly be established in the Ice-
land-Faeroe Islands gap covering the access
routes to and from the Norwegian Sea.,g
This would happen only if hostilities had started between the
two opposing sides.
Other analysts, for all that, carry the scenario one step
farther by assuming Soviet pre-emptive military occupation of
the area. Iceland is the "ideal and, indeed the only feasible
50
site for the /Soviet/ advanced base."^ The Soviet Union could
use political persuasion which might be effective because a
strong minority of the Icelanders do not want foreign forces
or bases there. If this does not work, the Soviet Navy could
hold one of its semi-annual exercises in the area and then
51
move in without any warning. This possibility is not so
preposterous when one realizes that the Icelandic security
^""johan J. Hoist, "The Soviet Union and Nordic Security,"
Cooperation and Conflict , Vol. 6, 1971, p. 141.
5°Croker, "Iceland and the Maritime Threat to NATO,"
P. 52.




52force is composed of about 500 men, while the United States
provides between 3,700 and 4, 000 Air Force and Navy personnel
at the NATO air base at Keflavik.^ Most of these are support
personnel and would be inadequate in numbers or weaponry to
repel an amphibious or airborne assault unit of Soviet naval
infantry or paratroopers. A Soviet guarantee of Iceland's
self-proclaimed 50-mile territorial sea for the protection of
fishing might make the citizenry very interested in exchanging
"big brothers." The heated dispute between Iceland and Great
Britain over freedom of fishing beyond the 12-mile limit goes
to the heart of the Icelandic economy because fish and fishing
provide more than 90 percent of the island's exports. ^
It must also be assumed that the Greenland, Iceland,
^ T.N. Dupuy and Wendell Blanchard, The Almanac of World
Military Power , R.R. Bowker Company, New York, 1972, Second
Edition, p. 93.
^Dupuy and Blanchard, The Almanac of World Military
Power , p. 93; see also: L. Snezhanov, "Iceland: Heated
Debate," New Times (Moscow), No. 6, February, 1972, p. 23,
which gives the lower of the two figures.
^"Damned Dots," The Economist , Vol. 2^0, No. 6675, July
31 » 1971, p. 16. The territorial sea limits were extended to
50 miles in September, 1972, after sufficient warning, but
Great Britain refused to recognize these new limits and con-
tinued to fish inside the territorial sea. The continued dis-
agreement strained NATO relations. More recently, the British
have agreed to negotiate the situation. See David Winder,
"Time Out Called in Cod War," The Christian Science Monitor ,
October 3, 1973, PP. 1, 8; and "Iceland Reaches Accord in
London," The New York Times , October 17, 1973, p. 8. See also,
"Iceland Rescinds Plan to Close U.S. -operated Base at Reflavik,"
(sic), The New York Times , August 1974, p. 3. Among other
things, this article states the new Icelandic Premier has de-
clared that Iceland will extend her fishing limits to 200 miles,
rather than the present 50 miles, by 1975. This move will most
assuredly upset the British fishermen who have been fishing
these waters for several hundred years and cause renewed fric-
tion between Great Britain and Iceland.
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Faeroe Islands, United Kingdom chain provides necessary commun-
ication links across the Atlantic. For example, undersea
cables could stretch across these waterways, providing secure
and constant communication links for Allied use. Even short-
distance atmospheric communications would be less subject to
outside interference with these land stations available to re-
transmit the signals.
It appears that Iceland not only provides the North At-
lantic Alliance with a strategically crucial spot in the ocean,
but also denies to the Soviet Navy complete freedom of (unob-
served) movement to and from the Norwegian Sea and the Atlantic
waters. Whether or not the Soviets would try to acquire Ice-
land by force is certainly problematic, but the possibility
exists because of her available naval units, exercise areas,
and the inadequate defenses immediately available to or in Ice-
land. Once occupied by Soviet force, it does not seem likely
that Iceland would be willing to fight to get rid of them.
Diplomatic techniques seem the most probable avenues of Soviet
attempts to dislodge the NATO (United States) forces, followed
by efforts to disengage Iceland from NATO and, perhaps, to
associate her more closely with the Soviet Union. To sustain
her ships in any long-term Atlantic conflict, the Soviet Union
must have unimpeded access through the GIUK gap. On the
other hand, if a short war or intermittent actions take
place in the Atlantic, the gap is reduced in its significance
to the Soviet Union.
The English Channel and southern North Sea area should be
considered next for two reasons. First, these shipping lanes
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are the ocean lifelines for the NATO Allies the Netherlands
and Belgium, as well as the earlier-mentioned states. The
small but highly regarded Dutch Navy is divided in large measure
between the Atlantic and Channel NATO naval commands. ^
The principal task of the Royal Netherlands
Navy lies in Allied defense within NATO.
Next to this it has a task in relation to
matters within the kingdom.,-/:
The protection of these shipping routes, sv/eeping for mines
along the coast and in the Channel and North Seas, and support
for the Army are its primary missions /'The Netherlands parti-
cipates with Belgium and Great Britain in the Standing Naval
Force Channel, which force consists of mine countermeasures
58
vessels operating in that area/ The even smaller Belgian
-^Dupuy and Blanchard, The Almanac of World Military
Power, p. 102. One destroyer and a marine commando unit are
usually serving in the Caribbean Sea where the Navy has re-
sponsibilities in the Netherlands Antilles Islands and the
Netherlands Surinam, according to Frans P.H.M. Koch, "The Royal
Netherlands Navy in the Caribbean." United States Naval Insti-
tute Proceedings , Vol. 98, No. 4/830, April 1972, p. 118.
^ The Commission of Civilian and Military Experts, The
Future of the Netherlands Defense Force—Findings and Recom-
mendations: Report to the Government of the Netherlands
,
March 1972, p. 21. (Copy provided by the Royal Netherlands
Embassy, Washington, D.C. No publisher or place given.)
57 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The
Military Balance 1973-1974 , p. 16.
5
°See Moore, Jane's Fighting Ships 1973-74 , p. 75 of the
"Foreward," pp. 40-42 and pp. 223-230, for greater detail on
the naval assets. See also Drew Middleton, "Rifts and Soviet
Pressure Worry NATO," The New York Times , September 9, 1974,
p. 3, in which he states, "Cuts by the Netherlands in her de-
fense budget and a review of defense spending in Britain have
raised fears that alliance forces in Central Europe will be




Navy has concentrated almost exclusively on mine warfare ships
and craft, while both naval air arms have helicopters and mari-
time patrol aircraft (Netherlands only).
"
The Atlantic Ocean
Under the overarching heading of the Atlantic Ocean, one
must put such disparate problems as submarines, time needed to
cross, physical properties, and other miscellaneous items.
Should hostilities occur between the V/arsaw Pact members
and the Atlantic Alliance members, some war plans assume re-
supply to Europe from the United States and Canada. Even in
the best of Air Force dreams, more than 90 percent of all
logistic support must travel by sea, over any appreciable
period of time. There are just not enough aircraft and monies
(or, perhaps, in fact, air fields) to support massive and con-
60tinuous air lift. If sea-lift of either combatant forces in
the form of troops or of logistical support and resupply is
contemplated, then the North Atlantic Alliance cannot count on
using the sea lines of communication for a period of ten to 30
days. The Soviet submarine population in the Atlantic is
59^ 7 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The
Military Balance 1973-1974 , pp. 17 and 2J>.
60
Former Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNaraara. in
talking of the forward deployment logistic ships (FDLS; and
the integration of sealift with other methods of transporta-
tion in contingency situations said, "After testing a wide
range of combinations, we found the force that gives us the
required capability at the least cost: six C-5A squadrons,
fourteen C-1Zf1 squadrons and 30 FDLS, pre-positioned equipment
in Europe and in the Pacific, a Civil Reserve Air Fleet, and
460 commercial cargo ships." The Essence of Security , Harper
and Row, Publishers, New York, 1968, p. 85. The Air Force




sufficient, according to some analysts, to make maritime move-
ments in any substantial numbers extremely difficult, if not
impossible, initially. As one senior United States naval
officer explained the situation, there are so many Soviet sub-
marines that the Allies have to consider controlling "merely
61lanes or havens," not the whole sea. Moreover, the Striking
Force Atlantic would have to gain control of the sea lines of
62
communication before it could proceed to Europe. Another
analyst, having finished a study on shipping problems in the
Atlantic, commented that the seaborne logistic support units
might have to "stand down for as long as 30 days or more"
while the navies cleared the area (or sufficiently reduced the
numbers) of submarines ^ before the merchant and/or troop ships
could cross either with or without escorts.
If one assumes a distance of roughly 3,200 miles from the
east coast of the United States to Great Britain and about
another 1,300 miles to the north of Norway, then transit time
is important. Even without submarines to make the passage
difficult, six or seven days might be needed to reach Southamp-
ton and another three and a half days to get to North
61
Interview with a United States naval officer, Norfolk,
Virginia Spring 1973. He implied, also that control of these
lanes would be for a short time only, and only while they
were actually being used, not all the time.
Interview with an Allied naval officer, Norfolk,
Virginia Spring 1973.
^Interviews with a United States naval officer in
Norfolk, Virginia, and a Department of the Navy civilian in
Washington, D. C. , Spring 1973.
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Norway. H These calculations are based on a 20~knot sustained
speed for combat units. Merchant convoys would probably take
65longer as their speeds are generally lower. y Transits cannot
be made in straight lines or great circle routes because anti-
submarine warfare and anti-aircraft evasive tactics must be
66followed to reduce losses. So time must be added to the
straight-line calculations, but how much is not known, as the
routing tactics are classified.
The Atlantic Ocean, especially the northern half, can be
extremely rough. The seas run high, there is a great deal of
rain, and the atmospherics for aircraft operations can be
terrible. Bad weather and poor visibility are certainly help-
ful to ships trying to avoid airborne or surface detection,
but they also slow down and make more difficult shipboard opera-
tions and, therefore, must be judged more harmful than advan-
tageous where speed is of such great importance.
Other problems might include such diplomatic and military
considerations as what to do about neutral or third country
ships in United States ports? Local war does not mean worldwide
^"The Oxford Atlas , Oxford University Press, London, 1963,
p. 12.
^Best estimates based on information available indicate
about 15 to 16 knots. See figure 5-9, "MSTS Ship Characteris-
tics," Military Sea Transportation Service , Navpers 10829B,
prepared by the Bureau of Naval Personnel, Government Printing
Office, Washington, 1962, p. 58. The average speed then was
13.9 knots and increased speeds can be assumed in new ships
with better designs and increased capacities.
See: "Sailing the Convoy," Chapter 6, Naval Control of
Shipping , Navpers 10o30-A prepared by the Bureau of Naval Per-
sonnel, Government Printing Office, Washington, 1966, pp. 62-72.
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hostilities, but transhipping is commonplace today and could
put domestic goods in the hands of adversaries. Another mari-
time problem would have to do with United States-owned merchant
ships and ships with "flags-of-convenience." Which ships can
be requisitioned in a state of less than war? If taken over,
would third country crews of "flags-of-convenience" ships be
willing to sail into hostile areas? ' There are other problems
which could be put under the sub-heading "miscellaneous" in
dealing with the Atlantic Ocean, but these seem to be the most
prominent.
The Tropic of Cancer
Part of the North Atlantic Treaty reads "...an armed
attack on the territory of any of the parties... in the North
Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer...." The Cuban
missile crisis, therefore, could not have been considered under
NATO auspices even if the other members had wanted it to be so.
Aside from the many political ramifications of this crisis, it
did indicate a very real military problem—namely that an arti-
ficial barrier across the ocean brings NATO to a halt in its
operating procedures, at 23 degrees 2.7 minutes north latitude.
The doctrine of "hot pursuit" will hold only marginally after
this point. More importantly, the Allies cannot protect any
£_
A question posed by a United States Coast Guard officer
in Norfolk, Virginia, is, whether or not the U.S. government
would want third country nationals serving aboard these ships.
Could they cause more trouble than they would be worth to NATO?
Would they, in fact, even be willing to serve in a hostile fire
zone? Interview, Spring 1973.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Facts and
Figures , Appendix 4> Article 6, p. 271.
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of their ships or shipping beyond the Tropic of Cancer except
when their naval ships operate as national units. For example,
submarines (or surface ships) could harass shipping and then
run south of the Tropic to relative safety from NATO forces.
"
One of the tasks of the naval forces of the North Atlantic
Alliance is the insurance of the continued flow of logistic
70
support to Europe. To do this, NATO must, if hostilities
occur, successfully engage adversary (Soviet) forces at sea and
either remove them or drive them from the Atlantic waters.
With the haven of the Tropic of Cancer always available, these
71forces can harass ships and shipping with impunity. ' A
former Allied Commander Atlantic advocates doing away with the
Tropic of Cancer as a boundary for three reasons. First,
artificial lines in oceans are meaningless for naval operations,
Mountains or rivers or major bodies of water are acceptable,
but lines in water are not. Second, NATO shipping interests
(which vitally affect the economies of all the partners) call
for protection beyond this line. The need for safe passages
does not begin or end at the Tropic of Cancer. Third, this
line limits the awareness by the members of actions beyond
^Interview with a retired United States naval officer in
Washington, D. C. This officer was a senior official in the
Atlantic Fleet-Allied Command Atlantic organization at the time
of the Cuban missile crisis and discussed at length the problems
of the Tropic of Cancer as a barrier to NATO, Spring 1973.
7°Ibld.
^ 1 E.P. Holmes, "NATO from a Saclant Viewpoint," Brass ey's
Annual 1971 , edited by J.L. Moulton, Praeger Publishers, New




what they see as "their" territory. A fourth factor should
be added. Just because the NATO forces recognize and adhere
to a boundary for their operations, is certainly no reason to
suppose, or expect, an adversary to do the same. He would be
foolish to do so.
Until the reopening of the Suez Canal, over 50 percent of
European oil and 25 percent of its food supplies come around
the Cape of Good Hope, through the South Atlantic, and across
the Tropic of Cancer before they can be protected by NATO
forces. It is also estimated that by 1975, about 50 percent
of United States oil imports will travel this route. ** Recent
events in the Middle East and their effect on Western Europe
have demonstrated the total Allied dependence on oil. In addi-
tion to Great Britain's Simonstown Agreement of 1955, which
makes South African facilities available to NATO in time of
war, the Portuguese have several islands in the South Atlan-
tic suitable for naval facilities. These facilities could be
available for NATO naval escorts to protect shipping from South
Africa to the North Atlantic, passing the merchantmen on from
"^Holmes, "NATO from a Saclant Viewpoint," pp. 17-18.
'-^The North Atlantic Assembly, The Soviet Maritime Threat ,
p. 34.
'^"The North Atlantic Assembly, The Soviet Maritime Threat ,
p. 33 . But see also: Ian Aitken and David McKie, "Simonstown
to 'Wither on Vine,'" The Manchester Guardian Weekly , November
9, 1974, P. 9 and "Not Worth the Risk," The Manchester Guardian
Weekly , November 9, 1974, p. 1. Both these articles discuss
the reconsideration of the Simonstov/n Agreement by the British
Government. Apparently the political liability of an agree-
ment with a government practicing apartheid is greater that
the military advantages gained by such an agreement.
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station to station. Sao Tome and the Cape Verde Islands both
provide possibilities, as do some of the British islands in
the South Atlantic. (St. Helena and Ascension are two which
come to mind.) Until recently, Portugal's policy of colonial
75
rule made her unwelcome by some of the Alliance members, y
but her recent decisions to grant independence to the African
colonies make her much more acceptable to all her partners in
NATO. The present government, however, is causing NATO other
problems.
Some analysts feel that if the North Atlantic Treaty were
opened up for revision by considering the removal of the Tropic
of Cancer as a southern boundary, some members might use this
as an excuse to withdraw from the Organization. This de-
parture might take the form of French semi-association with all
the benefits and few of the commitments, or a complete retreat
from the Treaty itself. Greece seems to be following the
French example, although most hope she will not exit completely
from the military portion of the Alliance. Portugal may go also,
Within the Atlantic Ocean several navies maneuver and must
be considered in assessing the forces within the area. (The
Soviet Northern Fleet which sails this ocean has already been
discussed.) The French, Canadian, American, and Portuguese
ships all ply these waters regularly.
France actually has three ocean areas of concern: the
75Erik B. Johansen, "On NATO's Northern Flank," p. 69.
'^Interviews with allied and United States naval officers
in the Spring of 1973 in Norfolk, Virginia indicated Denmark
might be the first to go with Iceland or Canada second. No
one thought of Greece as the second, behind France. No one anti-
cipated the governmental change in Portugal, either.
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Channel, the Atlantic and the Mediterranean Sea. Like Great
Britain, she also has some overseas naval commitments, of a
77
modest nature. Although most of the present fleet of sur-
face ships was built in the 1950s, a strong new construction
78program is changing that picture. These new ships include
a helicopter carrier, six guided missile destroyers and 14 es-
79
courts, plus some auxiliaries. y The nuclear ballistic missile
submarine program continues with five built or building, suffi-
cient to have at least one on station at all times. Most of
the larger surface ships and the nuclear powered submarines
are located in the Channel and Atlantic ports.
Although France is withdrawn from the military structure
of the North Atlantic alliance, her naval cooperation with NATO
is well-known, and the number of exercises in which France
participates has risen, "largely as a result of representations
made to DeGaulle by the French Chiefs of Staff after the invasion.
77
'
'Minister of State in Charge of National Defense, French
White Paper on National Defense , Vol. 1, 1972, pp. 24-25.
(No date or place of publication given. Received from the Em-
bassy of the Republic of France, Washington, D.C., Winter 1972.)
'Henri LeMasson, editor, Les Flottes de Combat 1972 ,
Editions Maritime et D'Outre-Mer, Paris, 1971 > p. 18.
^Moore, Jane's Fighting Ships 1 973-74 , p. 1"? of "Fore-
ward," and pp. 107-127 for greater details on these ships.
International Institute for Strategic Studies, The
Military Balance 1975-1974
. p. 20. See also, "France to
Build Nuclear Aircraft Carrier," The Times (London), January
24, 1974. "France has announced plans to build a nuclear-
powered aircraft carrier of 15,000 to 18,000 tons, to be opera-
tional from 1980." This carrier may be equipped to handle ver-




of Czechoslovakia in 1968." Joint naval exercises in the
Mediterranean have been commanded by French flag officers, and,
since 1968, the French Navy has participated in maneuvers and
Op
surveillance in the Mediterranean Sea. French cooperation
in Allied exercises in the Atlantic are not so well documented,
but it is known that suitable French units appear during NATO
maneuvers with amazing regularity to perform appropriate tasks
within the overall operations. ^
The Canadian armed forces are an integrated organization
—
there is no separate navy, but the Maritime Command provides
"combat-ready sea and maritime air forces to meet Canada's de-
Oi
fense commitments...." ^ These include: territorial waters'
surveillance, contributions to the allied defense of North
America, joint oceanic cooperation with the United States, and
contributions to international peacekeeping operations. A new
and larger class of destroyers is being built to supplement
the compact fleet of 18 frigates, diesel submarines, and
y1
"France and the Bomb," The Economist , Vol. 234, No. 6722,
June 2if, 1972, p. 45.
Qp
Edward A. Kolodziej, "France Ensnared: French Strategic
Policy and Bloc Politics after 1968," Orbis, Vol. 15, No. 4,
Winter 1972, p. 1091; Andre Beaufre, "French Defense Policy,"
Journal of the Royal United Service Institution , Vol. 155,
No. 657, March 1970, p. 9; and "France and the Bomb," p. 45.
^Interview with a retired senior United States naval
officer in Newport, Rhode Island, Fall 1973.
^Minister of National Defense, Defense 1971 * Ottawa,




auxiliary ships. y Canadian moves to "reconsider" her mili-
tary commitments within NATO seem to have been muted, although
talk along these lines was strong for a while.
The largest navy of the North Atlantic Alliance members
is that of the United States. Although the Navy is divided
generally among four major fleets, two of them are of particu-
lar and immediate interest to NATO—the Second Fleet located
at Norfolk, Virginia and the Sixth Fleet partially located
87in the Mediterranean. ' Generally, the Second Fleet, with four
carriers, about 60 surface ships, and half a dozen amphibious
oo
ships, ' plies the Atlantic and provides the rotation ships
for the Sixth Fleet. This latter fleet has two carriers, about
20 surface combatants, and amphibious ships v/ith Marines em-
89barked. 7 With these still substantial assets, the United
States Navy is stretched thin in meeting all its world-wide
commitments and, because of its overage ships and systems has
had to reduce itself from almost a thousand active ships in
%loore, Jane's Fighting Ships 1 973-74 , p. 75 of ."Fore-
ward," and pp. 56-63 of text. See also, International Insti-
tute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1973-1974 ,
p. 19 for slightly different figures.
or
Peter Silverman, "Canadian Defense Policy," Journal of
the Royal United Service Institution , Vol. 116, No. 664,
December 1971 , p. 43.
'The Third Fleet is in the eastern Pacific and the Sev-
enth Fleet is in the western Pacific Ocean.
oo
International Institute for Strategic Studies, The
Military Balance 1973-1974 , p. 4.
9"Key Area Where U.S. is Slipping," U.S. News and World
Report , Vol. 72 , March 20, 1972, p. 38, and International Insti-
tute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1 973-1 974 , p. 4.
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1968 to just over 500 by 1974. 90 Owing to United States com-
mitments to some Pacific countries, none of the Third and
Seventh Fleet forces should be considered in discussing the
immediate inventories of the NATO navies. Therefore, the
Atlantic Alliance members could count on perhaps half of the
total United States naval forces in time of crisis. It is
understood, however, that most of the Atlantic forces are ear-
91
marked for NATO, but exact figures are classified. Present
construction programs include attack submarines, destroyers,
a nuclear carrier, several amphibious assault ships, and vari-
92
ous auxiliaries. Included in the naval forces are the
Marine Corps, and total combined attack and fighter aircraft
exceed 2300, also about 1200 helicopters, plus fixed-wing patrol
93
and anti-submarine warfare planes.
Another NATO ally "fronting" on the Atlantic Ocean is
Portugal, with a navy smaller than that of the Netherlands.
Although the overseas commitments of that navy are in a state
of flux, the forces remaining in the home waters are earmarked
° For the most recent figures by ship type see, "Naval
Force Summary, February 1974, Naval Review 1974, U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings , Vol. 100, No. 855, May 1974, p. 303.
"interview with a United States naval officer, Norfolk,
Virginia, Spring 1973.
92Moore, Jane's Fighting Shins 1975-74 . p. 356 for exact
figures. See pp. 355-513 for complete details of the naval
assets.
^"Naval Forces Summary, February 1974," United States
Naval Institute... , p. 303.
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for NATO control in time of emergency. ^ A building program in-
cludes four now corvettes to accompany the frigates, corvettes,
submarines, patrol craft, and support and auxiliary vessels. ^
Portugal is an intermittent participant in the Standing Naval
Force Atlantic, and her mission includes the surveillance and
maintenance of the freedom of the home waters. It should also
be noted that Portugal's ships easily could be used for the
seaward patrolling of the Straits of Gibraltar, should that be-
come necessary. Gibraltar, of course, is at the entrance to
the Mediterranean Sea. Portugal's present political problems
are extreme and may reduce her usefulness to and within NATO.
The Mediterranean Area and the Southern Flank
The last major area problem is the Southern Flank or the
Mediterranean Sea. This Sea is long, over 2,500 miles, narrow
and presently has but one useful entrance (or exit). Until
the opening of the Suez Canal, the Straits of Gibraltar remain
extremely important. It is bordered by NATO members, Western-
leaning neutrals, Warsaw Pact members (although only through
the Turkish Straits from the Black Sea) , Communist oriented
neutrals, Arab League partners, other Arab-oriented states,
and Israel. The littoral states themselves have enough local
and regional problems of their own, but even less than any
other part of the world will they be left to deal with their
own difficulties free from external interference.
From the perspective of the North Atlantic Alliance, one
y
^Interview with an allied naval officer Newport, Rhode
Island, Spring 1973.




of the most serious matters in the Mediterranean right now is
the Arab-Israeli split, not so much because they are fighting
but because the United States Sixth Fleet is in part, an
example of the American commitment to Israel. In speaking of
the United States commitment to NATO and possible troop reduc-
tions, a Congressional report said:
It should be remembered that the 6th Fleet is
part of our NATO commitment, and any reduction
that includes the 6th Fleet weakens the friend-
ly forces—the Western sea forces—on Israel's
open flank. q/-
This problem of United States dual commitments in the Mediter-
ranean has caused some very real disputes within the Alliance.
For example, when the United States increased its military aid
to Greece and Turkey in 1970-72 to help offset increased Soviet
naval presence in the Mediterranean, the President justified
this in terms of protecting Israel. He had said that, "With-
out aid to Greece and aid to Turkey, you have no viable policy
97to save Israel." 7 This naturally brought angry cries from
the Arabs and denials from Greeks and Turks (who lean toward
qo
the Arabs in that conflict). The Greek and Turkish govern-
^ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on
Armed Services, Report of the Special Subcommittee on North
Atlantic Treaty Organization Commitments , 92nd Congress 2nd
Session, Document H.A.S.C. No. 92-6i+, Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C., August 1972, p. 1 1f983.
^
'"Greece Denies U.S. Statement that Bases Help Protect
Israel," The New York Times , August 16, 1972, p. 12.
9°The Turks favor the Arabs, if such an all-embracing
term can be used, because of background, proximity, and reli-
gion. The Greeks have about 60,000 citizens living and work-
ing in the various Arab cities, especially Alexandria, Egypt,
and do not want to bring any harm to overseas Greeks.
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merits have both made it clear they are not interested in be-
coming involved in the United States pledge to Israel. ^
A second area of very definite conflict between Greece and
Turkey concerns Cyprus. Despite the Alliance bonds, hostility
is extreme between the two countries, and armed conflict con-
tinues between them. Apart from any Alliance allegiance, Tur-
key does not want to see Cyprus fall into Greek hands because
the location of that island is so close to Turkey that she
feels she would be at a strategic disadvantage in their bi-
lateral affairs. Turkey does not want Greece in Cyprus. This
means continuous conflict between the two NATO members. More
importantly, the Greek withdrawal from the military portion of
NATO seriously affects the viability of the southern flank
security in that her possible withdrawal will leave a gap in
the defenses. In addition to removing her own forces from the
North Atlantic Alliance, Greece has indicated she is consider-
ing asking the United States to vacate her NATO/US facilities
U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on
Armed Services, Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on
North Atlanti c Treaty Organization Commitments , 92nd Congress,
1st and 2nd Sessions, Document No. H.A.S.C. 92-52, Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., October 1971-March 1972,
p. 13441. But see also: U.S. Congress, House of Representa-
tives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings Before the Sub-
committee in Europe on Greece, Spain, and the Southern NATO
Strategy
,
92nd Congress, 1st Session, Government Printing




in Greece. This would cause problems to the United States
in her meeting of her commitments to NATO and to the Middle
East.
Some of the physical properties of the Mediterranean mili-
tate against certain naval defensive procedures. Anti-submarine
warfare operations are difficult because of the high ambient
noise levels in the Mediterranean. At any time, there are 2,000
to 2,600 ships underway in these sometimes shallow waters.
1 01Their transit noises make listening1 very difficult. These
same noises also mean life is more arduous for the attack sub-
marine, thus making the situation, perhaps, a standoff. The
elongated, relatively narrow shape of the Mediterranean makes
hiding difficult at times. Land-based aircraft could very
easily locate merchant or naval ships attempting to resupply
Greece or Turkey (or Italy) in the event of hostilities. This
makes the political leanings of the North African littoral
countries extremely important, as they could provide landing
100 Ian Smart, "The Family Fight and NATO," The New York
Times , August 18, 1 974, Section 4, p. 5; Drew Middleton,
"Greek Bases Worry U.S. and NATO," The New York Times , August
23, 1974, p. 2; David Mutch, "Italy's NATO Role Grown," The
Christian Science Monitor , August 2.7 , 1974, p. 2; and Kingsbury
Smith, "Independent Cyprus of Paramount Importance to NATO
Security," Boston Herald American , August 7, 1974, p. 6. Some
students of Eastern Mediterranean politics feel the latest
fighting over Cyprus is actually a cover for the dispute be-
tween Greece and Turkey over oil deposits in the Aegean Sea.
There is no proof of this yet.
10l Issac C. Kidd, Jr., "View from the Bridge of the Sixth
Fleet Flagship," United States Naval Institute Proceedings ,




strips for Soviet aircraft. Attack carrier-based aircraft
are potentially more vulnerable too, because the carrier does
not have so much maneuver room as she might in an Ocean area.
She is more 'detectable' by land-based aircraft because she
cannot really hide from or avoid them if they have bases on
the Southern coast of the Mediterranean.
If hostilities between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces were
to occur, probably most merchant shipping (certainly all
Allied shipping in the affected area) would cease until suit-
able escorts could be provided. The geographic constraints
discussed earlier prevent independent passage or routing except
at great risk. The substantial Soviet naval surface and sub-
marine forces and the Warsaw Pact air forces pose a sufficiently
serious opposition to force the Allied naval and air forces to
contain or destroy these elements before much resupply could
take place. The Sixth Fleet could and would support land
operations, but only after it had dealt with the Soviet naval
1 03forces. ^ Depending on the numbers of ships (on both sides)
and many other factors, this could take a few days or a month.
Since Greece and Turkey have only about 30-days' worth of
logistic supplies on hand, a protracted delay in convoy
Horacio Rivero, "The Defense of NATO's Southern Flank,"
Journal of the Royal United Service Institute for Defense
Studies , Vol. 117', No. 666. June 1972, P. 8.
10
^Horacio Rivero, "The Defense of NATO's Southern Flank,"
p. 8. See also Middleton, "Rifts and Soviet Pressure Worry
NATO," in which he states, "The withdrawal of Greece from the
military sector of the alliance has opened a gap in the alli-
ance's radar network that military sources believe could have
serious consequences in any future Middle East crisis."
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resupply could be disastrous for them. 10Zf The mission of the
Commander Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe at Naples is to
protect the lines of communication across the Mediterranean
with ships from Italy, Greece, Turkey, Great Britain, and the
105United States, ' but the opposition must be controlled or
eliminated before this can happen. It seems apparent that the
basic missions of the naval forces in the Mediterranean
—
attack aircraft, anti-submarine warfare, and convoy escort
—
may all be delayed while these forces assume an initial self-
protection role to preserve their own existence. After these
initial steps, then they can accept more supportive roles to
assist and resupply the land actions, if any.
The naval forces of the Alliance members within the
^"North Atlantic Assembly, The Soviet Maritime Threat ,
p. 30.
105Kidd, "View from the Bridge of the Sixth Fleet Flag-
ship," p. 22.
For a more complete background on recent commentary on
the Mediterranean and naval policies see: Dana Adams Schmidt,
"Basing of U.S. Navy in Greece in Doubt," The Christian Science
Monitor , December 5, 1973, p. 8; Richard Burt, "Growing Soviet
Navy Deployed in Crises," The Christian Science Monitor , Decem-
ber 14, 1973, p. 16; Paul Kemezis, "NATO Studies Tactical
Lessons of the Mideast War," The New York Times , December 22,
1973, p. 2; Norman Polmar, "Supremacy at Sea Still a Crucial
Issue," The New York Times , January 13, 1974, Section 4, p. 17;
Drew Middleton, "Potential Reopening of the Suez Canal Raises
Questions of Military Strategy," The New York Times , January
23, 1974, p. 6; Michael Getler, "Zumwalt Presents Grim View of
Naval Power," The Washington Post , February 20, 1974, P. 2;
Richard Burt, "Suez Canal Opening Could Give Soviets an Edge,"
The Christian Science Monitor , March 6, 1974, p. 3; Richard Burt,
"Kremlin's New Naval Missile," The Christian Science Monitor ,
August 6, 1974, P. 1; Kingsbury Smith, "Independent Cyprus of
Paramount Importance to NATO Security," Boston Herald American ,
August 7, 1974, p. 6; and Richard Burt, "Sea Power: U.S. vs.




Mediterranean Sea include those at a small British naval facili-
ty at Gibraltar, the French forces in the Sea, the navies of
Italy and Turkey, (and perhaps Greece with a situation similar
to that of France), and the United States Sixth Fleet. The
British Gibraltar force is very small and the Mediterranean
portion of French assets is also modest, ' but the Italian
Navy is substantial.
The modern, diverse, and relatively effective Italian
navy must protect her sea lines of communication because about
1 n$
85 percent of her trade travels by sea. The long-term prob-
lem of continued sufficient funding for training and operations
looms as particularly severe for Italy's navy because of her
'runaway' inflation. ' By judicious use of planning and de-
signing efforts, the Italians have built three cruisers with
helicopter capabilities, plus other forces of more than 30
destroyer-type ships, submarines, mine warefare craft and more
107
'The British usually have a frigate and a Royal Marine
Detachment at Gibraltar, according to the Secretary of State
for Defense, Statement on the Defense Estimates 1972 , pp. 9,
50. The French have destroyer-type surface ships, auxiliaries,
and diesel submarines at Toulon according to Le Masson, Les
Flottes de Combat 1972 , p. 1. The British force may shrink short-
ly.
1 oR
Marcello Vacca-Torelli, "An Analysis of the Strategic
Importance of Gibraltar and Suez in the 70' s," unpublished
thesis, Naval Command Course, Naval War College, Newport,
Rhode Island, April 1971, p. 37.
^Frederick L. Ashworth, "The Soviet Strategic Offensive
and the NATO Southern Flank," Brassey's Annual 1969 , J.L.
Moulton, editor, F.A. Praeger, Publishers, New York, 1969,
p. 85; and David Mutch, "Italy's NATO Role Grows," The Chris-
tian Science Monitor , August 2.7, 1974, p. 2.
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than 100 auxiliaries. The Navy also operates substantial
1 1
1
numbers of maritime reconnaissance and patrol aircraft,
which work as an integral part of the NATO maritime air patrol
in the Mediterranean Sea.
When (and if) Greece does operate within the context of
NATO, her missions include the retention of the sea lines of
communication around Greece, resupply of the Army in Thrace,
limited amphibious operations, convoy resupply protection, and
an antisubmarine warfare role in conjunction with the Sixth
1 12Fleet. The dozen and a half destroyer-type ships, sub-
marines, mine v/arfare craft, and landing vessels, are supple-
mented by four new missile boats already built by France, and
some other new missile boats being built by France for the
Greek navy.
The extreme eastern end of the Mediterranean and the
passages to the Black Sea are patrolled by the Turkish Navy,
another small and comparatively old navy. Although most
vessels have been transferred from the United States and the
United Kingdom, Turkey herself is completing two new frigates
to join her other heavy surface fighting ships, patrol and
torpedo boats, mine warfare craft, amphibious warfare ships,
110Moore, Jane's Fighting Ships 1973-74 , p. 75 of
"Foreward' and. 176-188 of text.
International Institute for Strategic Studies, The
Military Balance 1975-1974 , pp. 2.2.-Z5.
G. Drossinos, "The Royal Hellenic Navy," United States
Naval Institute Proceedings , Vol. 97, No. 3/8 1 7 , p. 37^ Mar. 1971
n
^Moore, Jane's Fighting Ships 1973-74 , p. 75 of the
"Foreward," and. pp. 146-152 of the text.
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and auxiliaries. ^ With these assets, Turkey guards her
coast in the Black Sea; the Bosporus, Sea of Marmara and the
Dardenelles; and her Mediterranean coastal area. Perhaps the
passages between the Black and Mediterranean Seas are Turkey's
most important aspect, even although these waterways are closely
controlled by the Montreux Convention.
Although the strategic nuclear submarines of the eastern
and western alliances are not listed as part of any of the
mentioned fleets and are not designated as 'area' forces of
either side, they must be acknowledged as integral parts of
the force structures of both sides. The capabilities of the
present and proposed submarine-launched ballistic missiles and
to a lesser extent the attack submarines materially affect the
functional utilization and geographic placement of other exist-
ing and future naval weapons platforms. The SLBMs and nuclear
powered submarines may also affect the current plans to have
substantial and continuous United States naval forces in or
near the European NATO waters. If this comes to pass, then
the preceding comparison of Alliance and Warsaw Pact maritime
forces will have to be redrawn in light of the new situation.
All advances in military and naval technology have a po-
tential effect on the use and placement of weapons platforms,
be they ships, aircraft, land-based missiles, or troops. Of
particular importance to this paper, however, are the ranges
of the submarine-launched ballistic missiles, the quietness of
11ZfMoore, Jane's Fighting Ships 1973-74 , pp. 307-314.
The Federal Republic of Germany is also building at least one
new submarine for Turkey, p. 309.
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attack and SLBM submarines, and potential breakthroughs in
anti-submarine warfare detection equipment.
The present fleet ballistic missile submarines of both
sides carry missiles with ranges of 1,700 and 2,800 nautical
1 1 5
miles. ^ The warheads have either multiple re-entry vehicle
or multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle capabili-
ties. With the present missiles and their maximum range of
2,800 nautical miles, the European waters are very important
for launch purposes. Although the closeness of the Norwegian
Sea to the Soviet Union (if Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev are
considered as NATO target areas) has diminished as the missile
range has increased, the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean
Sea are still within the 2,800 nautical mile radius of a
1 17
circle with its center in Moscow. The proposed new Trident
liO
submarine with its Trident I and Trident II missiles, would
vastly increase the operational area of the submarine-launched
^International Institute for Strategic Studies, The
Military Balance 1975-1974 , p. 69.
Herbert Scoville, Jr., "Missile Submarines and National
Security," Scientific American , Vol. 226, No. 6, June 1972,
p. 22.
1 1
^Scoville, "Missile Submarines and National Security,"
pp. 18-19.
The Trident submarine is to displace 17|000 tons (cur-
rent FBM about 9,000 tons) with a length of 500 to 600 feet
(vice 425 feet for the present FBMs), and will carry 24 missiles.
See Ocean Science News , No. 14, August 4, 1972, p. 2. The
Trident I missile will have a range of 4,000 nautical miles,
while Trident II will be 6,000 nautical miles. These missiles
will have a maneuverable re-entry vehicle warhead thus increas-
ing target choice after launch. See Ocean Science on Station ,
No. 15, January 31, 1973, p. 1.
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ballistic missile force. With a i+,000 or 6,000 nautical mile
range for the missiles, these submarines would not need to
launch from European waters any longer. These submarines could
stay in the mid-Atlantic or Indian Ocean or off the China coast
in the Pacific Ocean. ' The increased maneuver room for these
submarines would decrease the interest of the United States in
the Norv/egian Sea, Iceland, the GIUK Gap, the bases at Holy
Loch and Rota, and perhaps ships in the Mediterranean. As the
ranges of the Soviet submarine missiles increase, their interest
in the waters of the Atlantic become less strategically impor-
tant for nuclear warfare. Increased SLBM range may not, how-
ever, decrease their interest in the Atlantic for ship-killing
and convoy disruption purposes.
The quietness of the attack and ballistic missile sub-
marines is important because their detection (or lack thereof)
120is dependent on how much noise they make. Right now the
technology available in anti-submarine warfare gives a distinct
advantage to the submarine for many reasons, including the slow
cruising speed used by the FBMs once they are on station.
Slower speeds mean less noise, thus increasing detection prob-
lems. This makes detection doubly difficult as the operational
areas increase in size and the time needed to reach that area
^Charles J.V. Murphy, "What We Gave Away in the Moscow
Arms Agreements," Fortune Magazine , Vol. 86, No. 3, September
1972, p. 115.
1 pr\
John Simpson, "Technology and Political Choice in Future
NATO Maritime Strategy," Orbis, Vol. 17, No. 1, Spring 1973,
p. 261. 'Noise' can be caused by the propeller and the hull
moving through the water, and by the machinery within the boat.
U.S. submarines are significantly quieter than most Soviet boats.
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decreases. As the submarine noise levels decrease, detection
becomes harder and present technology does not seem to indi-
1 21
cate any significant advances in the near future.
Although the Soviet Union seems not to have conquered
the noise problem so well as the United States, she has tested
a if,000 nautical mile submarine-launched missile reportedly to
be used in the Delta class fleet ballistic missile sub-
122
marine. The announcement that the Soviet Union has suc-
cessfully tested a multiple independently targeted re-entry
vehicle, can and probably will have a significant impact on
the use and placement of her strategic missile submarines when
121 Simpson, "Technology and Political Choice...," pp. 263"
266. Other advantages to the submarine include: her large
area to hide in; noise disturbances created by the hunting
ships; noises of other ships, as merchant ships; water tempera-
ture gradients which affect the efficiency of sonar gear; and
the rough ocean bottom which provides hiding places and com-
plicates sonar echoes.
1 22Ocean Science on Station , No. 15, February 7, 1973,
p. 1 . For an extensive discussion of the mechanics of Soviet
naval missiles see James R. Schlesinger, Annual Defense Depart*
ment Report FY 1 97*3 * U.S. Government Printing Office, Washing-
ton, D.C., March 1974, p. hi.
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this missile is fitted to the boats. ^
The advantages accruing to the Soviet Union of a longer-
range missile with MIRV capabilities compounds the ASW prob-
lems of the Alliance members and compensates for the easier
detection of their noisier submarines.
Longer range Allied missiles, therefore, might have a
deleterious effect on the maritime operations of the NATO
Alliance since they could make the United States (especially
Congress) less interested in home-porting ships overseas or
in continuing such frequent cruises of ships to various Euro-
pean ports for extended periods of time. The increased
125For more detailed commentary on the recent changes af-
fecting submarine technology and use see: John W. Finney,
"U.S. Plans to Add to Nuclear Arms," The New York Times ,
December 1, 1973, p. 1; John W. Finney, "New Soviet Subs Called
Challenge," The New York Times , January 14, 1974, p. 5; Drew
Middleton, "Navy Plans Big Antisubmarine Outlays," The New
York Times , January 17, 1974, p. 12; John W. Finney, "Maneuver-
able Warhead Being Developed by U.S.," The New York Times ,
January 20, 1974, p. 1; Dana A. Schmidt, "Goals Differ on War-
head," The Christian Science Monitor , January 21, 1974, p. 3;
Dana A. Schmidt, "Schlesinger 1 s Choice: Cold War or Detente?,"
The Christian Science Monitor , March 6, 1974, p. 2; Drew
Middleton, "U.S. Global Military Role: Are Forces Big Enough,?"
The New York Times . March 17, 1974, PP. 1, 3; Drew Middleton,
"Defense Debate Focuses on Kind of War to Plan For," The New
York Times . March 18, 1974, P. 6; Drew Middleton, "As U.S. Arms
Outlays Slow, Soviet Intentions Are a Big Question," The New
York Times
. March 19, 1974, p. 8; John W. Finney, "Aging Fleet
Called a Soviet Handicap," The New York Times , May 20, 1974,
p. 17; Drew Middleton, "U.S. Is Stressing Accuracy Over Size
in Developing Latest Nuclear Weapons," The New York Times , May
26, 1974, p. 1; Drew Middleton, "Navy and Air Force Upgrade
Weaponry," The New York Times , May Z7 , 1974, p. 1; Drew Middle-
ton, "Amid Detente, Soviet Military Expansion," The New York
Times , July 1, 1974, p. 12; Frank P. Young, "Ceremony Marks
End of Zumwalt Era," Evening Capital (Annapolis), July 1, 1974,
p. 23; National Broadcasting Company, "Meet the Press—Admiral
Zumwalt," Vol. 18, No. 26, Merkle Press, Inc., Washington,
June 30, 1974; "Remarks by Admiral E.R. Zumwalt, Jr., U.S.N.
,
Chief of Naval Operations, at the Change of Command and Retire-
ment Ceremony, Annapolis, Maryland, June 29, 1974," provided by
the Public Affairs Office, Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland.
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operational area of the Trident with her longer range missiles
would make less necessary the bases at Holy Loch and Rota and
diminish the need for carriers in the Mediterranean in a nuclear
war situation. They, logically, would not alter directly the
non-nuclear war scenarios, but then political decisions con-
cerning strategy and diplomacy are not always based on military
logic. Since the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean is also part
of the United States commitment to Israel, perhaps Trident and
6,000 mile missiles would not materially affect that area.
On the other hand, the increased range and capabilities
of the Soviet missiles might very well necessitate an increased
ASW effort by the North Atlantic Alliance to keep a better
watch on the submarines and their maneuvers. ASW capabilities
could include more surface warships equipped with helicopters,
sonar, and other devices, and more attack submarines to hunt
for the Soviet boats. Technological breakthroughs in ASW
techniques as well as missile range and boat carrying capacity
could all substantially affect the use and deployment of non-
nuclear maritime assets within the NATO areas of concern.
In addition to the Soviet ballistic missile submarines
mentioned, all of v/hich are now stated to be in the Northern
Fleet, ^ the Warsaw Pact leader has substantial surface and
sub-surface forces in the Black Sea. This Fleet includes the
two new aircraft carriers, a new class of cruisers, other
heavy surface ships, and more than 1 50 torpedo and patrol
^"Drew Middle ton, "Rifts and Soviet Pressure Worry
NATO," The New York Times , September 9, *\97h, p. 3.
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boats, plus the necessary auxiliary and landing vessels. y
Some of the diesel submarines carry cruise missiles, but most
of them are into their second decade of use.
The two remaining Warsaw Treaty Organization Allies with
coasts on the Black Sea are Bulgaria and Rumania. Their small
and relatively ancient naval assets must be considered for
1 26local use only.
PART TWO
Adjniral of the Fleet S.G. Gorshkov
From January through November 1974, the United States
Naval Institute Proceedings published, with additional commen-
tary by United States naval officers, eleven articles written
by Admiral Sergey G. Gorshkov, the Commander-in-Chief of the
Soviet Navy. Originally published in the Soviet naval journal
Morskoi Sbornik ,, these articles provide insight into Admiral
Gorshkov* s views of naval and maritime matters. Analyses of
these articles as to their import and meaning are continuing
and opinions diverge sharply on their interpretation.
For example, John Erickson, of Edinburgh University,
feels that the content of the articles is not so important as
the reasons for which they were written and published in the
^Moore. Jane's Fighting Ships 1973-74 , p. 530.




127first place: first, Admiral Gorshkov may be trying to
educate his junior officers within the navy to his line of
reasoning and philosophy of naval strategy and use. Or, he
may be attempting to coalesce the opinions of the divergent
1 pP\
groups within the navy. Third, Admiral Gorshkov may not
have any major educational or institutional problems within
the navy. Rather, he may be trying to educate his fellow
officers in the Army, Air Force, and Strategic Rocket Forces,
all of whom are competing with him for their share of the
military budget of the Soviet Union. Or fourth, all the
military officers may be trying to educate and persuade the
civilian politicians of the legitimacy and needs of all the
armed forces and their own services in particular.
Although the Soviet navy has grown and expanded under
Admiral Gorshkov, Professor Erickson sees it still co-existing
in a 'soldier dominated' military system^that is, one in which
the land strategy dominates national objectives, and most
national defense expenditures revolve around ground warfare
forces. With the advent of nuclear parity (with the United
States) , the functions of the services have undergone some
modifications and this has led to a scramble for assigned
1 27
This information comes from an interview with Pro-
fessor Erickson in Edinburgh in May 1974.
1
pO
Professor Erickson sees several groups, including:
the professional sailors (ship drivers); the aviators; the
planners and managers; the naval politicians; and the advo-
cates of sea power for the sake of sea power. These groups
shade into each other and may have members in one or more
camps. Some are dominated by flag and other senior officers,
while others are full of middle grade and junior officers, but
most are definable entities and can be labeled and isolated as
such by Professor Erickson.
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missions (or, reasons for existence). The importance of the
land forces must now be shared with the other service branches.
This 'job hunting' perhaps led Admiral Gorshkov to write his
series on the historical perspective of the Navy; its uses
past, present, and future, and the discussion of the western
1 pq
naval policies and the world oceans. 7 Of particular interest
here are the last five articles which deal with the more
modern and recent aspects of the navy and its use by the
Soviet Union. Because of this increased naval emphasis, Pro-
fessor Erickson is not particularly optimistic about Soviet
naval interest in future maritime arms control measures. He
sees the naval leadership as being more interested in maintain-
ing and solidifying their new and increased position within the
armed forces and, thus, within the decision-making apparatus
of the government. ~* The ascendent importance of the naval
forces may well reflect the increased 'clout' of that leader.
Yet another analyst of Soviet naval interests takes a
different view of the Gorshkov papers. He sees the Admiral as
^According to one commentator, Admiral Gorshkov, during
his tenure as Commander-in-Chief, "has changed Soviet naval
strategy to emphasize five primary missions: strategic
attack, strategic ASW, defense against aircraft carriers, dis-
tant operations, and interdiction." See George W. Anderson,
"Commentary." United States Naval Institute Proceedings . Vol.
100, No. 7/857, July WTk, p. 63.
^Another observer puts greater emphasis on the Soviet
Union's determinations of her own vital interests. "This, to
me, is the principal lesson of these fascinating Gorshkov
papers— the support and defense of vital /Soviet/ interests."
J.C. Wylie, "Commentary," Ilnifcad Stalas Naval Tnnt.i tlltfi Pro-
ceedings , Vol. 100, No. 9/859, September 1974, p. 69.
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actually setting out a new naval doctrine. -*' Mr. McConnell
views the naval missions as changing from those essentially of
protecting the homeland, the merchant marine, and fishing in-
terests to those now of the world-wide use of the fleet. While
this world-wide protection still includes the expanded merchant
and fishing interests, it also now includes the Soviet "state
interests" in the Third World, seabed natural resources, and
political utility in peace and war situations. Mr. McConnell
also sees a nev; strategic role of the submarine launched ballis-
tic missile submarines of the Soviet Union. In a conflict
situation, these boats are to be used later, not sooner as
originally planned. In other words, they will be held back in
an initial exchange of nuclear weapons, to be used in the
second or subsequent rounds as a final devastating attack upon
the western allies. He bases this theory on the fact that
Gorshkov views surface ships as supporting the SSBNs, a theory
valid only if the submarines are to be used after an initial
exchange of nuclear weapons.
The fleet no longer is used only for homeland defense.
Rather it has a distant seas mission, while the submarines are
to be used for a final crippling blow as opposed to an initial
strike.
From these two perspectives, then, Mr. McConnell sees
little reason for Soviet interest in arms control discussions,
of any great substance, for limitations of submarines. There
I Z1
^Interview with Mr. James McConnell, Royal Naval College,
Greenwich, May 197^-. Mr. McConnell is attached to the Center
for Naval Analyses, Washington, D.C., usually, but was on a
leave of absence in Great Britain.
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are, however, some possibilities in restraints or controls of
(most likely) surface ships and their foreign deployments.
The Soviets might be interested in restricting these deploy-
ments to reduce United States overseas 'influence 1 and thereby
increase their own growing 'influence', advanced by their ship
visits to foreign ports and ship maneuverings in foreign
1 32
waters. ^ The all important issue, according to Mr. McConnell,
is the Soviet definition of "state interests" and what that
phrase includes. If certain maritime assets fall within the
scope of those perceived as necessary to preserve "state
interests," then they will be immune to arms control influences.
If they fall outside this framework, then they may become the
subject of such negotiations.
In late 1972, Robert W. Herrick analyzed the first half of
the articles by Admiral Gorshkov. ^ In his review of these
writings Mr. Herrick categorizes the Admiral's arguments for
a larger Soviet navy under the following headings:
1 ^2
^ See James M. McConnell and Anne M. Kelly, "Superpower
Naval Diplomacy in the Indo-Pakistani Crisis," Center for
Naval Analyses , (Professional Paper No. 108) Washington, D.C.,
February 1973, who state, "The /India-Pakistan/ crisis cer-
tainly revealed the high valve now placed by Moscow on coercive
naval diplomacy. ...Soviet deployments during the crisis were
dictated by the needs of diplomacy. Their magnitude demon-
strates conclusively the significance of this factor in Soviet
naval policy," p. 9.
1 ^"S
^Robert W. Herrick, "The Gorshkov Interpretation of
Russian Naval History," in Michael MccGwire, editor, Soviet
Naval Developments— Context and Capability , Center for Foreign
Policy Studies, Department of Political Science, Dalhousie
University, Halifax, Fall 1972, pp. 275-289. The rest of the
Gorshkov articles were published after the initial analysis.
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to continue the traditional Leninist naval poli-
cy of the Party and of the more enlightened.
Tsars; to overcome the geographic handicap. of
having four separate fleet areas; to conduct
globally expanding operations and deployments
throughout the World Ocean; to meet the require-
ments for the offensive strategy made possible
for the USSR by the military-technical revolu-
tion; to build the very large navy essential to
avoid decline to status of a third-rate power; to
continue an alleged long-standing Soviet and
Tsarist policy that the Navy's size is only
limited by the economy; to win the unrestricted
access to the high seas essential to the USSR's
further development; and to serve as a unique
peacetime instrument of foreign policy.^.
Mr. Herrick supports each of his contentions by analyzing
and summarizing the first six of Admiral Gorshkov's articles.
For the purposes of this paper, the problems of the four
separate fleets, the globally expanding deployments (to support
state interests) , the linkage between a large navy and the
maintenance of a superpower status, the size limited only by
the economy, and the use of the navy as a peacetime instrument
of foreign policy are the most important. Taken as a group,
these lines of thought do not indicate any great inclination
toward, nor a desire for, considerations of maritime arms con-
trol discussions. Although Mr. Herrick does not state that
Admiral Gorshkov (or the other Soviet leaders, military or
civilian) would not be so inclined, he does posit that the
Admiral considers naval arms limitation negotiations "as a
capitalist snare and delusion." To him, arms limits are only
useful if they at least can achieve parity for the Soviet
Union, but even then, the time is always used by the capitalists
^"Herrick, "The Gorshkov Interpretation...," p. 275.
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to continue the arms race in an attempt to gain the upper hand,
Besides, as the Soviet view of the inter-war period indicates,
these arms control agreements "never have a productive, last-
ing effect."^
Perhaps of importance here is Admiral Gorshkov's tenth
article entitled, "Navies as a Weapon of the Aggressive Policy
of the Imperialist States in Peacetime." ^ Here, Admiral
Gorshkov reviews the repeated use by Great Britain and the
United States of their navies to achieve political goals
through the projection of force and presence that these ships
provide (or provided in the case of the British).
It would be difficult to find an area on our
planet where US leaders have not used their pet
instrument of foreign policy—the Navy—against




A little further on, Admiral Gorshkov states
The aggressive, openly anti-Soviet trend of de-
ployment of the naval forces and the formation
from them of various types of NATO strike forces,
carrier strike forces, and later also squadrons
of nuclear-powered missile submarines were em-
ployed for numerous threats to our country,
serv/ing/, as an (sic) instrument of nuclear
blackmail, and was (sic) the foundation of
their military doctrine. *-?o
^^Herrick, "The Gorshkov Interpretation...," p. 287.
'•^"Translation of the complete series of the original
articles from Morskoi Sbornik were provided by Professor John
Erickson, Edinburgh University, Spring 1974.
^^S.G. Gorshkov, "Navies as a Weapon of the Aggressive
Policy of the Imperialist States in Peacetime," Tenth Article,
p. 12, of translation provided by Professor Erickson.
138Gorshkov, "Navies as a Weapon...," p. 1Z+.
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After reciting all the present and past uses of navies for
nefarious policy reasons by the imperialists, Admiral Gorshkov
emphasizes the use of the Soviet navy as an instrument of the
foreign policy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, al-
though "the goals and methods of employing" his navy differ
radically from the capitalists goals and methods for their
navies. The main mission of the Soviet navy is "the defense
of the country from attacks by aggressors from the direction
of the ocean." However to achieve this defense of the country,
the armed forces of the Soviet Union must oppose
the forces of aggression in the World Ocean with
strategic defensive counterforces whose founda-
tion is made up of the Strategic Missile Forces
and an ocean-going Navy.
1 ^q
The role of the Navy as "an instrument of state policy in
peacetime" is increasing not decreasing, and must continue to
grow as the Soviet interests dictate increased, political oppo-
sition to the forces of capitalism and imperialism throughout
the world. Admiral Gorshkov certainly does not sound very
interested in arms control negotiations, preferring to enlarge
the Soviet Navy rather than maintain it at its present level
or reduce it anywhere. One must also speculate that few mili-
tary leaders will actively advocate the diminution of their
own particular service missions, especially when they are
charged with the protection of their respective countries
utilizing those same forces.
1 39




In the North, NATO needs sufficient warning of impending
crisis to get forces into the area and defend thinly populated
elongated Norway. On the other hand, the Soviet naval ships
must pass through a narrow choke point between North Norway and
the Arctic ice to get into the Norwegian Sea. They must then
pass through the GIUK Gap to get into the Atlantic Ocean for
any operations. Once there, their mission of sealift disrup-
tion would be much easier than the North Atlantic partners'
mission of ocean resupply. The two choke points, however, can
be perceived as very threatening to the Northern Fleet. The
Baltic offers a short distance for surprise attack by a Warsaw
Treaty member, but equally quick exit closure by an Alliance
power, should any decide to do so. The naval forces immediate-
ly available seem more equally balanced within the Baltic, but
their possible uses in that semi-enclosed sea could be so
radically different from each other as to make "balance" and
"comparison" useless exercises. Would the Soviet, Polish, and
GDR ships be interested in a crisis in exiting the Baltic, and
if so, what for? Or would they be more effective in support
o.f. amphibious operations against the Danish and FRG coasts,
thus tying up the Baltic assets of these two nations?
Within the broad reaches of the Atlantic Ocean there is
plenty of maneuver room for all the navies normally sailing
these waters. But, certain areas are obviously more sensitive
and important than others. From the NATO perspective, Iceland
is most necessary. For the Soviets, mere denial of Iceland to
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NATO use would be sufficient to their purposes. On the other
hand, the United States does not need any (more) bases in
Cuba, ^ but keeping the Soviet Navy out of there is most im-
portant.
As mentioned earlier, the Atlantic, in the present NATO
scheme, would be used for extensive convoy resupply to Western
Europe should a conventional war occur there. The Alliance,
in that case, would have to provide merchant ships and naval
escorts for the convoys. There are two problems here. The
Western Allies would be extremely hard pressed to supply
quickly a sufficient number (perhaps even a minimum number) of
escorts to cover the many merchant convoys needed to fill
Europe's needs adequately in time of hostilities. Second, the
Warsaw Pact allies need a much smaller number 6f ships to dis-
rupt the convoys and deny use of the sea lines of communica-
tion to their opponents. Rough analysis of the maritime forces
available to both sides indicates that now the Soviet Union
and her Allies can probably do exactly that. This fact,
coupled with Admiral Zurawalt's pessimism recently and Admiral
Gorshkov's statements in his articles about further expansion
of the Soviet Navy, may lead one to conclude that the mission
of convoy resupply to Europe, as now envisaged in NATO planning,
will become increasingly harder, if not impossible, as time
goes on.
The U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay is used pri-
marily for "refresher" training for the men whose ships have
undergone repairs or been overhauled recently. It is not an
important aspect of the NATO plans.
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The Atlantic Ocean also is the medium for much of the oil
and trade travelling to Western Europe. Some of this comes
through the Mediterranean Sea, but much also comes up through
the South Atlantic, an area outside the geographical confines
of NATO. Disruption of this trade, especially the oil imports,
could very quickly upset the Western European (and American)
industrial and economic balance and bring strong pressures to
bear not previously experienced or even anticipated. Thus,
the Tropic of Cancer has great symbolic importance to the North
Atlantic Alliance.
Within the Mediterranean Sea, the Southern Flank of NATO
seems to be tearing itself apart, despite any outside pressures
to the contrary. The hostilities between Greece and Turkey,
centered most recently on the issue of Cyprus (but perhaps more
importantly on oil in the Aegean) , have at least temporarily
destroyed the possibility of any real defense or protection of
NATO coming from either of those two countries. Additionally,
the British presence in the Mediterranean keeps shrinking
slowly but surely, as to a lesser degree does the Sixth Fleet
which is hard pressed to meet United States commitments to
NATO and Israel. The French are marginally increasing their
naval forces in the Mediterranean, along with the Italians,
but these cannot match the declines of Great Britain and the
United States, or the loss of all Greek assets and some
1/1
Turkish naval forces. ^ (And, one must not forget that France
^ The Greek withdrawal from the military part of NATO
takes all her fleet assets from the Alliance. Turkey lost at
least one destroyer during her invasion of Cyprus.
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is no longer a part of the military aspect of the North Atlan-
tic Treaty Organization.) None of these states can match the
numbers of Soviet naval ships available for Mediterranean
operations, although in combination the Western Europeans can
muster greater numbers. ^
One must also remember that the Warsaw Treaty Organization
ships desiring to sail in the Mediterranean must pass through
the Turkish Straits, controlled by that country through the
Montreux Convention. The Straits of Gibraltar are certainly
wider and deeper but they are at least subject to surveillance
by the British.
The examination of the maritime assets of the two treaty
organizations by general numbers, types, and location must also
be placed next to that remarkable series of articles written by
Admiral Gorshkov, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Fleet. His
statements about the need for an expanded navy to implement
and support Soviet "state interests" is as important as the
types of ships he desires. If he needs a yet larger navy to
support and defend state interests, then, logically, state
interests are expanding. If that is so, then maritime arms
control measures would not be particularly inviting to either
Admiral Gorshkov or his civilian leaders. In addition to the
political implication of the Admiral's papers, the naval empha-
sis is of interest. He supports submarines and extended air-
craft coverage of the surface ships. He also wants better
^ During the October 1973 Middle East war, the Soviet
Navy had more than ninety ships in the Eastern Mediterranean
while the Sixth Fleet assets were slightly more than 60 ships.
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built ships for longer deployments and for greater distances
from the homeland. He wants a 'World Ocean' fleet, capable of
sailing anywhere for extended periods of time. Admiral
Gorshkov has provided some insight into the workings of a
Soviet naval mind and the implications for NATO cannot be taken
lightly.
All these factors combined, then, make the maritime as-
pects of the NATO-WTO rivalry grim from the Western perspective.
With the advent of detente politics and the defense budget
cutting going on in most NATO countries, the balance of the
scales will most likely not be tipped in favor of the Westerners
in the near future through any building programs or other in-
creases in maritime forces. It, therefore, seems appropriate
for the Alliance members to look for some other method of
lessening, if not alleviating, the inferior position which
they presently occupy in this adversary relationship. An often
repeated method of attempting to manage arms expenditures or
gross imbalances in the relative strengths of potential or
real adversaries is the use of arms control negotiations to
limit, reduce, or put a ceiling on the armed forces of a coun-
try or group of countries. It seems worthwhile at this point
to examine possible ways of constructing a maritime arms con-
trol agreement for use within the NATO-WTO area of interest,
namely the Atlantic and the Mediterranean.

CHAPTER V
THE VARIOUS WAYS OF CONSIDERING FUTURE MARITIME
ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS
It is a senseless proceeding to consult
the soldiers concerning plans for war in such
a way as to permit them to pass purely mili-
tary judgments on what the ministers have to
do; and even more senseless is the demand of
theoreticians that the accumulated war
material should simply be handed over to the
field commander so that he can draw up a
purely military plan for the war or for a
campaign.
-
After reviewing the treaties, agreements, accords, state-
ments, and draft proposals on various aspects of maritime arms
control in this century, as well as the array of maritime
assets within the NATO area of consideration, it seems neces-
sary to re-examine these data in the perspective of possible
maritime arms control considerations. Up to this juncture,
the political ramifications of these historical events and
material assets have not been probed deeply (and in some
cases not at all). An examination of the various methods of
constructing agreements will be conducted, drawing on histori-
cal precedents and current proposals from selected arms con-
trol literature. The political utility of any agreements
will not be considered. The methods of considering maritime
arms accord are based on those found in the recent past. Some
proposals have been based on geography, while others have
Clausewitz in Krieg und Kriegfuhrung, 1857 « as quoted





concentrated on restricting various types of the ships, their
hardware, or their personnel. Still other propositions have
centered on limiting monetary expenditures. Finally, the
linkages among these methods are examined, especially as they
affect the freedom of the seas and the law of the sea.
Geographic Restraints and Sanctuaries
Perhaps the most immediately appealing and initially
simple agreements one might construct use geography as their
determining factor. As recently as October 1974» Secretary
Brezhnev, head of the Soviet Communist Party, suggested that
the two major naval powers agree to remove all their nuclear
armed ships from the Mediterranean Sea.
We are ready at any time to negotiate with
the United States an agreement for the with-
drawal of all ships, including submarines,
from tne Mediterranean. ?
This is not the first time this Soviet proposal has been made,
p
"Brezhnev Asking New Move to Curb Atom- Arms Race," The
New York Times , October 7, 197^, p. 1. Elsewhere, the article
indicated these withdrawals pertained to nuclear-armed ships,
not conventionally-armed ships, although his quote does not
say so. He said also: "To stop the arms race and then to go
on to restrict armament—those are the main stages that must
be reached to achieve the goal of complete disarmament," p # 1,
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nor is this suggestion limited to the Soviet Union. American
arms control analysts have made similar proposals for the
Mediterranean as well as other ocean areas.
One scientist proposed that areas of the ocean be free
from anti-submarine warfare technology in the form of hunter-
killer submarines, surface tracking ships, and other passive
or active acoustic equipment used for detecting ballistic
missile submarines. While not specifying that this sanctuary
for SLBMs could or should apply to the Atlantic Ocean, it is
obvious that this is a primary area of consideration because
submarines from any NATO or WTO navy could ply these waters.
The sanctuary concept differs from the geographic restraint
notion in that the former creates areas in which only certain
types of vessels may sail free from hostile forces; while the
latter creates areas where ships of certain types may not
sail. Although these views postulated so far have discussed
^In July 1968, the Soviet Union, in a U.N. Memorandum
(146) on Disarmament proposed, among other things, a limita-
tion on the navigation zones for rocket carrying submarines;
as outlined in Duncan E. Brown, "Arms Control in Hydrospace:
Legal Aspects," Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars , Ocean Series 301, June 1971, pp. 48-49. R.M.
Burrell, "The Soviet Union and the Mediterranean," Soviet
Analyst , August 10, 1973, PP. 6-7, in which the author says,
".
. .
(I)n April 19&7 Brezhnev called for the total withdrawal
of the U.S. Sixth Fleet from both basins of the ^/Mediterranean/
Sea." Michael Palmer and David Thomas in "Arms Control and
the Mediterranean," The World Today , Vol. 27, No. 11, November
1971, say that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. might want to limit
the size (not further defined) of ships they send into the
Mediterranean without eliminating their numbers completely.
The authors say the two superpowers might also want to in-
clude the navies of other nations to make an agreement more
realistic, and, perhaps, more worthwhile, p. 499.
Herbert Scoville, Jr., "Beyond SALT One," Foreign
Affairs
.
Vol. 50, No. 3, April 1972, p. 493.
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nuclear powered (or nuclear missile carrying) ships (both sur-
face and submarine) , they need not be limited to these types
of ocean weapons platforms. They could just as easily apply
to aircraft carriers, cruisers or other categories of ships.
Yet another proposal for a sanctuary of sorts is that of
prohibiting all SLBM submarines from approaching closer than
(say) 1000 miles from any coastline other than that of their
5
own territorial waters. Again, this sanctuary with geographic
restraints could apply equally to aircraft carriers, thus re-
ducing considerably the effectiveness of the embarked aircraft.
Other ships, for example ASW surface ships used for tracking
or trailing SLBMs, could have similar, perhaps less distant,
geographic restraints of perhaps 100 or 250 miles from another's
coastline. One could envisage concentric rings emanating from
a coast line, with each succeeding line prohibiting potenti-
ally more destructive or deadly types of naval ships. Thus,
war at sea between similar (or dissimilar) types of ships
truly would be far from land and heavily populated areas.
This contradicts a study which indicates that most recent
naval conflicts have been restrained (that is, not total),
and in or near territorial waters of one of the participants.
If one looked for a single and simple proposi-
tion around which the whole doctrine of modern
naval operations could be built, it would be
that belligerent operations are permissible
only within the territorial waters of the com-
batants each of which claim the right of self-
defense. Limited war must not threaten states
5
^Discussion with Mr. John Boright, Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency, Washington, Spring 197k»
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other than these. Therefore, naval action must
not occur beyond the territorial seas of the
combatants nor can it be pursued in the terri-
torial waters of neutral states.... Apart from
limited actions by France at the time of the
Algerian crisis, the only clear instance since
1945 of naval operations being carried into
the high seas was during the Indo-Pakistan War
of December 1971
,
when a neutral merchantman was sunk with a total loss of
life. 6
Despite this theory that (extended) territorial waters
will see most if not all future naval conflicts (based on past
experience), the thought of 'cleaner 1 wars far out at sea is
very appealing to many. One must also consider, however,
that
a war at sea, fought in isolation away from
any land battle, could become nuclear, while
the battle ashore might not.,-;
More rapid escalation of a war at sea to nuclear proportions,
which in turn could involve concomitant land actions both con-
ventional and nuclear, makes the movement of possible wars to
the ocean arena much less immediately appealing to strategists
and arms controllers alike. An escalating war at sea, re-
gardless of the geographic restraints or sanctuaries outlined,
could lead to nuclear and/or more extensive land conflict,
despite initial plans to the contrary.
7
David O'Connell, "Can the Navy Plan for Peace?," New
Scientist
.
October 25, 1973, p. 257.
^Stephen T. De La Mater, "The Role of the Carrier in the
Control of the Seas." Naval Review 1972, U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings , Vol. 98, No. 831 , May 1972, p. 114.
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Historical precedent prior to 1945 for a geographic ap-
proach to arms restraints may be seen in the Montreux Conven-
tion (Chapter I) which restricted within a specified area cer-
tain types and numbers of ships. The ships and procedures were
more important than the geography of the Turkish Straits, but
the Straits were emphasized because of their location within
the country of Turkey, thus making their control necessary to
the security of that state.
The post-World War II era saw a marked increase in vari-
ous proposals involving geographic restraints or sanctuaries,
most of which pertained to nuclear weapons. Perhaps this
interest in geography vis a vis nuclear arms stems from the
fact that nuclear war cannot be 'won' in the traditional sense
of the word. Prior to the advent of these weapons, a nation
(or nations) had a good chance of defeating an opponent or
opponents if it obtained sufficient manpower and weapons sys-
tems and was willing to pay the various prices (social, econo-
mic, monetary, psychological) for these means of national pro-
tection. Nuclear weapons signalled the change in warfare from
a goal of winning (or not losing) to one of mere survival of a
sufficient percentage of the population in a functioning con-
dition to continue some form of the prior society. Since
people could in no way escape the possibility of nuclear war
(or its spillover effects) by building strong or modern or
aggressive armed forces, they concluded that keeping those
weapons out of their immediate geographic areas might help in
avoiding the results of such an encounter. Other agreements,
of course, did not relate to nuclear weapons; in fact they did
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not deal with arms at all— they merely used geography as a
factor in the equation of the agreements.
The post- 19^5 emphasis on geography as a factor in the
signalling of diplomatic maneuvers was used by President
Truman in his two proclamations (Chapter III) about the con-
tinental shelf and the minerals contained therein. Once so
done, the use of geographic restraints or santuaries could be
transferred to other arenas of political, diplomatic, or mili-
tary interest (Chapter III).
The Territorial Seas Treaty has a form of geographic
restraint built into it in that it permits coastal states to
close their territorial seas as necessary for "security"
reasons. The High Seas Treaty of the same year (see both
Treaties discussed in Chapter II) could be viewed as creating
sanctuaries of sorts because it grants warships "complete im-
munity from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag
State," although these havens do not provide freedom from
attack, but rather areas in which warships may sail freely and
need not fight each other unless political decisions are made
to do so. Nuclear free zones, in which some or all forms of
nuclear weapons are prohibited, are discussed in the 1961
United Nations General Assembly resolution concerning Africa
and the 196^ Latin American declaration (Chapter II). Both
these statements specified land and water areas free from cer-
tain types of weapons, but not all weaponry or systems. The
1962 and 1963 Rapaki Plans (Chapter III) also proposed nuclear
free geographic areas, including territorial waters. But only
the Latin American agreement of the four, defined in any detail
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what was meant by nuclear weapons, transportation, exact longi-
tude and latitude of the Zone and other explicit data. It
seems to come closest to being a workable, realistic attempt
at some sort of arms control within a geographic area.
The Soviet Union in 1962 (Chapter III) called for general
and complete disarmament world wide, including the elimination
of all military bases on foreign territory as a first step.
It, along with subsequent disarmament proposals, was so wide
in scope and narrow on realistic implementation procedures
that it was not considered a truly feasible proposition.
Once the use of geography as a tool in fashioning arms
agreements (be they control, restraint, limitation or prohibi-
tion) became well known, it was used with increasing frequency.
A Soviet proposal in 1963 sought to declare the Mediterranean
Sea a nuclear free zone (Chapter III); while the Baltic Con-
tinental Shelf declaration (Chapter II) sought an area to "be
used by all states exclusively for peaceful purposes" (not
further defined). This Baltic statement had been preceded by
o
a United States commission report applauding nuclear free
zones and proposing a "U.S. -Soviet Treaty establishing a zone
of nuclear and conventional arms limitation under U.N. inspec-
tion in the Bering Straits and including comparable areas in
Alaska and Siberia." Neither the Bering Straits, nor any of
the other areas nominated for nuclear free zones was selected
for further study by the United States or the Soviet Union.
United States Citizens Commission on International Co-
operation. See Chapter III. Other areas named by the Com-
mission were the Near East, and Latin America and Africa, both
of which already had pronouncements of some sort on the books.
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Outright prohibitions based on geography are paramount
in the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967,
and the 1971 Seabed Arms Control Treaty (Chapters III and II).
All three prevent the use of specified areas for nuclear
weapons. As individual treaties, each has further restrictions
or prohibitions: on all military efforts (Antarctic Treaty);
on orbiting nuclear devices (Outer Space Treaty); and on other
weapons of mass destruction (the Seabed Treaty). Of course,
one might say these geographic areas were not going to be used
anyway for the purposes prohibited, but one might also state
that they could not be excluded from use unless someone had
already considered utilizing them for such ends. These
treaties are specific as to geography and prohibitions. They
are vague in neither area nor weaponry definition and for these
reasons have good chances of being adhered to by all parties
concerned (or at least not breached or abrogated).
The latest expressions of interest in geographic re-
straints, limits, or prohibitions as means of controlling arms
movements (and use) can be seen in the Indian Ocean Zone of
Peace Proposal of 1971 (Chapter II), the current mutual force
reduction talks, the European security conference, and the Law
of the Sea Conference (Chapter III). All of these discussions,
whether intermittent or continuing, are utilizing geographic
areas as independent variables in their equations of arms con-
trol. They cannot abolish the particular weapons systems, but
they can try to keep them from a particular area.
Geographic area constraints, restraints, limitations, or
prohibitions have had great appeal recently to those construct-
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ing arms proposals, both maritime and otherwise. It seems,
however, that by examining the various proposals and agree-
ments, one might conclude that the supervision of these pro-
nouncements is difficult except in small areas or semi-enclosed
seas. A sanctuary for nuclear-equipped submarines in the
Atlantic would be hard to delimit, difficult to protect, and
almost impossible to enforce. The Mediterranean provides more
supervision possibilities, for example, but even that sea,
with its narrow entrance channels, has several littoral states,
from which nuclear weapons systems could set sail. And geo-
graphic restraints or sanctuaries have never addressed the
question of the rights of the coastal states. In the Medi-
terranean, the French have a submarine base. They also have
nuclear subs. Are they, then, to be prohibited from using
their own coast for their own ships? What does that exclusion
do for the sovereignty of a state over its own territorial
waters?
If geographic considerations are to be used in an area
like the Mediterranean, or the Baltic for that matter, to con-
trol nuclear weapons, what happens to ships other than the
SLBM submarines? If aircraft carriers have on board planes
capable of carrying nuclear weapons, should they be excluded
also, and how is this possibility or fact to be verified?




such as the very fast, missile carrying Osa and Komar classes.
Are the states having such ships to be limited in their utili-
zation of them within a semi-enclosed sea regardless of terri-
torial sea sovereignty? Or, is there to "be one set of rules
for the littoral states covering their territorial waters, a
different set of rules for the same states in the rest of the
semi-enclosed sea, and still different regulations for non-
littoral states 1 maritime assets, particularly the nuclear
variety? These are some of the complexities surrounding geo-
graphic constraints and sanctuaries, but by the same token
geography is only one method of constructing arms agreements—
another is tonnage limitations.
Tonnage Limitations
The limitation of ship size by tonnage displacement was
a popular device in the various treaties and proposals of the
inter-war period. The 1922 Washington Naval Treaty (Chapter
II) included the scrapping of some ships and the retention of
others. Although the ships were identified by name and came
under a general ratio for the participating states, the bottom
line of the agreement consisted of tonnage ceilings for certain
ships defined by type and gun-calibre for each country.
(Capital ships were limited to 525,000 tons for the United
States and Great Britain; 175,000 tons for Italy and France;
°0sa class ships belong to such states as Algeria, Bul-
garia, Egypt, Poland, Rumania, and the Soviet Union. The Komars
are in the inventories of Algeria, Egypt, the Soviet Union, and
Syria. See Moore, Jane's Fighting Ships 1973-74, PP. 668-b69.

198.
and 315,000 tons for Japan.)
There was not a great diversity of weapons systems avail-
able at that time to build into the various ships, so size
generally could be used to determine destructive capabilities.
Guns and shells could be made larger or smaller, but they were
the bases for fire power measurement. Torpedoes were still in
their infancy, as were airplanes; and rockets, nuclear-tipped
shells, miniaturized nuclear weapons, depth charges, and exotic
electronic warfare equipments were still designers' dreams.
All this meant that, generally speaking, the tonnage factor
was a handy and not ineffective gauge for measuring the poten-
tial of a state's navy. (Of course, other factors such as:
training, quality of the workmanship, will, and political
utility were of extreme importance, but they were dealt with
in other portions of the inter-war period maritime treaties.)
In the 1930 London Naval negotiations, tonnage was a pro-
minent fixture in the final treaty, although the increased
emphases being placed on gun-calibre and ship-types complicated
the equations. Numbers became important for the larger ships,
but not yet for the smaller surface ships or submarines. For
example, the United States initially sought all-around reduc-
tions in naval tonnages, staying within the ratio system es-
tablished in 1922. She did not get it. More important here
is the fact that the 1930 agreement recognized tonnages as
significant by making the exchange of construction program
information among the signatories center around the various
tonnage categories rather than numbers.
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Tonnage was the pivotal factor in the aborted 1931 naval
treaty between France and Italy. It was also used as a part
of the equation proposed at the 1932 League of Nations World
Disarmament Conference. Global tonnage limitations by ship-
type had been established for each signatory. Although the
ratio system was not used, this formula doomed all navies not
at the top of the list to eternal inferiority, which role was
politically and militarily unacceptable to the governments
concerned.
By 1935 i tonnage was losing its place of prominence in
the naval arms discussions. The London Naval Conference of
1933-1936 produced few grounds for common agreement among the
participants. In fact, Japan withdrew because no one would
accept her concept of a common upper limit for all the navies
concerned. France and Italy still opposed fixed ratios. And
the United States and Great Britain disagreed on other matters.
Numbers limits, in the final treaty, were dropped within the
categories of ships (defined still by tonnage and gun-calibre)
subject only to prior notification of future building programs
by the signatory governments. Tonnage limits thus slid from
a position of great importance in negotiating naval treaties
to one of inferior status. With the political pressures on
each state increasing, tonnage as a determining factor became
the 'lowest common denominator' of agreement. Its significance
had shrunk to almost nil and its importance had diminished to
being nothing more than one of the elements in a list of in-




The importance of size was momentarily revived in the 1936
accord between Great Britain and Germany in which they agreed
to a total naval aggregate surface tonnage ratio of 100 to 35>
respectively. The submarine ratio to be built by Germany was
only h$ percent of that of Great Britain, again based on
tonnage.
The one surviving working treaty of the inter-war period
is the Montreux Convention of 1936, which has tonnage limits
built into its complex system of controls. Non-riparian
states' warships passing into the Black Sea are limited by
type, tonnage, and numbers. These constraints hold true today
and limit those United States and other NATO ships able to
enter that semi-enclosed sea.
Tonnage constraints worked as a tool for measuring and
limiting naval potential only so long as: (a) the v/eapons sys-
tems on the ship platforms were not too varied or variable
(i.e., size was an indicator of ship strength and capability);
and (b) the political will to bargain on substantial issues was
greater than the political pressures for more and larger con-
struction programs. Thus, it seems that even if advancing
technologies and diversity of building and use of naval ships
had not reduced the significance of tonnage as an accurate
measuring device, the change in the political atmosphere sur-
rounding the particular naval negotiations would have lessened
its importance. This came about because tonnage changed from
a size-limiting factor to merely a size-indicating factor.
When ceilings were removed on building, tonnage lost its
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prominence in the arras control arena.
The advance and growing diversity of weapons technology,
which partially caused the diminution of tonnage as an effec-
tive tool for limiting naval armaments, should now be examined
as a separate method available for measuring and perhaps
setting limits on maritime assets.
Ship Types, Weapons Systems, and/or Numbers for Ceilings or
Restrictions
As indicated in the preceding paragraphs, numbers of
ships in certain categories were used in formulating some of
the arras agreements of the inter-war period, although the
bottom line of the equations were based largely on tonnage in
the final analysis. Numbers in their own right became much
more popular in the post-World War II era, as did greater em-
phasis on types of weapons.
For example, the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone pro-
hibits and prevents the "testing, use, manufacture, production
or acquisition" of any nuclear weapons. Signatories, further,
cannot retain, store, install or deploy such weapons in the
area. These very specific bans contrast sharply with other
accords which speak of "peaceful purposes" areas, "zones of
peace" and other vague terms (see Chapters II and III). The
1971 Seabed Arms Control Treaty is also specific in its prohi-
bitions of a certain type of weapons—in this case "any nuclear
v/eapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction" emplaced
or emplanted in or on the ocean floor. In both of these
treaties, the exact definitions of nuclear weapons are assumed,
rather than spelled out. But, these assumptions have held up

202.
so far, and have not been tested.
More recently, the types of weapons and the numbers have
been limited by the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks agree-
ment involving submarine launched ballistic missiles carried
in modern nuclear powered submarines. By that accord, the
United States may have a maximum of kk hulls capable of launch-
ing up to 710 missiles, while the Soviet Union may have 62
modern submarine platforms with 950 missile launchers (Chapter
II). At first glance, this seems to be an agreement of the
utmost specificity, capable of no misinterpretation by either
side, but recent articles indicate that even exact numbers can
be misleading. In counting only one type of weapon and one
type of platform, other partially similar types of systems fall
into a grey area of accountability. In this case, the Soviet
diesel submarines with "old" missile launchers caused ambiguous
interpretations on the United States side. This particular
problem seems to have been alleviated through further negotia-
tions, but it is indicative of the complexities of any compari-
sons (or agreements) in which one side has a system differing
in even one aspect from a comparable system of the other side.
See Leslie H. Gelb, "The Story of a Flap," Foreign
Policy , No. 16, Fall 1974, pp. 165-181, for an excellent sum-
mary of the "loophole" in the 1972 Agreement concerning the
numbers of submarines and missiles the Soviets could have.
This article recounts the "numbers game," but also the internal
bureaucratic conflicts and the stress between the Executive and
the Legislative branches of the federal government. Mr. Gelb
describes the different interpretations put on the numbers,
i.e., what in fact was being counted. He also describes the
different emphases placed on parts of the agreements in state-
ments made by various political leaders. The statements,
themselves, indicate deliberate or unintentional misunder-
standings of the numbers and to exactly what they referred.
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When one is dealing primarily with numbers, as is the
case in the mutual balanced force reductions talks in Europe,
they can assume a life of their own. The NATO allies, for
example, proposed a ceiling of 700,000 troops (stationed and
indigenous) on each side. On the other hand, the WTO advocated
a 15 percent reduction of forces on each side. Both sides are
concentrating on numbers, both (at least superficially) want
some sort of reductions of armed manpower in the European
theater, both are willing to continue negotiations to achieve
the goal of reduced troop strength. But, even using the same
tool—numbers— to obtain these ends, the two sides have dif-
ferent formulae to get there.
The problems of the mutual force reduction talks, and
those generated by the supposedly specific SALT I Agreement,
are magnified when one considers transferring them to the
general maritime arena. A quick glance through such publica-
tions as Jane's Fighting Ships , The Military Balance , Les
Flottes de Combat , and Breyer's Guide to the Soviet Navy , will
indicate the multiplicity of ship types and the diversity of
names for similar types of ships. Further reading indicates
that similar ship hulls can and are fitted with myriad different
weapons. For example, the Soviet Union is completing two air-
1
1
craft carriers apparently equipped to carry vertical take-
off and landing aircraft. These carriers also have surface-
to air-missiles and torpedo tubes. The United States, on the
other hand, has 15 aircraft carriers (one nuclear powered) and
l1 Moore, Jane's Fighting Ships 1975-74 , p. 531.
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all capable of handling a variety of aircraft. Most of these
latter carriers have point-to-point defense missiles aboard,
12but none can launch torpedoes. The Soviet Union has a cruise
missile, capable of sinking ships at sea, which can be launched
from submarines as well as surface ships. ^ The United States
has no such weapon in the current inventory. ^ The Soviet
Union has more cruisers than the United States, but the latter
has almost 200 destroyer/frigate/escort type ships. The
1 c
Soviets have about 180 destroyers and escorts. J
After one has accepted the fact that similar types of
ship hulls have different names, one must then understand that
the same names in different navies refer to different ship
types. The United States has: guided missile frigates (some
with nuclear power) of 5,800 to 10,000 tons displacement;
destroyers of 3,500 to 6,900 tons displacement; and cruisers
from 14,600 to 17,500 tons displacement. The Soviet Union's
cruisers range from 6,000 to 19,200 tons displacement; her
destroyers from 3,500 to 5,200 tons displacement; and her
12Moore, Jane's Fighting Ships 1973-74 , pp. 392-403.
•^The International Institute for Strategic Studies,1*
The Military Balance 1973-1974 , p. 69.
1ZfSee Richard Burt, "Sea Power: U.S. vs. U.S.S.R.," The
Christian Science Monitor , August 30, 1974, 1,4; "Soviet Navy
Has Edges on U.S., Jane's Says," The New York Times , August
29, 1974, P. 9; Richard Burt, "Kremlin's New Naval Missile,"
The Christian Science Monitor , August 6, 1974, P. 1; and
"Elsewhere in the News- International," The Boston Globe , October
4, 1974, P. 2. In this last article, the successful testing
of a 5000 mile SLBM was indicated in the Soviet Union. The
comparable U.S. SLBM has a range of about 3000 miles.
1 5The International Institute for Strategic Studies,
The Military Balance 1973-1974 , pp. 4 and 7.
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frigates from 1,100 to 1,900 tons displacement. The figures
are not important in themselves. They indicate that a frigate
in the United States Navy is a large surface combatant, the
same name in the Soviet Navy is used for a relatively small
surface combatant ship. Even destroyers, which appear to be
at least relatively comparable, are equipped differently and
have differing missions and armaments to accommodate their
1 7divergent tasks.
How does one compare a somewhat smaller United States
nuclear powered cruiser with a larger conventionally powered
Soviet ship of the same type? Can one equate a point defense
missile system with a cruise missile system on a surface com-
batant? And, if one is going to compare these surface ships,
where, in the equation, does one put the ships of the Allies
of these two super powers? For example, the British have con-
templated MIRVing their Polaris missiles in an attempt to
Moore, Jane's Fighting Ships 1973-74 * sections on U.S.
and U.S.S.R. All figures are for full loads.
1 7
' M (T)he U.S. and Soviet fleets for some time are likely
to remain very different and very difficult to compare. There
is no simple way to add up ships and determine the quantita-
tive balance. Neither can a force level comparison take into
account the striking qualitative differences between the two
fleets: the vast differences in the performance characteris-
tics of ships, weapons, aircraft, and electronic equipment.
While there might be a concensus of expert opinion as to
whether the United States or the U.S.S.R. has supremacy in one
area of naval capability or another, any assessment of the
degree of difference, or the implications of such differences
for aggregate capabilities should be treated cautiously."
Barry M. Blachman, Edward M. Gramlich, and Robert W. Hartman,
Setting National Priorities—The 1975 Budget , The Brookings
Institution, Washington, D. C. 1974, p. 121.
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1 8increase the nuclear force without building more submarines.
The British have a Royal Fleet Auxiliary which provides direct
fleet support for the combatant forces and have recently
created the Royal Maritime Auxiliary Service to provide ser-
vices in such areas as ocean research, ocean towing, cable
1
9
ships, and salvage ships. y Within other navies on the other
hand, some of these functions are provided by the integral
units of the force. The French are planning to build a nuclear
powered aircraft carrier of 15,000 to 18,000 tons, to be opera-
tional after 1980. This carrier is very small compared to
United States, Soviet, and British carriers, but compares
favorably with the British through-deck cruiser which will be
capable of launching vertical and short take-off and landing
pi
aircraft.
These problems are not limited to ship types and utili-
zation. Aircraft used in conjunction with naval units provide
yet another complex issue. In the United States Navy, naval
aircraft (or planes with naval missions) are an integral part
of that service. The planes are manned by, maintained by, and
assigned to naval forces. Aircraft with many of the same
__ .
Louis Heren, "Navy May Buy New Nuclear Warheads," The
Times (London), February 12, 196>9. It does not appear now
that this will occur because of the severe economic problems
of Great Britain, but it is a possibility.
1
9
^Ministry of Defense, "Royal Maritime Auxiliary Service
Formed," Ministry of Defense , London, Press Release,
No. 129/70, September 3, 1970, 1 page.
20
"France to Build Nuclear Aircraft Carrier," The Times
(London), January 2Zf, 1974.
21 Moore, Jane's Fighting Ships 1973-74 , p. 318.
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missions for the Royal Navy are flown by, owned by, and a part
of the Royal Air Force. • (Carrier aircraft are still manned
by RN personnel.) Yet a third situation exists in the Soviet
Union. The Soviet Navy has an integral air arm, but so far
all her fixed-wing aircraft are land based (this may change
as her two carriers join the operating forces). These vari-
eties of organization of naval components (or components used
in a maritime mode) indicate the difficulties in formulating
any arms agreements.
Submarines might be divided into two categories—attack
(anti-ship subs) and strategic (missile-launching subs). But
beyond this gross division, the problems of categorization are
compounded. Is a nuclear powered attack submarine equal to
two diesel powered attack boats? What happens if the nuclear-
powered sub also has cruise missiles aboard? And what about
torpedoes on submarines—are they equal to cruise missiles?
These are just some of the complexities in determining type,
equivalent weapons systems, and comparable restrictions and/or
ceilings on these diverse varieties. Within these categories,
one must also consider active inventories, reserves, and
"mothballed" ships. Reserve ships in the United States Navy
are fully ready for operations and are manned by a substantial
number of active duty personnel whose complement is filled out
by active reserve personnel. How should these ships be cate-
gorized?
When discussing similar types of weapons systems, one
must recognize a potentially hazardous technological innovation-
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miniaturization. The use of small "tactical" nuclear weapons
is already being discussed as useful for armies, especially
in the European theater. The transfer of this concept to the
maritime arena compounds the problem of systems comparisons.
A conventional destroyer with a typical weapons array could
become a devastatingly different threat if her guns fired a
rocket assisted, nuclear tipped projectile and her torpedoes
22
carried small nuclear warheads. That some surface ships are
already capable of carrying nuclear weapons has not been dis-
puted in this country, and some say that "any ship capable of
carrying nuclear weapons /now/ carries nuclear weapons." -*
Nuclear tips to warheads carried by missile firing combatants
like the Osa and Komar class small boats increases their
destructive power almost geometrically compared to a similar
craft conventionally equipped. This is not to say that these
weapons will come to be used, but they are very distinct possi-
bilities and cannot be ignored merely because they are not yet
in place, so far as is known in the open literature.
The difficulties of restraints by ship types, weapons
systems, and/or gross numbers of ships, leads to the considera-
tion of other possible methods for implementing arms agree-
ments. Perhaps ceilings on manpower may provide a useful tool
22These ideas were initially posed in a discussion with
a staff member of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
Washington, D.C., Spring 1974-.
23^So stated Gene R. LaRocque, a retired U.S. naval officer,
to a Congressional Subcommittee, as quoted in Fox Butterfield,
"U.S. Atomic Arms Again Stir Tokyo," The New York Times
.




Manpower Limitations by Service or by Overall Armed Forces
Numbers
In reviewing past maritime arms measures, limitations by
manpower ceilings is not a new concept. John Bellers wanted
to limit his 100 equal provinces of Europe to "1000 soldiers
or an equivalent in ships or money for enforcement of rules
and defense of the league," (Chapter I). The World Disarmament
Conference at Geneva in 1932 sought limits on the maximum
number of sea personnel ("effectives"), their length of con-
scripted service, and reserves (Chapter I). The Versailles
Treaty had actually limited the German Navy by numbers and
types of ships, as well as by maximum numbers of personnel
(15,000), and extended enlistments with no conscription
(Chapter I). It must also be noted that the first two propo-
sals were not accepted by any states, and the imposed Ver-
sailles limits were ignored by Germany when she began to re-arm
herself.
Manpower ceilings again appeared as part of arms con-
straints packages in the early 1960's, with the general and
complete disarmament proposals of the United States and the
Soviet Union at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee
meetings in Geneva (Chapter II). These draft treaties set
overall armed forces limits for the two superpowers and lesser
ceilings for other states. The procedure is reminiscent of
the tonnage scales of the Washington Naval Treaty, and assumes
that the other nations will accept their inferior status as
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signalled by their lesser numbers of personnel. Manpower con-
straints were not the only limits in these drafts—others
included percentage reductions of aircraft, subs, and surface
ships; weight limits on some ships; time scheduled destruction
of certain weapons systems; elimination of specified military
installations; and budgetary controls. The GCD proposals have
not been accepted by any country so far and probably will not
be in the foreseeable future because they rely on a strong
international peacekeeping force to protect the individual
states which agree to reduce drastically their national armed
forces. The acceptance of assigned inferior status is also
difficult for many states to digest— the taking of lower man-
power limits and the concurrent secondary or tertiary levels
consigns the nations to these roles in perpetuity (or at least
for the duration of the treaty).
Another aspect of manpower ceilings not addressed recent-
ly in proposals or draft treaties is the makeup of the 'armed
forces*. (The World Disarmament Conference of 1932 went into
great detail, but this specificity has not been repeated
recently.) As an example, the United States has Army, Navy,
Air Force, Marine, Coast Guard, and National Guard in her in-
ventory of armed forces. V/ithin these services are active
duty military personnel, reserves on active duty, personnel
in stand-by reserve status (several categories of these);
civilians working directly with the naval forces (as the civil
service merchant seamen manning Military Sealift Command supply
ships which victual combatant ships) ; civilians working in the

211.
headquarters, supply, support, and logistic commands of the
Navy; and within all these categories private civilians and/or
companies working on a short term or contractual basis. In
considering 'manpower' ceilings, one must take into account
these diverse categories of men and women and how they fit into
the overall armed forces picture. Presently, the United
States, like Canada and Great Britain, has no draft or con-
scriptive service, but the trained reserves of these (or any)
states provide potential for expanded resources. Other nations
have extensive compulsory service programs of varying lengths,
and large numbers of trained, ready reservists. ^
If the limits, reductions, or ceilings decided upon in a
maritime arms agreement settle the questions of 'naval per-
sonnel'
,
how, then, are the spinoff effects on the other armed
forces to be met? Would a reduced navy, in turn, dictate a re-
duced Marine Corps or a smaller army, both of which rely on the
navy for some forms of transportation and gunfire support? The
Military Sealift Command provides some support services for the
United States Navy, but it also provides extensive surface
shipping to other departments of the executive branch of the
government. Are these, too, to be considered in any curtailment
"^"For example, the Soviet Union has compulsory military
service of 2-3 years, depending on the branch of service; the
other WTO states have betv/een 16 months and 3 years. The
United States, Great Britain, Canada and Luxembourg have
voluntary service, while the other NATO nations have compulsory
or draft service of 12 to 48 months depending on country and
branch of service. The U.S. has about 837,000 ready reservists;
the other NATO countries very roughly have about 3.6 million.
The U.S.S.R. has 700,000; the other WTO members have very
roughly about 1.9 million trained reserves. All figures from
the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military
Balance 1973-1974 , pp. 10, 11-13, 17-25.
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of naval activities? The Soviet Union relies heavily on its
civilian merchant fleet for resupply and replenishment of its
naval ships at sea. y How does one calculate this in a mari-
time equation on arms control?
A last question one must examine in any maritime arms con-
sideration in the NATO area of interest which centers around
manpower controls, is that of navy to navy comparisons. Is
it, in fact, realistic to compare the United States Navy (or
the NATO navies) to the Soviet Union's Navy (or the WTO
navies)? The Soviet Union is generally considered a land power
connected to her allies by land. Naval forces, at least until
recently, v/ere of secondary importance and were utilized for
coastal defense and a minor anti-shipping role. The United
States and the other NATO members, on the other hand, are con-
nected by oceans and seas, including the Atlantic and the Medi-
terranean. The lines of communication run across water not
land, and these nations are almost totally dependent on the sea
lanes for resupply and assistance provided by other members.
^See David Fairhall, Russian Sea Power , Gambit Incorporat-
ed, Boston 1971, especially Chapter 11, "The Red Fleet in Blue
Waters," pp. 203-222. "In general the range of Soviet naval
activity has been increased in parallel with the rapid expan-
sion of the Russian merchant fleet. ...Some of the direct ways
in which Russian merchant vessels can assist their naval col-
leagues /include/.
.
.a tanker sent out to refuel a submarine, a
trawler collecting hydrographic data, a scientific research
vessel monitoring NATO communications," p. 203. And, "One of
the striking things about this new oceanic presence is that it
does not depend on having naval bases scattered throughout the
world. Like other big modern navies, the Soviet fleet is truly
independent of the land when it wants to be," p. 207. And,
"The Soviet Navy now operates a fleet of about 1 50 major auxil-
aries, more or less equally divided between /sic/ oilers, supply
vessels, and. repair ships. The oilers can be supplemented by
merchant marine tankers.
.
.which are also used to supply the
long range fishing fleets at sea," p. 210.
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If the NATO navies (and the waters which they ply) are the vital
links among these states, then should they be considered in an
arms agreement with the navies of the WTO—navies which are of
at least secondary (and perhaps tertiary) importance in the
overall military strategies, both offensive and defensive (if
one can make such distinctions), of this latter Alliance? In
other words, if the oceans provide the vital links for NATO,
and the land provides the vital links for the WTO, should not
the primary armed forces of these two arenas be compared— that
26is, the NATO naval forces with the Warsaw Pact land forces?
Such questions may seem ridiculous at first glance, but if they
are not examined carefully, a maritime arms agreement might be
constraining a vital portion of one side's armed protection
force but only an important element of the other side's protec-
27tion forces.
Personnel ceilings, limits, or reductions are not so
__
Of course, such questions as: how many ships equal how
many divisions and of what varieties are almost beyond com-
prehension, but they v/ould arise in this type of arms considera-
tion.
'For a brief but good summary of the U.S. -Soviet naval
balance see Blechman, Gramlich, and Hartman, Chapter 5>
"Assessing U.S. Military Requirements," in Setting National
Priorities— The 1975 Budget , pp. 99-132, especially pp. 1 18-
12/+. See also the following: "The Soviet change of emphasis
from a military strategy based almost exclusively upon land-
based forces to one incorporating elements of a maritime capa-
bility raises fundamental questions, directly with regard to
Norway's security, and indirectly in respect to Norway's future
in NATO." And, "However, Norway and NATO's northern flank
constitute only half of the problem generated by the change in
Soviet strategy. As in the North Atlantic, so in the Mediter-
ranean there is an ever-growing Soviet maritime presence."
Martin Edmonds and John Skitt, "Current Soviet Maritime Strate-
gy and NATO," International Affairs (London), January 1 969
,
PP. 35 and 38 respectively.
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easily constructed, then, as one might imagine at first sight.
They rival ship-type restraints in complexity and diversity of
problems. V/hat types of people within the navies, what types
of naval elements (or other elements) within the armed forces,
and what other elements which affect the navies are to be con-
sidered in a maritime agreement? All of these people (and
their ships and weapons systems) must be paid for by some divi-
sion of the government, however, so perhaps the problems of
devising a maritime arms agreement can be examined through
budgetary constraints. If the initial flow of money is re-
stricted, then the numbers, amounts, and quantities of what it
buys will be controlled.
Budgetary Limits, Ceilings or Reductions
William Penn sought to spend the excess of funds result-
ing from disarmament on other, more important, projects. He
perceived disarmament (or arms reductions) as causing a reduced
expenditure of money. The reverse procedure, the control of
the expenditures to force arms restraints, was proposed, in the
Russian Circular Note of 1899 which advocated in part the "non-
augmentation" and. eventual reduction of land and sea forces
budgets (Chapter I). The inter-war period saw such innovations
as naval 'holidays' on building, and the scrapping of some
ships, but these induced financial easements, rather than being
compelled by budgetary ceilings or limits, were the results of
other reductions. The Greco-Turkish Treaty of 1930 aimed for
no "unnecessary increase in their exnenditure/s/ on naval arma-
ments," but did not actually impose spending restraints
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(Chapter I). The 1932 World Disarmament Conference included
specified budgetary limitations for naval armaments among its
proposals (Chapter I). The 1971 Indian Ocean Zone of Peace
proposal expressed the desire to spend the limited funds avail-
able on "economic and social reconstruction" rather than mili-
tary measures, but used geographic exclusion from the area,
rather than their own military budget limits, as the method for
achieving these goals (Chapter II). The 1962 Soviet GCD pro-
posal included reduction of military expenditures as one method
of arms control. Other proposals and agreements have foreseen
budgetary benefits as results of arms negotiations, but not the
method for the limitations in the first place. (Some of the
public discussions of proposals for the SALT II Agreements
foresaw reduced or at least not increased budgetary expenditures
as a result of those proposed accords.)
Budgetary controls as the governing factor in an arms
agreement equation, on the other hand, have a whole different
set of problems involved with them. The first of these is the
same as for tonnage, numerical, or manpower ceilings—that of
the inferiority accorded all those states not in the first or
top category. Would other NATO and/or WTO members accept lesser
military budget ceilings than those of the United States or the
Soviet Union whether or not they intended to spend to those
ceilings? Would states in the third echelon of limits demand
to be in the second level for political prestige, regardless of
how much they actually spend on arms?
A Second problem is similar to that of manpower controls—
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would money restrictions hold for maritime forces only
(assuming all elements of these forces could be mutually
agreed upon) , or should budgetary limits be spread over all
the armed forces of a state? If this latter were to be part
of an agreement then what parts of the military establishment
would be included: active inventories, reserve inventories,
civilian payrolls, research and development in private in-
dustry, etc.? For example, in the United States, government
payment of academic or business R&D need not involve the
exchange of funds—it could be paid for through complete tax
exclusion, and thus never appear as a line item in the annual
defense budget. In a closed society such as the Soviet Union
the hiding of military or naval expenditures in other areas




A third, and perhaps the most complex aspect of budgetary
controls on arms expenditures (be they naval, maritime, or
total armed forces) involves the tool used to measure the
money being discussed. If dollars (for example) are the mea-
sure, then how are they to be compared with the Soviet ruble
—
by official exchange rates or estimated actual corresponding
values? Who will determine the values? How will one account
for inflation in one country and not another; or revaluation
—
"No single figure of Soviet defense expenditure in
dollar terms can be given, as precision is not possible on
present knowledge. Budgetary information is lacking. The
Soviet defense budget, which has remained implausibly static
at just under 18 million rubles a year since 1969, excludes a
number of items: military R&D, stockpiling, civil defense,
foreign military aid, as well as space and nuclear energy pro-
grams; and also frontier guards and other security troops.
The largest of these missing items is military R&D, much of
which is thought to be financed out of the growing votes for
science. The ail-Union science budget has grown at a rate of
9 percent a year since 1969, equivalent to doubling over
eight years.... From the International Institute for Strate-
gic Studies, The Military Balance 1975-1 974 . p. 8. The article
goes on to say that other unidentified defense-related R&D
is in the budgets for Higher Education Institutions and Enter-
prises and that the total Soviet defense budget may range from
$81 to &90 billions for FY 1973. "It must be borne in mind,
however, that this method uses United States price weighting.
The relationships could be very different if Soviet prices
were used as weights instead," p. 1 1 . Of course, this hiding
of defense expenditures in other areas of the total budget is
not limited to closed societies—it happens in the U.S. as
well, but to a much lesser extent and with less chance of per-
petual secrecy. See also: J.G. Godaire, "The Claim of the
Soviet Military Establishment," in Joint Economic Committee,
Congress of the United States, Hearings on the Dimensions of
Soviet Economic Power . 87th Congress, 2nd Session, U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C., December 1962, pp. 33-
46, for information on the dispersal of defense expenditures




or devaluation of a state's currency? 7
If a flat rate of expenditure for each state is not ac-
ceptable, then perhaps a percentage of that country's total
annual budget could be allotted for military matters. This
would solve the problem of first and second rate powers, be-
cause no one would have to accept second or lower level status
vis-a-vis the first level powers. The measurement of this
percentage (say a maximum of 10 percent of the state's gross
national product) would, again, be a problem. For example,
297
"An exchange rate is the price of one currency in terms
of another or in terms of gold, the common denominator of cur-
rencies. In a market in which trade flows freely and prices
and exchange rates are allowed to seek their own levels, the
relative prices of two currencies will reflect, roughly, the
relative purchasing power of each currency in its own country,
particularly of internationally tradeable goods.... It is no
exaggeration to say that over the past 30 years the exchange
rate of no Western nation has been as far out of line from its
equilibrium value as the Soviet ruble exchange rate.... The
Soviet exchange rate has typically been so far out of line and
controls have operated so successfully, that it seems fair to
describe the rate as no more than an accounting device for con-
verting foreign currency prices of Soviet exports and imports
into rubles for the purpose of constructing foreign trade ac-
counts in local currency." Franklyn D. Holzman, "Some Finan-
cial Aspects of Soviet Trade," in Franklyn D. Holzman, editor,
Readings on the Soviet Economy , Rand McNally and Company,
Chicago, 1962, pp. 427-428. See also: Alec Nove and Desmond
Donnelly, Trade with Communist Countries , The Institute of eco-
nomic Affairs, The Macmillan Company, London, 1960. "In the
practice of Soviet trade, there is a virtually complete divorce
between internal and external prices. This is due partly to
the nature of the internal price system, partly to a completely
artificial exchange rate, and partly to the trade procedures
adopted." With different internal and external price systems,
hidden defense expenditures, and an artificial exchange rate,
it seems almost impossible to make any valid and worthwhile
dollar-ruble comparisons for the purposes of limiting or reduc-




Soviet output looks considerably smaller in the
ruble comparison than in the dollar comparison.
A computation made for 1965, for example, showed
Soviet GNP as 35 percent as large as American
when the comparison was in rubles, and as 57.5
percent as large when the comparison was in
dollars.
™
Clearly, the difference of 10 to 22 percent in estimating the
comparable gross national products of two states is a signifi-
cant one, and too great to use that tool as a worthwhile mea-
31
suring device. Although budgetary restraints as a driving
force in maritime arms control considerations have great appeal
because of the expected spinoff from these procedures, the
means of implementing these limits (be they flat rates or per-
centages) are difficult to determine and inaccurate at best.
Phrases like "the reordering of national priorities," or the
"redistribution of expenditures," or the "increased funding of
social and people-oriented programs (and the consequent re-
duced spending in the military-industrial complex arena),"
and others, sound as though they are the cures for the ills of
the world. But getting at the facts of these budgetary re-
straints and obtaining the necessary data to make a workable
formula is another matter— 10 percent of X numbers of rubles
30Robert W. Campbell, The Soviet-Type Economics—Per-
formance and Evolution , Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston,
197*f, Third Edition, p. 103.
31
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"Soviet Union Proposes 10% Cut in Arms Budgets by Per-
manent Members of Security Council," Soviet News , Soviet Em-
bassy London, October 2, 1973, pp. *f14-*f15. A 10 percent re-
duction of defense budgets has great appeal, but 10 percent of
a Soviet budget, whose total is exceedingly difficult to
determine with any accuracy and whose estimated total outlays




is still 10 percent of X. Even if X could be translated into
some numerical value, that value is still only marginally
useful until it can be compared fairly accurately with the
other currencies involved (dollars, pounds, francs, marks,
etc.). The use of gold as a standard of measure of other cur-
rencies has potential possibilities, but gold prices are fluc-
tuating now and will not stabilize in the foreseeable future.
Linkages Among the Various Methods of Considering Maritime
Arms Control
As indicated throughout this chapter, the possible ways
of examining and constructing a maritime arms agreement are
incredibly complex and varied in nature. Each separate method
is fraught with its own weaknesses (and strengths in some
cases) , and each seems unable to be isolated from the other
possible choices. Yet the history of recent maritime arms
control attempts indicates that complex or complicated pro-
posals risk failure of one sort or another. (a) If they are
too far-reaching, the proposal may tax the political will of
the potential signatories to the point where they are afraid
to sign because the accord demands too much or guarantees too
little to risk giving up any sovereignty. GCD is an example
of this. (b) If the draft agreements are so loosely worded
as to encourage or admit diverse interpretations (and there-
fore, actions), those proposals will not provide any real bene-
fits sufficient to insure signing, particularly if they deal
with a crucial or sensitive area, for example denuclearization
of the Mediterranean. (c) If the accords are too simple, they
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will achieve nothing except another agreement. The SALT II
has been categorized as this type of agreement. (d) And if
these proposals are too restrictive they will be avoided as
being unrealistic or unworkable by the various states they are
intended to encompass. The Law of the Sea Conference may be
in this category.
If, for the sake of argument, a maritime arms control
method can be developed and agreed upon by the negotiating
participants, then this method must be, for each state, co-
ordinated with that state's other military and national securi-
32ty interests. For example, limiting anti-submarine warfare
technologies v/ould mean the United States probably could not
control the sea lines of communication across the Atlantic in
a European theater war with the Warsaw Pact members as ad-
versaries. Lack of this control would mean that NATO plans
for surface resupply of Europe from the Western Hemisphere
must be rethought. This retardation or perhaps cessation of
Europe's replenishment from North America in turn affects the
32
The various methods of constructing a maritime arms
agreement discussed here are not unique to the ocean atmosphere.
In fact, many of the same formulae have been used in construct-
ing scenarios for central European accords. See J.I. Coffey,
"Arms Control and the Military Balance in Europe," Orbis, Vol.
17, No. 1, Spring 1973, pp. 132-154. In this article, the
author discusses approaches to mutual force reductions through:
manpower on active duty; reserves; combat units; various types
of weapons; stationed or indigenous troops; a man/mile formula;
and a percentage of stationed and/or indigenous troops. See
also: John Yochelson, "MBFR: The Search for an American
Approach," Orbis , Vol. 17, No. 1, Spring 1973, pp. 155-175,
in which the author examines percentage reductions; types,
origins, and readiness of forces; weapons systems; verification




battle plans of the land and air forces within that theater of
operations. Another example: banning all aircraft carriers
from the Mediterranean (either because they exceed a tonnage
limitation, or because they are a certain prohibited ship
type, or because their planes are capable of carrying nuclear
weapons) would mean these planes (both Navy and Marine Corps
in the case of the United States) could not provide tactical
support, reconnaissance, or logistical supply for United States
and allied ground troops fighting around the littoral of that
Sea. Thus, the operational planning of the other services and
other nations would have to undergo a fundamental re-examina-
tion in light of the absented aircraft.
Modern technologies and rapid communications have made the
operational plans of any war situation an integral and inter-
dependent process among land, sea, and air units of weaponry.
Soldiers and sailors no longer 'do battle 1 in vacuums, separated
from each other by their different natural elements. They are
(generally) planned for, procured, trained, and utilized as
part of a whole picture—an overall strategy. Restricting,
limiting, or controlling only one aspect of that integrated
whole, v/ithout examining the impact on the other elements of
that whole, will at best critically weaken the rest of the
plans, and at worst fatally wound them before they even are
tested in battle.
Arms Control versus the Freedom of the Seas
There are others, too, who believe that any maritime
agreements which restrict the freedom of the seas are unnatural,
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illegal, and unworkable. The oceans belong to no one, and
no nation or concert of nations through international accords
can limit, restrict, or prohibit the free passage of ships on
or through this medium so this line of thinking goes. The
vastness of the ocean spaces makes the implementation and en-
forcement of such regulations exercises in futility, and may
actually retard v/orld attempts to manageable arms control
agreements because they delude the signatories into believing
in unrealistic situations.
The construction of maritime arms control agreements is
both difficult and complex. Accords which might have a chance
of success must take into account myriad different details,
several different methodologies, and numerous diverse impacts,
both within the governments involved and on the external rela-
tions with other governments. Methods which appear simple on
the surface have incredibly complex structures beneath them.
Strong proposals are built with fragile and breakable under-
pinnings. Unrealistic limits or prohibitions are not seriously
considered by potential negotiators, and valid proposals require
political will and effort to insure their success. Prospects
-^Conversation with a senior retired Royal Air Force
officer in London, Spring 197^- and conversation with a senior
retired U.S. naval officer in Washington, Spring 1973. These
are opinions generally expressed in private and rarely appear
in print, primarily because opposing "arms control" is akin to
opposing motherhood and apple pie. Also, arms control agree-
ments are viewed by some as devices used by the Communists to
retard or stop Western military advances, while they overtake
or surpass the capabilities of the gullable Westerners. These
individuals view the Soviet Union as negotiating, signing, and
upholding accords only so long as those agreements are in their
own best interests. The Communists will break any agreement as
soon as it is in their interest to do so.
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for any type of substantive agreement are, at best, sometime
in the future and dim, at that.

CHAPTER VI
A COSTS VERSUS BENEFITS ANALYSIS OF THESE METHODS
OF VIEWING MARITIME ARMS CONTROL
The traditional mode of military analysis,
which saw in war a continuation of politics but
with its own appropriate means, is no longer
applicable. Policy and strategy merge at every
point.... Skill in quantitative analysis may
downgrade those /qualitative/ factors that can-
not be quantified. A complex strategic theory
may be so intellectually satisfying that the
difficulties of human beings employing it in
moments of great tension and confusion may be
overlooked. It may be tempting to treat allies
as factors of a security arrangement and to for-
get that their ultimate contribution depends on
intangibles of political will.... This is
another way of saying that national security
policy is not primarily a technical problem,
but a challenge to political understanding and,
ultimately, to philosophical insight.-
After examining the various ways or methods of viewing a
maritime arms control agreement, one must then consider the
types or categories into which these methods may fall. They
may be compared by numbers against quality; or by the value
of specific weapons systems; or by limitations on the buying
power of a state in procuring either the maritime hardware or
the people to manipulate those purchases. After categorizing
these methods with their liabilities and assets for each type
established, they may then be utilized in a maritime arms con-
trol formula.
Quantitative versus Qualitative Approaches
The controls or limits or ceilings on the quantity or
Henry A. Kissinger, "Editor's Conclusion," in Henry A
Kissinger, editor, Problems of National Strategy , Praeger




numbers of maritime entities in an agreement might be reached
through several methods. Tonnage ceilings could limit the
total numbers of a particular type of ship or boat specified.
No signatory, for example, could have more than 1.0 million
tons of aircraft carriers, perhaps divided among 13 hulls.
Or, the parties to the accord might agree that none of them
would build more than 350,000 tons of cruisers on a maximum of
326 hulls. This could be done for each type of combatant, both
surface and submarine. Proposals of this nature have already
been implemented in the SALT I Agreement, and have been dis-
cussed in recent literature as a means of limiting nuclear
powered attack submarines. By having a sliding scale of tonnage
and numbers, each participant is given some leev/ay in determin-
ing its particular needs, while all states have accepted mutual-
ly agreeable limits. In constructing an accord of this type,
however, it would seem necessary to agree on tonnage/numbers
for each major category of ship, i.e., all aircraft carriers,
all other surface combatants (cruisers, destroyers, escorts,
frigates, corvettes, etc.), all attack submarines (however
powered), all coastal surveillance craft (missile torpedo boats,
fast patrol boats, etc.), all amphibious operations ships, and
others. If this is not done across the board for all ships,
then any signatory could build a larger or smaller variety of
2These very rough figures approximate the coming U.S.
carrier strength.
•^Very roughly, these are tonnage and numbers totals for
the Soviet navy presently.
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the limited ship and call it by another name, thus evading the
agreement.
Since ships, of whatever variety, must be manned by
numbers of personnel, limits in this area might provide a
handle for controlling maritime armaments. In this endeavor,
the settlement of the definitions of terms becomes all-
important, as discussed previously. What makes up manpower,
and who are counted in the overall figures? Should only uni-
formed naval personnel be counted, or all people who receive
pay checks from the Department of Defense? If only naval per-
sonnel were included, how does one account for the civil ser-
vice merchant marine, the reserve components, the Coast Guard,
the civilian merchant marine (which provides support for the
Soviet Navy) , and other ancillary elements? In the United
States, for example, much of the shore establishment could be
civilianized, thus providing more uniformed personnel to man
ships at sea. Each ship could have two crews (as do the
SLBMs), enabling the hulls to have greater operating time at
sea.
Within manpov/er limits, perhaps an overall limit of all
DOD personnel might be possible, providing each state with the
freedom to mix its numbers under that ceiling. In this case,
one state, for its overall national interest, might prefer to
have 50% in ground forces, and 25% each in sea-going forces
and air forces. This, of course, does not account for quasi-
military functions performed by units not under the defense
ministry's control (as the Coast Guard in the United States).
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States or countries, or regions within a country could, set up
local militias or coastal patrols to circumvent the agreements
on overall manpower ceilings. On the other hand, the freedom
to mix v/ithin the total limits might be constructed so as to
include such local or regional units as a percentage of the
total national military units allowed. For example, no more
than 10 percent of a nation's armed forces may be of the local
or regional variety or no more than 5 percent of the naval
forces may be distributed among or used for coastal defense.
Although maintained by the regional governments (as opposed to
the federal governments) the local defense groups would be
counted in the overall national defense manpower ceilings for
the purposes of the accord.
A third quantitative attempt to generate arms agreements
is the budgetary ceiling. This method has some problems simi-
lar to manpower proposals—what to include and how to count it.
Research and development, as in the Soviet case, could be
placed in the budgets of other governmental agencies, or farmed
out to civilian elements both academic and industrial. The
problem of discovering the actual defense budget has also been
discussed, as has the problem of accurately discerning the
overall budget or the gross national product of a specific
state, especially a closed society nation.
Another possibility to be considered for a particular
world region would be a percentage limit on ships of non-
littoral states in that area. For example, the Soviet Union
or the United States could have no more than 10 percent of their
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combatant forces in numbers and/or tons and/or manpower in any
specified area at any one time. The Mediterranean or the Nor-
wegian-Barents Seas (or the Indian Ocean although that is be-
yond the NATO area) come to mind. This would in no way limit
the total maritime assets of any state, but it would create a
measure of constraint in particularly sensitive arenas. This
could be accomplished by across-the-board percentage limits
with no freedom-to-mix or a gross percentage with complete
freedom-to-mix as perceived necessary by each state. This
notion has many drawbacks, not the least of which is that it
might inspire greater building programs to enable a larger
number (although the same total percentage) of ships within a
particular region. As with some of the other quantitative
schemes, this idea does not examine the asymmetries of ship
types and weapons systems aboard those ships, or their diverse
missions within a given geographic area.
Limiting the number of ship-days at sea might also be
considered a quantitative restraint. For example, in the Nor-
wegian-Barents Sea area the United States and the Soviet Union
(or all NATO-WTO) navies except Norway's might be limited to
150 ship-days a year of operating time. Under this procedure,
the limits involve a particular area and the number of days
ships may operate there. Each ship operating in (as opposed
to transiting) the area is a ship-day. The NATO navies, for
example might hold one exercise a year in that area with 25
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ships involved, but it could only take six days. The Soviet
navy, on the other hand, might prefer shorter exercises with
fewer ships held more frequently. The multiple becomes the
governing factor, with each ship carrying the same "weight" in
the equation.
Qualitative limits, as compared with the quantitative
limits discussed above, have some different situations surround-
ing them.
Sanctuaries allow only certain types of ships in certain
areas, but do not limit the numbers of those types of ships.
Theoretically, this could make all of a certain type of ship
(SLBMs) safe from attack, but by the same token, it might also
make them much easier targets to find and eliminate if that
became necessary. Geographic restraints tied up with a quanti-
tative limit might work in certain areas. For example, no air-
craft carriers over a certain size or beyond a designated
number could sail in the Mediterranean. An area limit of this
type could and perhaps should be applied to other combatants
within the specified arena. As with the tonnage/numbers
^"It is realized that these figures may be totally unreal-
istic and that special provisions must be made for coastal
states, but the numbers are used for example purposes only.
5
"Tor example, one naval officer said recently, that he was
not opposed to the Soviets having a naval facility in Cienfuegos,
Cuba, because it was much easier to destroy all their ships
(surface and submarine) at one time rather than running all over
the Atlantic looking for them. This statement presupposes a
surprise strike by the U.S. and a Soviet Navy with all its ships
in port at the same time—an unlikely occurrence. It also may
mean that the USN finds it easier to track and keep up with So-
viet ships in Western Atlantic waters if they come from Cuba,
than if they travel down from the North Atlantic.
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ceilings discussed before, these restrictions could be on a
sliding scale to include types and numbers.
In this case, each non-littoral signatory would be allowed
a total of 75 naval and support vessels in the Mediterranean at
any one time. Within that number, each could have no more than
two aircraft carriers, ten cruisers, 25 destroyers, escorts,
frigates, or corvettes, 2.0 smaller combatants (patrol boats,
missile boats, torpedo boats, etc.), 10 amphibious ships, and
eight support or supply ships unless otherwise recompensed.
Each ship would have a numerical value of the next category so
there could be some freedom to mix, thus creating individually
suitable fleets. For example, an aircraft carrier could be
equal to five cruisers. A cruiser could be equal to three
destroyer- type ships, and an amphibious ship could be equal to
two destroyers, or some similar ratio. Each state could tailor,
within limits, its navy to its perceived needs within a specific
geographic area, but not limit its total armed forces or even
its total navy. Qualitative limits would by this method exist
in a certain area.
Qualitative restrictions by weapons systems have already
been discussed, such as no nuclear weapons in the Mediterranean.
This proposal is too simple, however, and does not address the
questions of nuclear-powered ships or nuclear capable weapons
(those weapons conventionally armed but capable of nuclear
tips). Even the limitation of certain weapons systems (as
opposed to their prohibition) seems difficult to define and
I owe this point to LT Robert W. Stuart, USN, Fletcher
School of Lav/ and Diplomacy, Fall 197^-.
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even harder to agree to among the parties because of the almost
infinite varieties and mixes of systems. Some of these have
been discussed earlier, but does a cruise missile on a destroyer
equal the same cruise missile system on a cruiser? Does an ASW
helicopter on a carrier have the same "value" or weapons system
"weight" as the same ASW helicopter on a guided missile
cruiser? Different ships have different missions and, there-
fore, have different weapons systems. But the same weapons
system may have alternative functions aboard, the same or dif-
ferent ships. It would seem, then, that a constraint of some
sort on a specific weapons system v/ithout any combination of
area or ship-type or numbers, would become merely a limit or
prohibition for its own sake, not for any tension-reducing
value that an agreement should or might have.
Short and Long Term Controls
Another perspective on these much-discussed problems is
that of the duration of the effect of the control or limit or
reduction. In other words, if a state initially agreeing to
some form of arms control measure determined, at some point,
that the accord was not to be continued, how long would it take
that state to recover from the restraints of that agreement?
If country A decided that the accord between A and B (or among
A through F) no longer served A's national interest because B
was not abiding by the tenets of the agreement, in what time
frame could A regain or recover its former newly determined
maritime strength necessary to compensate for B's gains?
Generally, the time needed, to recover or reach the determined

strength can be divided into short term and long term periods
depending upon the type of agreement.
Short term controls, those from which recovery is quick,
fall into the category of operational or geographic limits. A
signatory does not (necessarily) reduce or limit its assets,
it merely agrees not to use them in certain ways, or in certain
areas, or more than certain periods of time. Recovery from
these limits is quick and relatively easy, taking only a matter
of hours or days. In this case the forces exist and need only
to be shifted from one area to another, depending on the situa-
tion.
Long term controls, on the other hand, have extended re-
covery periods and may be categorized as hardware or military
assets controls. These encompass such concepts as numerical
limits on types of ships, numbers of personnel, and dollars
spent on these assets. Recovery from these controls is measured
in months or years. The period involved cannot be shortened
by any substantial amount because building or refurbishing
weapons from scratch or from a mothballed inventory takes time,
as does training of personnel. The sudden need to build (or
otherwise place into the active inventory) three attack sub-
marines, or one cruiser, or a squadron of fighter aircraft, or
train 10,000 more personnel cannot be met quickly or easily.
Requirements of this type can be fulfilled only over long
periods of time and with substantial expenditures of funds.
Although arms control agreements should be entered into
by the various signatories in good faith, it would seem prudent,
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and. perhaps necessary considering historical
indications, to examine and take into account the recovery time
involved in any sort of accord. Consideration of the needed
recovery time, on the other hand, may demonstrate a lack of
faith or even bad faith on the part of the negotiators and may
cause ill will (either real or perceived) among the partici-
pants. Nevertheless, it is a factor which must be recognized
and should be considered in any arms negotiations culminating
in any sorts of limits, restraints, or controls.
Verification of Various Methods of Limits, Ceilings, or
Reductions
In any arms negotiations involving constraints of any sort,
the ability of the signatories to assure themselves of others'
compliance with the specifics of the accords is important to
the usefulness and duration of the agreement. If one state
cannot reasonably assure itself that the stipulations to which
all agreed will also be adhered to by all so agreeing, then
there is little motivation to make an accord in the first
7place. Verification, then, is the ability to confirm that
the other parties to the agreement are in fact doing what they
agreed to do, or, conversely, not doing what they agreed not to
do. Since on-sight inspections are unacceptable to most govern-
ments because they threaten or perhaps in fact dilute the
7There are many parts of the state which must be reason-
ably assured of the veracity and thoroughness of the verifi-
cation procedures. The military and civilian leaders of the
executive branch, the legislators, and the general populace
must have a sufficient degree of faith in the system to accept
it in the first place and to abide by it for the duration of
the accord.

recipients' national sovereignty, and since no agreements on
an international entity capable of carrying out these tasks
seem forthcoming in the near future for the same reason, then
"national means of verification" appear to be the logical al-
ternative to this problem. National means, however, are not
foolproof and. are not even available in many areas of poten-
tial arms control agreements.
Accurate substantiation of budgetary limitations, reduc-
tions, or percentages spent on defense matters would be diffi-
cult in almost any state and almost impossible in a closed
society such as the Soviet Union (see Chapter V). Manpower
constraints have almost the same degree of difficulty of veri-
fication because of the varieties of manpower available and
the need to determine the utilization of the various categories
into which they are divided. Without on-sight inspection it
is hard to determine the readiness of a reserve unity, its
quality and quantity of equipment, and its utility in the im-
Q
mediate situation. Prohibitions against certain types of
weapons are equally difficult to confirm. As the Japanese
discovered recently, the statements of another country may not
always be accurate. Other than inspecting every compartment
and space in a ship or aircraft, one cannot be positive that
no nuclear weapons are carried aboard. And one inspection will
not suffice—it must be repeated periodically to insure com-
_ .
It is sometimes equally difficult to make that assessment




numbers and/or types of ships are more susceptible to negoti-
ation and agreement. For example, one of the fundamental
parts of the SALT I Interim Agreement on ballistic missile
submarine numbers limits revolves around the ability of each
side to verify through national means the numbers being built
by the other side. The Agreement even specifies the use of
national technical verification procedures and prohibits ac-
tions which could be taken to confound, confuse, or impede
these procedures. It seems now that this portion of the
Agreement is in some jeopardy and may call into question the
1 Q
See: "The Soviet-American Summit, May 1972, Interim
Agreement and Protocol on Strategic Offensive Missiles of 26
May 1972," in Survival , Vol. 1 If, No. k, July/August 1972,
pp. 195-196. "Article V 1. For the purpose of providing as-
surances of compliance with the provisions of this interim
agreement, each party shall use national technical means of
verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with
generally recognized principles of international law. 2. Each
party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical
means of verification of the other party operating in ac-
cordance with paragraph 1 of this article. 3. Each party
undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which
impede verification by national technical means of compliance
with the provisions of the interim agreement. This obligation
shall not require changes in current construction, assembly,
conversion or overhaul practices," p. 195.
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basic of the whole series of accords.
This present problem aside, confirmation of things which
can be seen and verified by a satellite (or other electronic
means) seems the most hopeful in the field of substantiating
what the other state says. Satellite photography can be used
to inspect areas of the ocean set aside as either sanctuaries
for only certain varieties of ships or geographic areas from
which specific types of ships are excluded. This, of course,
is more feasible presently for surface vessels rather than
submarines, but other types of electronic inspections may be
feasible in the near future to accommodate agreements on areas
1
1
John W. Finney, "Questions Arise on Soviet Arms," The
New York Times , November 6, 197*f, p. 9. "Defense Department
officials say they believe that recent Soviet actions raise
questions whether Moscow is camouflaging some of its strategic
weapons programs in violation of the 1972 agreement.... One
apparent act of concealment described by both Pentagon offi-
cials and /Senator James L^/ Buckley aides was a recent place-
ment of canvas covers over construction ways at a shipyard
near Murmansk where nuclear-powered missile-carrying sub-
marines are constructed. As a result, according to a Buckley
aide, the United States has been unable to determine for about
six months how many Yankee and Delta class submarines are under
construction by the Soviet Union. In addition. .. there are in-
dications that the Soviet Union, through various counter-
measures, is attempting to frustrate electronic methods used
by the United States. Electronic intelligence surveillance is
of particular importance in monitoring Soviet missile programs
during the development phase while photographic intelligence
through reconnaissance satellites is used to keep track of the




of the oceans involving submarines.
Tonnage constraints cannot be ascertained exactly by
national means of verification, but can be examined with,
enough accuracy to make them acceptable on the ground that
they are verifiable. It would seem, however, that the use of
tonnage limits alone have been dismissed already as a worth-
while arms control method because they are no longer an ac-
curate measure of ship strength or degree of lethality as dis-
cussed earlier. Tonnage combined with some other factor or
factors, however, may still have utility in arms control.
National technical means of verification, then, are best
able to substantiate another's claims in the hardware and geo-
graphic areas, i.e., in the categories of things that can be
seen by satellite photography. Substantiation of the claims
of another party to an arms agreement are least susceptible to
verification in the qualitative and non-photographable areas,
such as nuclear-tipped weapons, manpower or budgetary re-
straints, and for the present, undersea sanctuaries. Since
verification is an integral part of the acceptance of any arms
restraints, it would seem that arms control negotiators would be
12See: Greenwood, "Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Arms
Control," pp. 4-8 for discussions of visible light sensors,
infra-red sensors, radar, X-ray and gamma-ray sensors. See:
Robert Barkan, "Laser for War," Survival , Vol. 14, No. 5,
September/October 1972, pp. 239~241 , for a brief discussion of
lasers. See also: Bernard T. Feld. and George W. Rathjens,
"ASIV, Arms Control and the Sea-Based Deterrent," in Kosta
Tsipis, Anne H. Gahn, Bernard T. Feld, editors, The Future of
the Sea-Based Deterrent , The MIT Press, Cambridge, 1973,
pp. 121-147. These authors conclude, "In summary, the pros-
pects of limits on naval operations that could serve to pre-
vent erosion in confidence in the viability of submarine
launched missile systems is not good," p. 140.
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more interested in agreements involving various aspects of
hardware. This hardware may be constrained in its numbers or
in its geographic distribution, either by specific prohibi-
tions or by limited operations in certain areas of the oceans
and. seas.
Hardware limits which involve prohibitions on building,
however, are the same constraints from which it is most dif-
1 3ficult for a state recover, should that become necessary. ^
This, in turn, makes these types of accords less desirable over
the long term than their ease of verification might initially
suggest. The negotiators, or rather the national governments,
must then decide, in talking about maritime arms control with
others what is more important—verification of an agreement
reached or potential get-v/ell time needed to recover from the
strictures of that same accord, should the latter be deemed
necessary for the security of that state.
What to Include in a Maritime Arms Control Formula
If, as indicated in the Introduction to this discussion,
rising costs of seagoing armed forces (ship platforms, weapons,
manpower, and the support attached thereto) make mutual arms
control considerations more desirable, at least in the Western
world, then the problems outlined here should be considered
1 ~A
-Teld and Rathjens, "ASW, Arms Control and the Sea-Based
Deterrent," discuss verification for two types of violations.
(a) These violations or abrogations of strategic agreements
which would take months or years to overcome: "these v/ill
generally relate to development and/or construction of new
systems." (b) Violations or abrogations with felt signifi-
cance measured in hours or days: "these will generally relate
to limitations on operations or deployment...," p. 140.
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prior to any attempts at negotiations.
If national means of verification through the use of
satellites of any accord, is not of immediate and/or continu-
ing importance, then agreements limiting such things as man-
power authorizations or budgetary expenditures on defense
(either maritime or overall armed forces) could be considered
as having the greatest impact on the economies of the states
involved. Constraints in these areas, set at present or lower
mutually acceptable levels, would provide a reduced percentage
of gross national product devoted to defense measures. This
v/ould turn money, and perhaps manpower, to other aspects of
the economy, enabling the national governments to expend
greater efforts on other measures important to the health and.
well-being of the populace. Other maritime arms control con-
siderations, such as submarine sanctuaries or geographic limi-
tations, could also be considered if continuing national con-
firmation is not of utmost importance. V/hile these measures
might not have much deflating impact on the defense budgets
of the states involved, they might have a tension-reducing ef-
fect among the participants.
Accords based on any of these formulae for considering
maritime arms restraints must assume a high degree of honor
and integrity on the parts of the signatories to the agreements,
Since on-sight inspection by an international or multi-national
entity does not seem a possibility in the foreseeable future,
and national means of substantiation are not suitable to these
types of agreements, then the word of the individual states

becomes the only available method, of insuring compliance with
any accords. Long-term governmental commitment to interna-
tional agreements in the maritime atmosphere has been spotty
at best, especially in those treaties which required substan-
tial self-discipline and. control, that is, those areas requir-
ing states to stop doing things which they had been doing
either intermittently or for a period of time. (Naval "holi-
days," scrapping of ships, nuclear free zones, Law of the Sea
constraints proposals all involve the cessation or reduction
of some activity already extant.) Governmental commitment
(honor and integrity as exhibited by continued abidance with
the accords) to other forms of agreements v/hich limit or pro-
hibit actions not yet taken have a somewhat better reputation
as exemplified by the Antarctic and Outerspace Treaties. Re-
cent history of the maritime arms control attempts, however,
indicates few successful agreements involving substantial
governmental commitment over a long period of time, except to
those things v/hich they were not seriously considering doing
in any event.
If one assumes, on the other hand, that verification by
national means is a not unimportant aspect of maritime arms
control considerations, then one's options are somewhat dif-
ferent in constructing feasible formulae for discussions with
others. Satellite substantiation of the state's commitment to
an accord is limited to those things which can be photographed
with some degree of ease, namely numbers and types of ships,
and. various parts of the oceans and seas surfaces. The

construction of ships, if built as outlined in the SALT I
Interim Agreement, are detectable and identifiable by national
means of verification. Long before they are completed and
ready for sea, satellite photography (and other sources of in-
telligence) can observe these ships, as well as indicate their
type and general mission. This early detection by other parties
to an accord can either, (a) insure compliance with the speci-
fics of the accord or, (b) notify all concerned that one of the
signatories is not abiding by the letter of the agreement. If
the latter is true, then the other participants can take what-
ever action they deem appropriate to rectify the situation.
More important to this discussion is the early detection and
the consequent lead time it provides to the others in determin-
ing what actions (if any) to take.
Although national means of verification provide a long
lead-time (compared to no lead-time at all if other partici-
pants in the agreement are confronted with the results at sea
in defiance of the accord) , the longer time is necessary not
only for greater decision-making latitude, but also for greater
recovery time needed if any or all of the other signatories
decide to commence their own construction programs to match
that of the abrogator of the accord.
The same satellite operations can detect surface ships
(weather permitting) which contravene sanctuaries or areas of
geographic restraints. These facts can be reported to the
other participants for their information and use in any deci-
sion to act. In this case the reporting of a violation of an
accord is after the fact and thus does not provide a long time

to decide what actions if any to take. By the same token, the
recovery time needed to meet this new situation is much shorter,
assuming that the decision to recover is made. For example, if
the Mediterranean Sea were the arena for an agreement barring
more than one aircraft carrier and X numbers of other ships,
and the United States put another carrier into the area, the
Soviet Union could match that situation from the Black Sea
Fleet in short order. Similarly, if the Soviets put too large
a task force into the Norwegian Sea (beyond mutually agreed
upon numbers and/or types of surface ships) the NATO navies
could respond relatively quickly, either by sending in ships
of their own or requesting that the Soviets vacate the area.
The ability to verify nationally whether another party is
complying v/ith half of the bargain does not automatically in-
sure his compliance with that agreement, but it does help to
keep the aggrieved party from being caught totally unaware of
the abrogation of the accord. If country A really wishes to
defy the agreement, country B's ability to detect those steps
will not deter A from violating the agreement. National means
of verification will not stop any actions necessarily, they
will merely provide earlier knowledge of those negative actions
by country A. National technical means provide a greater re-
covery time for those signatories against whom the action is
taken.
It v/ould seem, then, that in evolving any formula for
maritime arms control considerations, national means of veri-
fication must play an important role. This in turn somewhat
limits the area which can be discussed to those that can be

verified—some hardware (both numbers and ship types) and geo-
graphic areas. Once this decision is made, one must then con-
sider the complexities of long and/or short term recovery
times involved if the agreement is abrogated or otherv/ise de-
fied by any participant. Subsumed under this problem is the
consideration as to whether or not recovery time is necessary
to handle the altered situation. If any of the other signa-
tories determines that it can manage with its forces in being,
then recovery time diminishes in importance. If, however, re-
covery time is needed to build, re-commission, or refurbish
ships, or train more personnel sufficient to meet the new cir-
cumstances, then recovery time is an important ingredient in
making a formula. The decision about the importance of the re-
covery time will broaden or narrow the scope of those methods
to be considered.
If, given the other factors mentioned here, recovery time
is deemed unimportant because a state has decided to handle
any new situations with its forces in being, then the range of
considerations v/ould include hardware and weapons systems. If
on the other hand, recovery time is deemed of great value be-
cause ship construction or personnel training v/ould be needed
to meet a suddenly altered situation, then geographic restraints
seem to be the best area of considerations. This method of
maritime arms control does not require any real reductions or
limitations of forces, merely their absence from certain areas
(or their operations only in certain regions). A breaking of
this agreement and the subsequent imbalance of forces in that
region could be re-balanced fairly easily and quickly with
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standing forces. The requirement for new forces not already
in being to rectify the imbalance, however, presents an altered
situation as discussed earlier.
Discussion of hardware constraints involves the question
of whether or not these should include numbers or ship type or
both. A combination of the two appears the optimum choice be-
cause of the asymmetries of navies and their mission. ^ No
two of the navies of any countries discussed in this paper are
the same, nor do they have like missions. It would seem,
therefore, that some form of sliding scale of numbers and ship
types would be needed for most of the categories of ships in-
volved. (This might not apply to ships with similar missions
and built not unlike each other, such as nuclear-powered attack
submarines armed with torpedoes and cruise missiles; but pre-
sently, even nuclear-powered attack submarines are not all
armed with cruise missiles, so exact one-on-one comparisons are
extremely limited.) Limits or reductions in these areas could
have a result of steadying or even shrinking the size of the
dollar and manpower expenditures, a not unpleasant side effect.
These constraints could also be tied into an ocean region, thus
combining the two into some form of regional maritime arms
Like tonnage alone, ship- types alone and numbers alone,
are not valuable measures of maritime assets. Ship-types can
be created out of whole cloth, such as the surface effects
ship of the U.S. Navy, the through-deck cruiser of the Royal
Navy, the small, nuclear-powered carrier of the French Navy,
or the VTOL carrier of the Soviet Navy. Numbers can be made
passe by (1) larger, more lethal platforms and/or weapons
systems, or (2) creation of new types (unless overall numbers
are limited in which case size becomes the method of circum-
venting this stricture).

control consideration. This might also have the effect of re-
ducing tensions at least locally.
Geographic restraints (or sanctuaries) by themselves would
not necessarily reduce the financial commitments in the defense of
any signatory country, but they could reduce the tension and
fear of hostilities in the local area. They might, on the
other hand, generate local rivalries if only the superpowers
were involved, in such an agreement, but this will be covered
in Chapter VII.
An arms control formula for maritime assets should in-
clude those things which can be verified by national means.
Consider for inclusions those methods which have shorter get-
well times if that is important. Include those items requir-
ing a longer recovery time if the potential change in the situ-
ation can be managed by forces in being. And, finally, include
those assets which were probably going to be limited by uni-
lateral action if no agreement were made.

CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS AND FINAL COMMENTS ON FUTURE
MARITIME ARMS CONTROL CONSIDERATIONS
It has been argued that the great danger in
the process by which arms limitations agreements
have been reached in the past, as v/itnessed by
the naval treaties between the wars, is that
they have established a system so rigid that its
breakdown was inevitable once that rigidity was
challenged by would be new entrants to the sys-
tem.... What is needed instead is the constant
exchange of estimates of security, together with
the frank understanding of each participant's
perceptions of threats to that security.
1
Although the Civil Service Commission has not yet de-
veloped a job description for the "Maritime Arms Control
2Crier," current literature of the academic and other scholar-
ly variety-^ is discussing the possible dimensions of such con-
siderations. It is assumed that it is only a matter of time
before the various governments of the North Atlantic Alliance
1 Donald Watt, "Historical Light on S.A.L.T.—Parallels
with Inter-War Naval Arms Control," The Round Table , No. 245,
January 1972, p. 35.
p
GS2, high school education, to roam the corridors of the
Executive Branches of the government in Washington, D.C. ring-
ing a hand-held dinner bell, calling to all and. sundry, "Naval
arms control is coming, naval arms control is coming." Must
be at least 18 years of age, physically fit, with strong vocal
abilities, a U.S. citizen (with acceptable security clearances),
and capable of understanding and utilizing both the District of
Columbia metropolitan transportation system and the multipli-
city of federal office buildings and complexes within the Dis-
trict, Maryland, and Virginia.
-^See "Conclusions," The Defense Monitors , Vol. 3, No. 3,
April 1974, p. 11. "There is an urgent requirement for the
United States and the Soviet Union to have overall discussions
about the general naval arms race between them (NALT talks),
/sic/, This ongoing naval arms race may be more expensive
than the strategic arms race. It is certainly more likely to




and/or the Warsaw Treaty Organization begin to examine these
notions (or some offshoot of them) seriously with a view to-
ward attempts at maritime arms agreements. In the case of the
United States, and to a lesser extent the Soviet Union, the
question of the number of participants becomes important im-
mediately.
Bi-Lateral or Multi-Lateral Negotiations
If, as has been indicated earlier, the future holds the
possibility and probability of maritime arms negotiations for
at least the United States and the Soviet Union, what procedure
should these two powers follow? Should they conduct bi-lateral
discussions similar to (or perhaps as a part of) the Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks? Or should these conversations and any
ensuing discussions take place in a multi-lateral forum similar
to the mutual force reduction meetings? In this essay, no
great distinctions have been made between strategic (or nuclear)
and conventional (or non-nuclear equipped) naval weapons sys-
tems. Rather, they both have been examined as related parts
of the ocean element of national security. Of course, weapons
systems and/or platforms may (and in some cases do) fall into
only one category or another, but, depending on the task and
mission prescribed, they may belong to both categories. It
does not seem worthwhile at this juncture, then, to pre-
determine which of these two types of forums should be used.
Instead, the forum should develop from the subject matter and.
the participants.
Since the geographic areas of NATO are those forming the
limits of this arms control examination, it follows that a
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NATO perspective should not be ignored in any discussions. If
the parallels of the mutual force reduction talks are followed,
then the North Atlantic allies and the WTO members involved in
the potential results of any talks should also be discussants
at the meetings. This presents some very complicated problems
if geographic areas are to be examined. In the Mediterranean,
the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain (Malta,
Gibraltar, and Cyprus), Italy, France, Greece, and Turkey
(coastal states), all have legitimate interests. Should they
all be involved in what perhaps should be essentially a bi-
lateral negotiation between the first two states mentioned,
neither of which is a littoral state? Soviet proposals for
the "de-nuclearization" of the Mediterranean (Chapter III)
have been put forth as starting points for negotiations.
Logically these discussions, should they ever take place,
should involve only the United. States and the Soviet Union be-
cause neither of them has coastal interests in the Mediterra-
nean, and they are both interested in reducing the other's
presence in that Sea.
For the United States, however, treaty commitments to
NATO and political commitments to Israel, prevent her from con-
sidering this arena in a purely bi-lateral context. By the
same token, those North Atlantic Alliance members having vested
interests in the Mediterranean are faced, with an "approach-
avoidance" conflict. They, because they rely at least to some
extent on the security provided by the Sixth Fleet's presence
in the Mediterranean, would want to present at least a private
opinion on any negotiating stance taken by the United States.

251.
At the same time, they would not want any limits or restraints
placed on their maritime efforts in that Sea because: (a)
they (except for Great Britain) are littoral states and con-
sider the Mediterranean "home waters"; and (b) they would view
a bi-lateral negotiation which also limited them without their
obtaining any equivalent exchange restraint from the WTO as
inequitable. Unless mutually acceptable restraints or limits
(either maritime or land-based) could be negotiated as part of
a multi-lateral Mediterranean discussion, it would seem that
the NATO allies could be doubly hurt by a United States con-
straint of some sort and by controls placed on themselves;
both of these for only restraints on the Soviet maritime forces
in that area.
A bi-lateral ocean arms accord with or without NATO input
to United States positions might lead to any one of three re-
actions among the other Western European states in the Mediter-
ranean. They could still perceive a Soviet threat potential
sufficient to warrant increased local naval forces created
TFor interesting parallels to this situation see, "The
Soviet-American Summit, May 1972—Agreed Interpretations, Com-
mon Understanding and Unilateral Agreements," Survival , Vol.
14, No. 4, July/August 1972, pp. 196-199. In their only uni-
lateral statement the Soviet Union declared, "Taking into ac-
count that modern ballistic missile submarines are presently
in the possession of not only the U.S. , but also of its NATO
allies, the Soviet Union agrees that for the period of effec-
tiveness of the interim 'freeze 1 agreement the U.S. and its
NATO allies have up to 50 such submarines.... However, if...
U.S. allies in NATO should increase the number of their modern
submarines. .. the Soviet Union will have the right to a corres-
ponding increase in the number of its submarines," p. 199.
Also Richard Burt, "SALT II and Offensive Force Levels," Orbis,
Vol. 18, No. 2, Summer 1974, PP. 465-48 1 , see the footnote p.
467. "According to Michel Tatu's article published in Le Monde
(January 18, 197*f)» the Soviet at the second round of SALT have
also demanded that the Chinese nuclear forces be added to the
U.S. offensive weapons total."
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jointly from a European naval force. On the other hand, a
felt need for greater protection by the interested Western
Europeans might not manifest itself in a cooperative effort,
but rather in local rivalries and increased building programs
developed on a national basis only. This could result in
duplication of efforts, excessive defense expenditures, and a
possible further disintegration of NATO cohesion in the area.
A third, and no less unpleasant possibility stemming from bi-
laterally negotiated constraints, could be the development of
a sense of hopelessness on the part of the Western Europeans.
They might feel there was nothing they could accomplish without
the full (present) strength of the Sixth Fleet against any
Soviet naval pressure in the area and therefore, they would
come to adopt a defeatist attitude. Any moves by the Soviet
Union (short of shooting incidents) would be protested verbal-
ly, but no substantial naval forces would be available to back
up the diplomatic resolve. A possible solution to this problem,
should the United States negotiate any sort of bi-lateral
limits, could lie in the Mediterranean equivalent to the Stand-
ing Naval Force Atlantic. Presently there is Naval On-Call
Force Mediterranean consisting of one or two ships each from
5
^See: Wolfgang Hager, "The Mediterranean: A European
Mare Nostrum?," Orbis, Vol. 18, No. 1, Spring 1 974, PP. 231-
251, especially pp. 2.1+8-2.1+9, in Which he says that a purely
European naval force would demonstrate to the Americans "that
the Europeans were playing their part" including increased
French participation. According to the author, however, a
large European surface fleet could place the Soviets in the
role of underdog in the area, protecting the Arab world from
the potential "imperialist" intentions of the Europeans. He
prefers common surveillance and electronic networks, shore-based
naval missiles, and increased aircraft reconnaissance.

the United States, Greece, Turkey, Great Britain, and Italy
exercising and operating together on an infrequent periodic
basis. If this task force were to become active full time,
it could have a synergistic effect politically on the Soviet
Union as well as providing NATO with another, much needed,
area of co-operation and effective mutual defense. This v/ould
enable the United States to consider some reductions in that
area without significantly degrading NATO defenses in the Medi-
terranean. It would not, however, help the United States meet
its avowed commitment to Israel because the other NATO allies
have made it clear they do not want to become militarily in-
volved in the Middle East hostilities, either directly or in-
directly.
Geographic restraints in other places, such as the Atlantic
or the Norwegian-Barents Sea areas have different, if similarly
difficult problems. The Atlantic Ocean is too large and. serves
too many purposes to be the arena for a single, all-embracing
arms negotiation of any sort. Any negotiations covering any
regions of the North Atlantic could not, in all probability,
be conducted on a bi-lateral basis because the maritime forces
of Canada, Great Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany (in-
creasingly so), Belgium, the Netherlands, France, and Portugal
all ply these waters. If the Soviet SALT Interim Agreement
unilateral statement is any indication, they will not accept
bi-lateral accords unless they also involve the naval assets
_
It averages about one time a year of active operations
and exercises. Hager, "The Mediterranean: A European Mare
Nostrum?," footnote, p. 2L+8.
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of the other NATO allies, and the other allies would not ac-
cept bi-laterally negotiated agreements constraining their
forces in any way. Any discussions along these lines would
have to include all the potentially affected parties, as is
the case of the mutual force reduction talks.
Geographic restrictions of the mileage variety (no ship
closer than X numbers of miles to another's shore) would have
to be done on a bloc-to-bloc basis to retain the integrity of
the Standing Naval Force Atlantic specifically and NATO naval
cooperation in general. Restraints involving all foreign
ships would be unacceptable to NATO and probably equally so to
the WTO allies. It also ignores the rights of the navies of
other nations not a party to any accord and seems too compli-
cated and unrealistic to pursue farther.
Sanctuaries within regions of the Atlantic Ocean especial-
ly as they pertain to ship types of the NATO and WTO navies
have greater possibilities at least from the standpoint of
feasibility of negotiation. If they centered around nuclear
powered missile-launching submarines logically the four nations
so equipped should participate. The could also apply to such
other ship- types as aircraft carriers and attack submarines.
Multi-lateral negotiations with the United States, Great Bri-
tain, France and the Soviet Union might be manageable from the
numbers of participants, but the same problem as that of Medi-
terranean discussion arises— too much quid from NATO and not
enough quo from the Soviets. Sanctuaries, say for SLBM sub-
marines, negotiated, between the United States and the Soviet
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Union only could not account for third-country intrusion and,
7
although this has been dismissed as unimportant by some, it
could cause severe problems to either or both sides. It would
seem that an agreement of this sort, that is, one that has a
high degree of risk involving forces beyond the control of the
signatory powers, could increase rather than decrease tensions
between the two sides. It might also end up costing more than
o
it might save in defense expenditures. An arms agreement
which increased tensions and costs would seem to be detrimental
to the welfare and national interests of all concerned.
The third area of possible negotiation involving maritime
assets is the Norwegian-Barents Sea arena. As indicated
'Richard L. Garwin, "The Interaction of Anti-Submarine
Warfare and the Submarine-Based Deterrent," in Kosta Sipis,
Anne H. Cahn, and Bernard T. Feld, editors, The Future of the
Sea-Based Deterrent , The MIT Press, Cambridge, 1973, pp. 87-
126. He writes about sanctuary operating areas for SLBMs and
safe passage for SLBMs along "designated deployment routes" to
enhance stability, pp. 116-117. But see also Bernard T. Feld
and George W. Rathjens, "ASW Arms Control and the Sea-Based
Deterrent," in The Future of the Sea-Based Deterrent
, pp. 121-
147 in which they cast doubt on the worth of SLBM sanctuaries,
but consider sanctuaries for surface ships as a possibility.
They conclude, "However, there is little basis for believing
that the world community would accept or honor permanent open
ocean sanctuaries on which the U.S. and the Soviet Union might
agree," p. 139.
o
Dominic A. Paolucci, "The Realities of Arms Limitations,"
Naval Review 1972, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings , Vol. 98,
No. 831, May 1972, pp. 1 78-189. "...(T)he more limiting the
arms control agreement, the more costly surveillance will be,
and the more important the surveillance will become. ...In
summary, if each nation has more than enough strategic forces
(more costly) , each can feel more secure against cheating by
the other side and therefore less surveillance and research
is needed (less costly)," pp. 180-181. He states that worries
about cheating could actually increase each side's feelings of
tension and therefore heighten the chances of misinterpreta-
tions of the other's unexplained activities, p. 181. In this
case, the increased chances of misinterpretations could be
caused either accidently or deliberately by a third party.
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earlier, this area is of particular concern to Norway and now
to Great Britain and the North Sea littoral states because of
the extensive petroleum and natural gas fields being explored
and/or exploited in these three seas. Because the Soviet
Union has to enter into negotiations with Norway about the sea-
qbed surrounding Spitsbergen, it would not seem as though she
would be interested in pursuing other discussions, either bi-
lateral or multi-lateral, concerning these areas at this time.
Aside from the potential oil problem surrounding Spitsbergen,
the NATO Allies have to consider the need to protect their oil
and natural gas fields in the Norwegian and North Seas. These
needs might make them reluctant to open any discussions on mari-
time arms control in a geographic context in these areas.
Lastly, the Soviets, despite the results of the negotiations
on Spitsbergen, may be reluctant to consider maritime arms re-
straints in the Norwegian-Barents Seas area because these are
the only egress routes for their Northern Fleet based at
Murmansk. They may not be desirous of entertaining any propos-
als which might limit, restrict, or restrain their freedom of
passage through these waters. Some say their newly tested
^David Binder, "Norway Rebuffs U.S. on Oil Panel," The
New York Times , November 13, 1974, p. 9. "Norway ha(s)...
more than 600 million tons of oil reserves on her continental
shelf, reaching far into the North Sea." See also, Terry
Robards, "Norwegians See Threat to Isles," The New York Times
,
November 26, 1974, p. 9.
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5000 mile submarine launched missile makes their need to
traverse these waters into the North Atlantic less acute, but
others argue that submarines firing from their own piers make
excellent targets for a United States second strike. Thus,
the need to get into deep ocean waters has probably been de-
creased only marginally. They would not be looking for an
accord retarding that right of freedom of navigation in any
11
way.
One last area of minor consideration under the geographic
heading of arms agreements is the Baltic Sea. Any accord
formed would probably require the transfer of large numbers of
the Soviet fleet from the area, and thus seems an unlikely
prospect. A cosmetic agreement to make it a "nuclear- free"
zone of some sort might be negotiated, but it would be nothing
"Elsewhere in the News-International," The Boston Globe ,
October k, 197k* P« 2. The Pentagon reported that the Soviet
Union test fired two submarine-launched missiles. "It was be-
lieved to have been the first test of submarine-launched SN8
missiles.
. . .
/They/ traveled almost 5000 miles from the
Barents Sea to about north of Midway Island."
1
1
''It is interesting to note that the Soviet Union at the
Law of the Sea Conference has supported the principles of free-
dom of navigation on the high seas, a 12 mile territorial sea
(as opposed to 100-200 territorial seas sought by some third
world nations) , and freedom of transit for international
straits. Despite her ideology, the Soviet Union has sided al-
most consistently with the developed, capitalistic states on





more than a "confidence-building" measure, if that.
In either a bi-lateral or multi-lateral context consider-
ing maritime arms controls, one can envisage attempts by
either side to link geographic discussions of areas within
NATO to areas outside of the North Atlantic Alliance. For ex-
ample, talks about superpower naval limits in the Indian Ocean
could, be linked, to similar or equivalent controls in the Medi-
1 3terranean. ^ Discussions on Baltic Sea limitations might be
tied to considerations of Caribbean arms restraints. In other
words, the Baltic is strategically important to the Soviets,
while the Caribbean is equally so to the United States. Both
have naval installations in their respective seas and both wish
to deny, as much as possible, access to those areas by the
Confidence building measures have "limited significance
for disarmament. They refer to political decisions concerning
certain military matters which only marginally affect the mili-
tary strength of the country concerned but which tend to im-
prove the political atmosphere and confidence in general,"
p. 106 of Chapter 4, "Security in Europe Through Disarmament
and Related Measures," World Armaments and Disarmament—SIPRI
Yearbook 1975 , Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,
Almqvist and Wiksell, Stockholm, 1973.
1 -z.
•^"The Suez Canal and International Stability," Press re-
lease from Senator Henry M. Jackson, dated March o, 1974, 6
pages. "I believe the Administration should now insist that
the Suez Canal be closed, to warships of all outside powers in-
cluding naval vessels of the United States and the Soviet Union."
And, "The principal, and rapidly growing, Soviet military fleet
is deployed in the Black Sea where it is supported by the indus-
trial and military resources of European Russia. ...In the
event of a crisis in the /Persian/ Gulf... the very considerable
navy that the Soviet Union keeps on station in the Mediter-
ranean could, be quickly redeployed in the Gulf, while the Black
Sea Fleet could be sent south into the Mediterranean. ...We,
for our part, cannot expect to make comparable use of the
Canal" because the to~station time is much greater from the
U.S. east coast, and many U.S. aircraft carriers cannot transit




The United States contributes about one fifth to one
1 5quarter of the NATO seapower, ' while the Soviet Union over-
whelmingly dominates the maritime assets of the Warsaw Pact.
It would seem then, that multi-lateral negotiations would be
disadvantageous to the North Atlantic Alliance members, but
most desirable from the Soviet perspective. By discussing re-
straints covering all the Western navies (and other maritime
assets) , the Soviets could obtain concessions of great advan-
tage to the East while giving up little of their own. In
either a numbers cut or a percentage-of-ships reduction either
by type or across the board the WTO v/ould have an advantage
^"See Barry M. Blechman and Stephanie E. Levinson, U.S.
Policy and Soviet Subs," The New York Times , op-ed, 22. October
1 97^f> p. 41. Despite the 1970 agreement on Soviet submarines
in Cuba (between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.) recent reports in-
dicate the following has happened since then: the Soviets have
"put a nuclear-powered attack submarine into Cienfuegos with a
tender, put a nuclear-powered tactical missile submarine into
Cienfuegos with a tender, put a diesel-powered strategic
missile submarine into a different Cuban port quietly, and put
a diesel-powered strategic missile submarine into a different
Cuban port publicly.
. .
,/l/t seems clear that the Soviet
Union is gradually but deliberately encroaching upon the agree-
ment. ...In effect, the submarine visits provide a test of
United States willingness to take risks in its broad relations
with the Soviet Union in order to prevent a shift in the two
sides' relative military capabilities. ...Thus, the series of
submarine visits to Cuba poses a political challenge for
United States foreign policy. ...Only by demonstrating a
willingness to make issues of single events that in isolation
appear relatively insignificant can the United States cause
the Soviet Union to understand that normalizing our relations
requires mutual concessions."
i 5
^Kenneth Rush, William J. Casey, and Donald Rumsfeld,
"Department Opposes Proposals for Unilateral Reduction of U.S.
Troop Levels in Europe," The Department of State Bulletin
,
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., August 6,
1973, PP. 209-228. The NATO allies contribute 80% of the
Alliance seapower, p. 211.
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because the Soviet Navy' s missions differ from the NATO naval
missions. The Soviet Union only has to deny use of the seas
to the Alliance members, while the latter have to gain and main-
tain that control in order to survive and fulfill their mis-
sions. None of the Warsaw Pact members relies heavily on sea
lines of communication for trade, commerce, or resupply. That
is not true for the NATO nations—they must use these routes
for peacetime and wartime communications. Since most of the
geographic and sanctuary areas discussed are closer—more
vital— to the Western Europeans than they are to the Soviet
Union or the United States, it seems that bi-lateral negotia-
tions would most likely be more productive in obtaining re-
sults equitable to both sides. It must also be emphasized that
since the United States is committed to the defense of all
NATO powers, she must pursue any maritime arms negotiations in
that area only after careful and constant consultation with
the other members of NATO. Anything less than this would be
politically unacceptable and militarily foolish.
The other methods of possible worthwhile maritime arms
controls, namely numbers restrictions, some ship- types limita-
tions and some weapons types restrictions, all have the same
frame of reference as geographic considerations. If these nego-
tiations must come, for reasons good or ill, from a NATO per-
spective they should be conducted on a bi-lateral basis. It is
well understood that by accepting (or not objecting to) bi-
lateral negotiations, the North Atlantic Alliance members af-
fected by any outcome (other than no agreement) must put great
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faith and trust in the United States not to sell them short in
the process. By the same token, once that trust has been
placed in the United States, the latter must resist any and
all tendencies to agree to accords not in the best interests
of the Europeans. Some proposals may look very attractive to
the United States, and yet be antithetical to the needs of the
Western Europeans involved. As the United States consults in
good faith with her allies while negotiating with the Soviets,
so the allies must be both realistic and honest v/ith the
United States. In these bi-lateral talks the United
States and their allies must remember that the results of the
negotiations are the most important aspect of the situation,
se]
17
not the process of the discussions them lves. An agreement
is not always better than no agreement.
T7
This idea was expressed very starkly by Dr. Winfred
Joshua in a conversation in the Spring of 197*+ in Washington,
when she commented on the upcoming Moscow Summit between
Pres. Nixon and Secretary Brezhnev. She said the best agree-
ment would be no agreement at all, but that the political
pressures on Mr. Nixon were too great for him to come home
empty-handed. It takes strength and will to say no and he had
neither the political or personal support to back him.
1 7
' It appears that sometimes the process of negotiation
becomes more important than the goal of the discussions. Pro-
cess seems to take on a life of its own and the goal becomes
obscured. In other words, 'no accord' is too often not recog-
nized as a legitimate and possible result of a bargaining
attempt between or among various nations. 'No agreement' is
not considered a 'positive' step and is, therefore, not ac-
cepted as a worthwhile result in a negotiation. It should be
more generally recognized as an acceptable conclusion. This
would then take the burden off the participants to 'produce'
something 'positive', thus returning process to its proper
position and re-emphasizing goal as the most important aspect
of the situation. With primacy placed on goal rather than
process, the negotiators could agree to disagree if necessary,
without being seen by their various publics as 'unproductive',
or 'unwilling to negotiate in good faith'.
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It must also be said that if the United States intends,
regardless of the negotiating process and any possible results,
to make a particular move such as cut aircraft carriers in the
Mediterranean to one plus a periodic "surge" force, or limit
nuclear powered attack submarines to 100, then almost any
agreement is better than none. Military cuts or restraints or
limits dictated by economic necessity or political decisions
at home should not be made before all possibilities have been
exhausted in trying to gain some reciprocol action. If, for
example the Soviet said only two (or one) NATO carriers could
sail the Mediterranean at any one time (thus effectively ex-
cluding the French and British carriers), then the United
States must refuse any agreement at all. A unilateral United
States decision to remove one of her carriers from the area
would in no way affect the allies' navies although it would
affect the overall defense posture of the Alliance.
If a negotiating situation already extant, namely the
mutual force reduction talks, strays into the area of maritime
considerations, however unlikely at this point, the one worth-
while method of examining maritime arms control in that forum
is the ship-days or operational approach. That could be
managed fairly easily within the NATO area on a bloc-to-bloc
or multi-lateral basis. It could provide standards for lit-
toral nations and other criteria for visiting navies. It
could include joint operations limits as well as ceilings for
independent steaming. Although it runs counter to the freedom
of the high seas concept, it could be used as a "confidence
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building 1 measure at least for non-strategic weapons systems
and platforms. This might be particularly applicable if
coupled with a geographic distance from given coastal states.
Ocean exercises, for example, could not take place closer than
75 miles from another's coastline (without prior permission),
regardless of a three, six, or 12 mile territorial sea. This
would, permit either side to conduct national or joint naval
exercises, but not unnecessarily or uncomfortably close to the
territory of another nation.
In summary, it seems that negotiations involving only
strategic weapons systems (nuclear missile-carrying and nu-
clear-powered attack submarines) should be conducted on a bi-
lateral basis between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Strategic weapons systems talks involving the assets of the
British and the French but not including them as participants,
could only work to the overall disadvantage of the Western
nations. In the first place, the United States would be dis-
cussing restraints of systems over which it has no real con-
trol and second, neither of those two would be willing to
accept any limits resulting from talks in which they had no
part. Third, it must also be recognized that Great Britain,
France, and the United States might not always be sufficiently
close allies to warrant the assumption that the weapons of one
are the potential defenders of all. In short, they may not
1
8




Allied interests diverge in other arenas touched upon




why neither Great Britain nor France would enter into negotia-
tions of strategic systems with the United States or the Soviet
Union. Had they been willing to rely totally on the United
States in the first place, they would not have buil*f* their
own systems. Therefore, they will not themselves discuss any
controls which would limit or reduce their freedom of maneuver,
unless it involved colossal reductions in the assets of the
two superpowers. This latter is an unlikely occurrence.
Regional or geographic maritime arms negotiations, on the
other hand, should include the interested parties, that is,
those whose navies use the area or whose country is affected
by discussions of that area. A conference on the Barents-
Norwegian Seas must include Norway and perhaps Great Britain,
as well as the United States and the Soviet Union. Those coun-
tries with a vested interest in the Mediterranean have been
mentioned before. These discussions must be on a multi-lateral
basis, especially if they center around conventional weapons
systems and some sort of ship-day or ship-type or numbers
formula or a combination of these factors.
Any maritime arms discussions involving only stationed
forces (to use the phrase of the Central European force reduc-
tion talks) can and probably should be carried on in a bi-
lateral mode. By the same token, any negotiations materially
affecting the indigenous forces (whether strategic or conven-
tional) must include representatives from those states. The
United States cannot speak for the other NATO allies in matters
affecting their national armed forces, nor perhaps can the
Soviet Union. The substance of the maritime arms control talks,
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then, dictates the numbers of participants.
Can a Maritime Arms Control Formula be Created?
The short answer to this question is: probably yes, but
with many caveats. If past experience is any indicator, nego-
tiations should center on: (a) items which were not going to
be pursued anyway; (b) those which are ripe for controls, such
as obselescent weapons systems or numbers beyond which none
was going anyway; (c) those which are redundant or which will
endanger national security least by reduction. As much as
possible, the governments should know ahead of time how much
they are willing to sacrifice in order to achieve some sort of
agreement. In other words, how important are factors as veri-
fication and recovery time (as mentioned in Chapter VI)? After
these have been weighed and measured, they can be given a
"value" in the larger perspective. The probable items of the
talks should dictate the forum and the participants. The
national government should determine what are its goals in any
negotiations. Is it willing to accept less than its original
aims in order to obtain some sort of accord, or are the initial
goals the only acceptable ones? If some sort of compromise is
acceptable in the talks, what are the confines of this compro-
mise? What, in short, is negotiable and what is non-negotiable?
Is an agreement of some type the most important goal? If the
accord at the end of the process is paramount, then what is
the national government willing to accept or sacrifice to
achieve the accord? Here, a list of options in ascending order




guideline for the negotiators (and the policy makers). y
The formula for future maritime arms control negotiations
must be flexible in its creation and use. The possible combina-
tions of weapons and methods should be several and at least
partially interchangeable. This initial adaptability in making
the formula will allow the conferees to change and substitute
the elements to enhance the negotiating process. This in no
way implies either ease of negotiating or lack of strength to
hold out for an equitable result. The process will be long,
complicated, and sometimes non-productive. And the government
must always be willing to accept the possibility of no accord
at all because of irreconcilable differences. The flexible
formula does, however, provide the negotiators more options with
which to work and also provides them with a broader knowledge
^See: Richard M. Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for the
1970' s. Building For Peace—A Report to the Congress , U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., February 25,
1971, in which he explains the preliminaries before the Strate-
gic Arms Limitation Talks. "We made a detailed analysis of our
ability, and the measures needed, to verify compliance with
each agreement. We also studied counter-actions if we detected
a violation and whether we could take them in time to protect
our security. The result was the development of individual
'building blocks' for all offensive and defensive weapons. We
can combine these blocks in various clusters of limitations and
reductions to produce alternative proposals for the negotia-
tions. This enables us to respond quickly and meaningfully to
any Soviet counter-proposals; at home we are not the prisoner
of bureaucratic jockeying to come up with an agreed response,"
pp. 188-189. In commenting on this development of "building
blocks," Mr. Nixon said, "It was anticipated that our new ap-
proach might forestall the early stalemates which had charac-
terized previous arms control negotiations when opening posi-




and (hopefully) understanding of the situation. On the
negative side, the multiple option situation may seduce the
conferees into feeling that, with all the variations at their
fingertips, there must be some combination attractive to the
other side(s). They become merchants offering their wares
and cutting prices to get a sale.
The maritime arms control formula should combine, within
its flexible formula, the methods of pursuing an agreement
with the topics of the discussion. In other words, methods
like ship-days in an area, or a sliding scale of numbers and
types, or sanctuaries, should be combined with the techniques
of the negotiations. These include the "building block" ap-
proach of varying and changing the elements of the formula
in order to broaden the scope of the talks within the limits
determined by the national government. By providing latitude
in content and method of negotiations, the national government
increases the possibility of agreement without decreasing
national security below the level it has determined as ac-
ceptable.
What Does History Indicate for the Future?
In reviewing the treaties, agreements, accords, and at-
tempts at agreements in the maritime atmosphere, one comes
away with a rather gloomy outlook. History has not been kind
20The more variables involved in the possible formula,
the more the negotiators must comprehend the broad implica-
tions of any set of combinations in order to put together
worthwhile elements from a national security perspective as
well as from a negotiating viewpoint.
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to arms control efforts in this arena, either in the idealis-
tic period right after World War I or in the more realistic
era since the Second World War. Nations abjure those plans
which they were going to foreswear despite the accord; or
those items too costly to maintain; or systems which outlived
their real usefulness. Agreements which did in fact require
substantial limits or reductions lasted only for short periods
before one or another nation began to circumvent the accord
either covertly or overtly after renouncing the treaty.
Post-World War II accords have fared somewhat better, but
they have cut into national security assets less substantially
and have been overcome or outmoded by technological progress
in most instances.
The most recent revelations about the possible violations
of the SALT I Interim Agreement may bode ill for future nego-
tiation attempts based on national technical means of verifi-
cation. Unless and until new verification procedures can be
developed, accords based on those principles will be suspect
from their beginning. This distrust will retard or perhaps
block any negotiations aimed at substantive results in the
maritime area. If agreements can be abrogated or circumvented
with such apparent ease and impunity, then they lose any value
in the international arena. No state is going to bother with
discussing arms control in a situation in which the parties
lack a background of good faith and acceptance of international




Perceptions, then, become very important: perceptions
in the case of the NATO nations, of their other allies; of
the utility of their own weapons systems and the increasing
costs thereof; and of the adversary, in relation to both in-
tentions and capabilities. The upward spiral of costs of per-
sonnel, ships, and weapons systems makes it necessary for each
government to reexamine its perceptions of its own national
security needs. Because the defense costs in the maritime
arena are rising so rapidly, these nations may determine that
the costs are not worth the results, that the nations would
be better off economically and socially with a decrease in de-
fense expenditures and resulting increases elsewhere. The
passage of time has not diminished the hopes and assumptions
that decreased defense spending will make money available for
other sectors of the economy. Secretary of State Hughes
stated that in 1922, and India applauded this possible result
in her Indian Ocean Zone of Peace proposal.
Idealism, if history is an indicator, will not alone en-
tourage nations to make any substantial and long-lasting mari-
time arms reductions. The hope of a "better world" or the
plea for faith and trust in each other has little impact on
sovereign nations which perceive all others as potential or
real enemies against which they must guard themselves. No
nation will accept the amorphous exhortations of international
good will and peaceful co-existence as sufficient reasons to
reduce its armaments substantivally. On the other hand, no
nation seems really interested in pursuing continued accords
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in areas or covering procedures inconsequential to their
security. Most of the geographic areas or technological as-
pects which can be restricted, controlled, limited or pro-
hibited have been so negotiated (Antarctica, Outer Space, the
Seabed, Partial-Test Ban, Latin American Nuclear Free Zone,
and others). In short, the western nations must soon consider
some of the fundamental elements of their maritime defense
programs such as numbers and types of ships and where these
forces are disposed, if they are desirous of pursuing arms
control measures as a way of lessening world tensions. As
indicated in this essay, if 'making a better world' were the
only reason of maritime arms control negotiations, the push
for such bargaining would be small indeed. Another influence,
however, may become the most important one and. that is the
rising cost of continued high levels of assets acquisition.
As indicated in the Introduction, cost factors are rapid-
ly overtaking technologies and perceptions of danger as the
principal determinants of levels of national defense. Short
of open hostilities, the costs are reaching the levels of un-
acceptable burdens, at least in the North Atlantic Alliance.
To be sure, the relaxing of tensions between East and West
has contributed to this reassessment of the situation, but
that is only a part of the issue. Nations arc less and less
willing to put such great amounts of money into weapons sys-
tems, platforms, and the people to manage them. Increasing
costs, then, make arms control discussions appear more appeal-
ing to these states. Arms control negotiations are a method
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of trying to got the adversary to give up or limit something
in return for reciprocol controls in areas where controls
were going to exist for monetary reasons anyway. If the NATO
allies are going to end up limiting or reducing their mari-
time assets because of excessive costs, they might as well
utilize the forum of arms control discussions to see if they
can get, either bi-laterally or multi-laterally, similar re-
straints from their adversaries. There is, of course, the
distinct possibility that no equivalent controls will be gained,
but at least some of the cost burdens weighing on the Westerners
must also bear upon the Easterners. These may be sufficiently
heavy to induce the Warsaw Treaty Organization members (or
member) to consider maritime arms control efforts as a worth-
while enterprise. In that case, the potential for gain on
both sides exists and may be great.
'The time has comet, the Walrus said,
'To talk of many things




And why the sea is boiling hot
—
And v/hether pigs have wings'.







PROPOSALS AND AGREEMENTS OF THE INTER-WAR PERIOD
Major Navies as of January 1920 1
G.B. U.S. France Japan Italy
Battleships k5 36(7) 20 13(2) 14
Battle
Cruisers 9(1) — m — 7 —
Cruisers 19 15 20 10 7
Light
Cruisers 79(9) 18(2) 8 17(6) 10
Flotilla
Leaders 26(2) — -.. — 7
Destroyers 355(6) 220(115) 76 68(10) k7
Submarines 103(10) 105U2) 57(8) 25(11) 80
Parentheses indicate additional ships being
built at that tine.
Richard D. Burns and Donald Urquidi, California State
College at Los Angeles Foundation, Disarmament in Perspective!
An Analysis of Selected Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements
Between the World Wars « 1919-1939. Volume III: Limitation of
Sea Power, prepared for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament





Secretary Hughes proposed for scrapping and limiting the number
of large surface combatants as follows at the Washington Naval
p
Conference 1922:
G.B. U.S. France Japan Italy
Battleships Scrap k Scrap 7 None. Scrap 2 No speci-
to be being to be fic ships
built. built. No speci- built. named, or





















Cruisers Some of Scrap 6 Total Scrap 10 Total only
the 15 being only older mentioned.







Total to speci- Not
be scrapped 19 30 fied 17 specified
Total No. of
Capital
ships left ZZ 18 10 10 10
U.S. Congress, Senate, Conference on the Limitation of
Armament
. Document No. 126, 67th Congress, 2nd Session, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 1922, pp. 47-^-9.




G.B. U.S. France Japan Italy
Capital Ships5 500,000 500,000 175,000 300,000 175,000
Cruisers,
FLs4 De-
stroyers /f50,000 450,000 150,000 270,000 150,000
Submarines 90,000 90,000 30,000 54,000 30,000
Final Tonnage Agreements of the Washington Naval Conference
of 1922. 5
G.B. U.S. France Japan Italy
Capital Ship
Tonnage Limits 525,000 525,000 175,000 315,000 175,000
Numbers of Capi-
tal Ship Re-
tained ZZ 18 10 10 10
Number of Capital
Ships Scrapped 20 15 — 10
built built built






Tonnage Limits 135,000 135,000 60,000 81,000 60,000
Other Surface
Combatant
Ships No tonnage ceilings, but no ship may be more
than 10,000 tons.
Submarines No tonnage ceilings or size limits on individual
vessels.
The U.S., G.B., and Japan scrapped, in numbers, more
hulls than they retained, while France and Italy did
not need to scrap any.
.
U.S. Congress, Senate, Conference on the Limitation of
Armament, Document No. 126, pp. 802-803.
^U.S. Congress, Senate, Conference on the Limitation of
Armament . Document No. 126, p. 804.
5
"1J.S. Congress, Senate, Conference on the Limitation of
Armament, Document No. 126, pp. 803-810; and Stephen Roskill,
Naval Policy Between the Wars , Collins, London, 1968, p. 331.
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Fleet Tonnage Tables—London Naval Treaty 1950
U.S. G.B. Japan
Capital 31 Dec 1929 31 Dec 1929 31 Dec 1929
Ships 532, if00 608,650 292, if00
* 31 Dec 1936 * 31 Dec 1936 * 31 Dec 1936
if62, if00 if74, 750 266,070
Aircraft 31 Dec 1929 31 Dec 1929 31 Dec 1929
Carriers 76,286 115,350 68,870
* 31 Dec 1936 * 31 Dec 1936 * 31 Dec 1936
135,000 135,000 81,000
Cruisers 31 Dec 1929 31 Dec 1929 31 Dec 1929
Over 6.1" 130,000 186,226 108,400
Guns * 31 Dec 1936 * 31 Dec 1936 * 31 Dec 1936
150,000 146,800 108,lf00
Cruisers 31 Dec 1929 31 Dec 1929 31 Dec 1929
Under 70,500 177,685 98,415
6.1" Guns *31 Dec 1936 * 31 Dec 1936 * 31 Dec 1936
189,000 192,200 100,450
Destroyers 31 Dec 1929 31 Dec 1929 31 Dec 1929
290,304 184,371 ^^^75
* 31 Dec 1936 * 31 Dec 1936 * 31 Dec 1936
150,000 150,000 105,500
Submarines 31 Dec 1929 31 Dec 1929 31 Dec 1929
80,980 60,284 77>&k2
* 31 Dec 1936 * 31 Dec 1936 * 31 Dec 1936
52,700 52,700 52,700
TOTALS 1,1 80, if70 1,332,566 768.502
* 1,139,100 * 1,151,450 * 71if,120
The U.S. agreed to tonnage reductions in capital ships, de-
stroyers, and submarines. She received increases in tonnage
for aircraft carriers and two varieties of cruisers.
Great Britain agreed to reductions of tonnage in capital ships,
large (or heavy) cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. She
From Tables II and V, Department of State, London Naval
Conference—Digest of the London Naval Treaty of 1930 with
Fleet Tonnage Tables . Conference Series No. k. U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1930, pp. 11-12.
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gained tonnage limits in aircraft carriers and smaller (or
light) cruisers.
Japan agreed to tonnage reductions in capital ships, destroyers,
and submarines, while receiving increases in tonnage for
carriers and small (or light) cruisers.
All three states agreed to the same submarine tonnages by 1936.
Limitation of Naval Armament Made in London. 1 936 '
Category of Ship
1 . Capital ship more than
10,000 tons or with a gun
calibre exceeding 8".
2. Capital ships up to 8,000
tons with a gun calibre
exceeding 8".
3. Aircraft carriers
k. Light surface vessels of
100 to 10,000 tons with no
guns exceeding 8" in cali-
bre.
a. Vessels with guns ex-
ceeding 6.1".
b. Vessels above 3>QO0
tons with no guns
more than 6.1".
c. Vessels less than
3,000 tons with no
guns more than 6.1".
Limitation
Max. 35 , 000 tons each. Max.
gun calibre of lit". None of
less than 17,500 tons to be
built before 1943. None with
a gun calibre of less than 10"
to be built before 1943.
None to be built before January
1943.
Max. 23,000 tons each. None
with a gun calibre exceeding
6.1". None with more than 10
guns exceeding 5.25" in calibre.
None to be built before January
19^3.
None exceeding 8,000 tons to be
built before January 1943.
May be built with prior notifica-
tion to other signatories
'U.S. Congress. Senate, Subcommittee on Disarmament, Dis-
armament and Security. A Collection of Documents 1919-19*35
.
84th Congress, 2nd Session, U.S. Government Printing Office,





6. Minor war vessels of 100 to
2,000 tons with no guns ex-
ceeding 6,1" in calibre, no
torpedo launchers, no speed
greater than 20 knots.
7. Auxiliary Vessels exceeding
100 tons not used as fight-
ing ships with no guns ex-
ceeding 6.1" in calibre, not
more than 8 guns exceeding
3" in calibre, no armor
plate, no speed greater than
28 knots, no adaptability
for operating aircraft at
sea.
Limitation
Max. 2,000 tons each. Max.
gun calibre 5«1".
Exchange of lists with their
characteristics and vital sta-
tistics detailed.





-less than 100 No limitations.

APPENDIX II
NATIONAL CLAIMS TO MARITIME JURISDICTION BY
STATES IN THE NATO AREA OF INTEREST,
State
1
Territorial Continental Exclusive Other
Sea Shelf Fishing Jurisdiction
Albania 12 12
Algeria 12 12
Belgium 3 12 3
Bulgaria 12 12
Canada 12 12 100
Cuba 3 3 12
Cyprus 12 12 12
Denmark 3 12 12
Egypt 12 200 meters 12 18
Finland k k 12
France 12 12 6
German D.:R. 3 3 3






Ireland 3 12 3
Israel 6 6 6
Italy 6 200 meters 12 12
Lebanon 6 6
Libya 12
Malta 6 12 12
Morocco 12 70 20
Netherlands 3 12 12
Norway k to limits of
exploitability 12 10
Poland 6 12 12






Office of the Geographer.
Limits in the Seas No. 3o-
Bureau of
—National
Claims to :tion. Department of State, Washington,





Soviet Union 12 200 meters 12
Spain 6 12 12
Sweden k 12 k
Syria 12 200 meters 12 18
Tunisia 12 12
Turkey 12 12 6
United Kingdom 3 6 3
United States 3 12 200
Yugoslavia 10 200 meters 10 10
These are the claimed limits in nautical miles, unless other-
wise indicated, of the listed states. Some have complicated
treaty arrangements with other states, while others have no
specific mileage claims, such as a continental shelf to the
limits of exploitability. Other jurisdictions include customs,
security, neutrality, sanitary, pollution, baselines, and
criminal and civil jurisdiction.
LATIN AMERICAN CLAIMS TO MARITIME JURISDICTION
State
Territorial Continental Exclusive Other







200 n.m. to limits of 200 n.m.
exploitabi-
lity
200 n.m. to limits of 200 n.m
exploitabi-
lity



















El Salvador 200 n.m. 200 n.m. 200 n.m.
Guatemala 12 n.m. to edge of 12 n.m.
the continen-
tal shelf
Honduras 12-200 n.m to limits of
exploitabi-
lity
Mexico 12 n.m. to edge of 12 n.m.
the continen-
tal shelf
Nicaragua to a depth of 200 n.m.
200 meters
Panama 200 n.m. 200 n.m. 200 n.m.
Peru 200 n.m. 200 n.m. 200 n.m.
Uruguay 200 n.m. to limits 12 n.m. 200 n.m.
of exploit-
ability







The continental margin is "that portion of the ocean ad-
jacent to the continent and separating is from the deep sea.
The continental margin includes the continental shelf, the con-
tinental slope, and continental rise."
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